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INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 
 
1. Concept of Potential Output : Any meaningful analysis of cyclical developments, of 
medium term growth prospects or of the stance of fiscal and monetary policies are all 
predicated on either an implicit or explicit assumption concerning the rate of potential output 
growth.  Such pervasive usage in the policy arena is hardly surprising since potential output 
constitutes the best composite  indicator of the aggregate supply side capacity of an economy 
and of its scope for sustainable, non-inflationary, growth.   
 
Given the importance of the concept, the measurement of potential output is the subject of 
contentious and sustained research interest.  Of course since it is an unobserved variable, 
before starting to measure it one must firstly clarify exactly what one means by the concept.  
It signifies different things to different people, especially when discussed over various time 
horizons, with the concept appreciated differently when placed in a short, medium or long 
term perspective : 
 
•  In the short run (i.e. less than one year), the physical productive capacity of an economy 
may be regarded as being quasi fixed and its comparison with the effective / actual output 
developments (i.e. in output gap analysis) shows by how much total demand can develop 
during that short period without inducing supply constraints and inflationary pressures.  
•  In the medium term (i.e. over the next five years), the expansion of domestic demand 
when it is supported by a strong upturn in the amount of productive investment may 
endogenously generate the productive output capacity needed for its own support. The 
latter is all the more likely to occur when profitability is high and either increased or 
supported by an adequate wage evolution with respect to labour productivity. 
•  Finally, in the long run (i.e. 10 years and beyond) the notion of full employment potential 
output is linked more to the future evolution of technical progress (or total factor 
productivity) and to the likely growth rate of labour potential.  For the latter, the EU is 
paradoxically in a much better position than the US, thanks to its present very low 
employment rate (with respect to the population of working age) and its very high rates of 
structural and cyclical unemployment (as a proportion of the active population).  
These medium and long run considerations should always be kept in mind when discussing 
potential output since the latter is often seen in an excessively static manner in some policy 
making fora, where the growth of capacity is often presented as invariant not only in the short 
run (where such an assumption is warranted) but also over the medium term as if the 
projection of fixed investment had no impact on productive capacity.  
 
2. Measuring Potential Growth for Use as an Operational Surveillance Tool : 
Notwithstanding the importance of the concept, and the consequent desire for clarity, the 
measurement of potential growth is far from straightforward and, being unobservable, can 
only be derived from either a purely statistical approach or from a full econometric analysis.  
It is clear however that conducting either type of analysis requires a number of arbitrary 
choices, either at the level of parameters (in statistical methods) or in the theoretical approach 
and choice of specifications, data and techniques of estimation (in econometric work).   
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In other words, all the available methods have "pros" and "cons" and none can unequivocally 
be declared better than the alternatives in all cases.  Thus, what matters is to have a method 
adapted to the problem under analysis, with well defined limits and, in international 
comparisons, one that deals identically with all countries. This was the approach which was 
adopted in our earlier 2002 paper on this topic
1 where it was stated clearly that the objective 
was to produce an economics based, production function, method which could be used for 
operational EU policy surveillance purposes. 
 
The preference for an economic, as opposed to a statistical, approach was driven by a number 
of considerations.  For example, with an economics based method, one gains the possibility of 
examining the underlying economic factors which are driving any observed changes in the 
potential output indicator and consequently the opportunity of establishing a meaningful link 
between policy reform measures with actual outcomes.  An additional advantage of using an 
economic estimation method is that it is capable of highlighting the close relationship 
between the potential output and NAIRU concepts, given that the production function (PF) 
approach requires estimates to be provided of "normal" or equilibrium rates of 
unemployment.  At a wider level, another advantage is the possibility of making forecasts, or 
at least building scenarios, of possible future growth prospects by making explicit 
assumptions on the future evolution of demographic, institutional and technological trends.   
 
However, whilst economic estimation would appear to overcome, at least partially, many of 
the concerns in terms of appraising policy effectiveness which are linked to statistical 
approaches, on the negative side difficulties clearly emerge with regard to achieving a 
consensus amongst policy makers on the modelling and estimation methods to be employed.  
Policy makers are fully aware of these latter trade-offs which make any decision making 
process, regarding the specific details of the PF approach to calculating potential output, a 
difficult one to undertake in practice.  The PF estimates must therefore be assessed in the light 
of these predetermined requirements and respect the difficult trade-offs involved.   
 
Since the primary use of the methodology is as an operational surveillance tool in the 
assessment of the annual stability / convergence programmes of the EU’s Member States, it is 
important that the agreed methodology respects a number of basic principles given the 
politically sensitive nature of the dossier.  The 2002 version of the present paper stressed that 
the main requirements for the PF approach were : 
 
•  Firstly, it had to be a simple and fully transparent methodology where the key inputs 
and outputs are clearly delineated; 
 
•  Secondly, equal treatment for all of the EU’s Member States needed to be assured; and  
 
•  Finally, given that the estimates are used for budgetary surveillance purposes, it was 
felt important to take a prudent view regarding the assessment of the past and future 
evolution of potential growth in the EU.  
 
This third requirement of prudence was in fact one of the explicit demands made when policy 
makers called for a new method to be developed for assessing structural budget balances since 
it was felt that past surveillance exercises had on a number of occasions produced an 
 
1 ECFIN Economic Paper No. 176 “Production function approach to calculating potential growth and output gaps : Estimates for the EU 
Member States and the US”   
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excessively optimistic picture of the degree of budgetary improvement in the upswing phase 
of previous cycles.  This optimism was linked to some extent with the cyclicality of the trend 
GDP estimates which had been calculated using the HP filter statistical method and via which 
the estimates of structural budget balances had been generated.  Consequently one of the key 
objectives of replacing the earlier HP methodology was to reduce the degree of cyclicality of 
the trend growth estimates to an absolute minimum in order to avoid the mistakes of the past.  
As made clear in the 2002 paper, this bias towards a prudent or cautious view is evident in all 
aspects of the PF estimation process, including in the elaboration of the medium-term 
extension to the method.   
 
3. Production Function as “Reference” Method : In terms of the application of the 
methodology, the July 2002 ECOFIN Council meeting endorsed the use of the production 
function (PF) approach as the reference method for the calculation of output gaps when 
assessing the stability and convergence programmes for a large number of the EU’s Member 
States. The details of this approach were described in the earlier 2002 paper. Following the 
ECOFIN decision, the Commission services were given the operational responsibility for the 
application of this methodology to the individual Member States, starting with its Autumn 
2002 forecasting exercise.  
 
Reflecting the constantly evolving nature of work in this area, the overall PF methodology 
was further refined following a two stage work programme, carried out by the EPC’s Output 
Gaps Working Group (OGWG) over the period May 2003 to June 2005.  
 
Stage 1 of the work programme involved the following issues :  
 
•  firstly, suggested improvements to the PF approach based on the experiences of the 
Member States with the application of the methodology since the Autumn 2002 
forecasts, including some carryover work from the pre-July 2002 ECOFIN Council 
decision;  
 
•  secondly, sorting out a number of country-specific problems which had delayed the 
use of the PF method in these respective countries; and 
 
•  thirdly, extending the method to the new Member States.  
 
This stage 1 work was largely completed by the OGWG at the start of 2004, with the formal 
EPC report on stage 1 endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 11 May 2004. 
 
The second stage of the EPC’s work programme was completed in June 2005, with agreement 
being reached at the 27 June EPC meeting on firstly, the use of new and updated budgetary 
elasticities for the 25 countries; secondly, on the practical issues needed to resolve the country 
specific issues; and finally, on a number of important modifications to the methodology 
(including the agreement to introduce hours worked and to use national accounts based 
employment data). Since all of the respective changes agreed during stage 2 have now been 
successfully introduced into the PF approach during the Commission services Autumn 2005 
forecasts, it is now considered opportune to provide an update of the 2002 paper
2. 
                                                 
2 The OGWG’s two-stage work programme (May 2003-June 2005) resolved virtually all of the issues which had 
been raised by the different national delegates regarding the PF framework. The only real exception to this latter  
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4. Structure of Paper : In terms of content, the paper is laid out as follows. Section  1 
provides an overview of the PF methodology and of the modifications agreed to by the EPC / 
ECOFIN Council over the 2003-2005 period. Sections 2 and 3 then go on to provide a more 
detailed description of these latter modifications, with section 2 focussing on the NAIRU 
method and section 3 on the estimation of total factor productivity. In the concluding remarks 
section of the paper, the operating principles which had been adhered to in establishing the 
method in 2002 and which have inspired the modifications laid out in the present update are 
reiterated.  Supplementary information is provided in annexes 1-6. 
 
 
conclusion was the failure of the Group to agree on an approach which would have restricted the PF method to 
the estimation of potential growth rate developments in the business sector (as opposed to its estimation for the 
economy as a whole which is now the case). This failure was essentially due to an absence of comparable public 
sector employment data for the individual Member States. Since these statistical problems are unlikely to be 
resolved over the next 2-3 years, it is widely accepted that additional changes to the methodology over this 
period will be relatively limited. However, while the official version of the method may not change dramatically, 
given the amount of policy interest in this approach and the need for the Commission services to keep up-to-date 
with developments in the literature, work will of course continue into the effects of using alternative 
specifications in the method; to experimenting with new methodologies and to exploiting new data sources. This 
ongoing research work will be essential in building a consensus amongst the Member States of the need / 
benefits of possible changes to the approach over the longer run, based on the practical experience garnered from 
using the methodology in the annual budgetary surveillance exercises. In other words, the methodology 
described in the present paper should not be seen in purely static terms. 
  
SECTION 1  :  CALCULATING POTENTIAL GROWTH RATES USING A PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
APPROACH : OVERVIEW OF KEY FEATURES / RECENT MODIFICATIONS   
 
1.1 Overview of Approach 
 
Instead of making statistical assumptions on the time series properties of trends and their 
correlation with the cycle, the production function approach makes assumptions based on 
economic theory. This latter approach focusses on the supply potential of an economy and has 
the advantage of giving a more direct link to economic theory but the disadvantage, as 
explained earlier, is that it requires assumptions on the functional form of the production 
technology, returns to scale, trend technical progress (TFP) and the representative utilisation 
of production factors.  As shown in the diagram below, with a production function, potential 
GDP can be represented by a combination of factor inputs, multiplied with the technological 
level or total factor productivity (TFP).  The parameters of the production function essentially 
determine the output elasticities of the individual inputs. With the Cobb-Douglas 
specification, it is necessary to estimate the trend components of the individual production 
factors, except capital.  Since the capital stock is not detrended, estimating potential output 
amounts therefore to removing the cyclical component from both labour and TFP.   
Capi t al
Stock
W orking A ge P opulation
Labour Force
Labour Potential Trend TFP
MEASURI NG POTENTI AL
OUTPUT USI NG A PRODUCTI ON FUNCTI ON APPROACH





















Potential Labour Suppl y
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COBB-DOUGLAS  PRODUCTION  FUNCTION
3 : In more formal terms, with a production 
function, GDP (Y) is represented by a combination of factor inputs - labour (L) and the 
capital stock (K), corrected for the degree of excess capacity (U ) and adjusted for the 
level of efficiency ( ).  In many empirical applications, including the Quest II model, a 
Cobb Douglas specification is chosen for the functional form. This greatly simplifies 
estimation and exposition.  Thus potential GDP is given by: 
K L U ,
E E , K L
 
(1)    TFP K L KE U E L U Y K K L L * ) ( ) (
1 1 α α α α − − = =
 
where total factor productivity (TFP), as conventionally defined, is set equal to : 
 
(2)         ) )( (
1 1 α α α α − − = K L K L U U E E TFP
 
which summarises both the degree of utilisation of factor inputs as well as their technological 
level.  Factor inputs are measured in physical units.  An ideal physical measure for labour is 
hours worked which we use as our labour input. For capital we use a comprehensive measure 
which includes spending on structures and equipment by both the private and government 
sectors.  
 
Various assumptions enter this specification of the production function, the most important 
ones are the assumption of constant returns to scale and a factor price elasticity which is equal 
to one.  The main advantage of these assumptions is simplicity. However these assumptions 
seem broadly consistent with empirical evidence at the macro level. The unit elasticity 
assumption is consistent with the relative constancy of nominal factor shares.  Also, there is 
little empirical evidence of substantial increasing/decreasing returns to scale (see, e.g. 
Burnside et al. for econometric evidence).   
The output elasticities of labour and capital are represented by α  and  ) 1 ( α −  respectively. 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, these elasticities 
can be estimated from the wage share. The same Cobb-Douglas specification is assumed for 
all countries, with the mean wage share for the EU15 over the period 1960-2003 being used 
as the estimate for the output elasticity of labour, which gives a value of .63 for α  for all 
Member States and, by definition, .37 for the output elasticity of capital.  While the output 
                                                 
3 CHOICE OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY – WHY USE COBB-DOUGLAS ?  One of the big advantages of using Cobb-Douglas is undoubtedly 
its simplicity, in that it is easy to make sense out of the coefficients imposed. The Cobb Douglas assumption greatly simplifies estimation of 
output elasticities, conditional on an assumption on returns to scale. With a high average degree of competition in the goods market, the 
output elasticities can be equated to their respective factor shares. Thus, there is only one parameter to estimate. While a large variety of 
views on alternative specifications to the Cobb-Douglas approach of constant factor shares are available, one needs to be aware of the 
implications associated with these alternatives.  For example, if one chooses to adopt an elasticity of less than 1, one is left with the problem 
of explaining why wage shares have fallen recently.  If one goes for the alternative assumption of using an elasticity of greater than 1, then 
the lack of econometric evidence to support using such a function needs to be taken into account.  Consequently, given the difficulties 
associated with the alternatives, the Cobb-Douglas assumption of unity appears to be a reasonable compromise.  In addition, of course, if one 
were to use a CES function with an elasticity of 0.8 or 1.2 the results would not differ very strongly from Cobb-Douglas.  Finally, the 
aggregation problem associated with having a mixture of low and high skilled workers in the workforce would also appear to lend support to 
the Cobb-Douglas view.  In this regard, if you aggregate over both sets of workers one would come close to Cobb-Douglas, with low skilled 
workers having a high elasticity of substitution (EoS) with capital (EoS > 1) balancing out the low EoS associated with high skilled workers 
(EoS < 1).  High skilled workers have generally a low EoS since such workers are regarded as being more complementary to K.  This view 
regarding the distinction between low and high skilled workers is supported by a paper by Krussell et al.  published in Econometrica in 
September 2000.  
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elasticity for labour may deviate somewhat from the imposed mean coefficient in the case of 
individual Member States, such differences should not seriously bias the potential output 
results.  
To summarise therefore, in moving from actual to potential output it is necessary to define 
clearly what one means by potential factor use and by the trend (i.e. normal) level of 
efficiency of factor inputs.   
 
•  CAPITAL  : With respect to capital this task of defining potential factor use is 
straightforward since the maximum potential output contribution of capital is given by the 
full utilisation of the existing capital stock in an economy. Since the capital stock is an 
indicator of overall capacity there is no justification to smooth this series in the production 
function approach. In addition, the unsmoothed series is relatively stable for the EU and 
the US since although investment is very volatile the contribution of capital to growth is 
quite constant since net investment in any given year is only a tiny fraction of the capital 
stock figures.  In  terms of the measurement of the capital stock, the perpetual inventory 




4 : The definition of the maximum potential output contribution of labour input is 
more involved since it is more difficult to assess the "normal" degree of utilisation of this 
factor of production.  Labour input is defined in terms of hours. Determining the trend of 
labour input involves several steps. In defining the trend input we start from a maximum 
possible level, namely the population of working age. We obtain the trend labour force by 
mechanically detrending (using an HP filter) the participation rate. In a next step we 
calculate trend un/employment to be consistent with stable, non accelerating, (wage) 
inflation (NAWRU). Finally we obtain trend hours worked (potential labour supply) by 
multiplying trend employment with the trend of average hours worked. One of the big 
advantages of this approach is that it generates a potential employment series which is 
relatively stable whilst at the same time also providing for year-to-year changes to the 
series to be closely linked to long run demographic and labour market developments in 
areas such as the working age population, trend participation rates and structural 
unemployment.  
 
•  TREND EFFICIENCY : Within the production function framework, potential output refers 
to the level of output which can be produced with a "normal" level of efficiency of factor 
inputs, with this trend efficiency level being measured as the HP filtered Solow Residual. 
 
Normalising the full utilisation of factor inputs as one, potential output can be represented as 
follows : 
 
(3)  . 
α α − =
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4 Since Eurostat and the OECD have agreed that the national accounts (as opposed to the labour force survey) is the preferred source for 
labour input data, the production function approach now uses the national accounts for the labour input variables i.e. for hours worked and 
employment.  
1.2  Medium-Term Extension  
 
While the production function derived potential output estimates provide a good picture of the 
present output capacity of economies, they should not however be seen as forecasts of 
medium-term sustainable rates of growth but more as an indication of likely developments if 
past trends were to persist in the future.  If, for example, a country's potential growth rate is 
3% in 2005, it can only be sustained at that rate in future years if none of the underlying 
driving forces change.  Any longer term assessment would need therefore to be based on a 
careful evaluation of the likelihood that present rates of growth for labour potential, 
productive capacity and TFP will persist over the time horizon to be analysed. In this context, 
annex 5, amongst other things, gives the results which emerge if one carried out a simple 
technical extrapolation for the three years following the end of the Commission services, 
Autumn 2005, forecasts (i.e. for the years 2008-2010). It is important to stress that this 
technical extension is in no way a forecast for these years, it is simply an attempt to illustrate 
what would happen if the trends of recent years were to continue on, using established and 
transparent ARIMA procedures.   
 
It is in this context that the illustrative estimates for the years 2008-2010 shown in Annex 5 
should be assessed, with the potential growth rates for those years being calculated using the 
following key inputs : 
 
•  1. TREND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TFP) : Trend TFP is modelled as the HP 
filtered Solow Residual. TFP can be calculated until the end of the short term forecast 
horizon, using the forecasts for GDP, labour input and the capital stock. From 2008 
until 2010 a TFP forecast is generated with the use of a stochastic model, where 
current TFP is explained by a parsimonious ARIMA model. For most countries, TFP 
growth is explained by a random walk with drift specification. A further 3 years are 
added at the end of the series to limit the end point bias problem in 2010. The HP 
trend is then calculated on the whole series up to 2013.  
 
•  2. KALMAN FILTER NAIRU’S : The trend specification chosen for the NAIRU implies 
that the best prediction for the change in the NAIRU in future periods is the current 
estimate of the intercept. This basically implies that the slope of the NAIRU in 2007 
should be used for the projection until 2010. Such a specification seems problematic 
for longer-term projections since it will eventually violate economic constraints (such 
as non-negativity of the NAIRU, for example). An alternative specification which is 
more consistent with the common notion of the NAIRU as a stable long run level of 
the unemployment rate would be a random walk without drift. This specification 
would imply a flat extrapolation of the last NAIRU value. Though this specification 
does not work well in estimation for European data where persistent trend changes of 
the unemployment rate can be observed, it may be a more plausible specification for 
the projections. The projections in practice constitute a compromise between these two 
concepts, with the NAIRU estimated according to the following rule: 
 
) ( * 5 . 1 1 − + − + = t t t t NAIRU NAIRU NAIRU NAIRU  
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In forecasting the NAIRU we allow 50% of the most recent decline. This implies that 
the NAIRU is practically stable in 2010, because after 3 years the change in the 
NAIRU only amounts to 12.5% of the decline in 2007. 
 
•  3. POPULATION OF WORKING AGE : In terms of a projection for the population of 
working age for the three years 2008-2010, since Eurostat periodically produce long 
range population projections for all of the EU’s Member States, it was decided that the 
most recent (i.e. 2005) Eurostat projections should be used for the extension to 2010. 
 
•  4. PARTICIPATION RATE CHANGES : While it would be more appropriate to split the 
overall participation rate into its male and female components, investigations into the 
feasibility of doing so suggested, at this stage at least, that without an improvement in 
data availability that this breakdown would not provide a significant degree of 
additional information over and above that provided by the total participation rate.  
The most significant problem was in terms of the timeliness of the data and the short 
sample length for the necessary series.  Due to these data constraints it was decided to 
continue to work with the total participation rate series.  On the basis of the forecasts 
by ECFIN’s desk officers for the labour force and the population of working age for 
the individual countries, the implied total participation rate up to the end of the 
forecasting period (i.e. 2007) is produced and this latter series is extended to 2010 on 
the basis of simple autoregressive projections with an estimated time trend. A further 3 
years are added at the end of the series to limit the end point bias problem in 2010. 
The HP trend is then calculated on the whole series up to 2013. 
 
•  5. AVERAGE HOURS WORKED : Labour input in the method is now decomposed into 
both the number of employees and the average hours worked per employee. The hours 
worked series is smoothed using an ARIMA process. The new approach provides a 
more meaningful measure for the rate of technical progress in the different countries 
since the TFP trend is now corrected for the trend in hours worked. In the past, TFP 
was biased downwards due to the secular decline in the average hours worked per 
employee. While the introduction of hours worked will in general not alter the overall 
growth rate of potential output for the Member States, it will however affect how 
potential growth is attributed to the various factors of production, especially labour 
and TFP (with TFP in general being boosted and with labour being correspondingly 
reduced).  
 
•  6. INVESTMENT TO (POTENTIAL) GDP RATIO : Since the purpose of the exercise is to 
get an estimate for potential output in 2010, the investment to potential GDP series is 
used as an exogenous variable. An AR process allowing for a constant and a time 
trend is specified and estimated until 2007. Notice, this makes investment endogenous. 
For a constant investment to GDP ratio, investment responds to potential output with 




Technical Specification of the Model Used  
 
The model used can be summarised as follows: 
 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES  
•  POPW - (Population of Working Age)  
•  PARTS - (Smoothed Participation Rate) 
•  NAIRU - (Structural Unemployment)  
•  IYPOT - (Investment to Potential GDP Ratio) 
•  SRHP - (HP Filtered Solow Residual) 
•  HOURST – (Trend, average hours worked) 
 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
•  LP - (Potential Employment) 
•  I - (Investment) 
•  K - (Capital Stock) 
•  YPOT -(Potential Output) 
 
 
1. POTENTIAL LABOUR INPUT 
 
HOURST NAIRU PARTS POPW LP * )) 1 ( * * ( − =  
 
 
2. INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL 
 
YPOT IYPOT I * =  
 




3. POTENTIAL OUTPUT 
 
SRHP K LP YPOT
35 . 65 . =  
 
 
4. OUTPUT GAP 
 
) 1 / ( − = YPOT Y YGAP  
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5 The depreciation rate is assumed to remain constant over the projection period.   
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1.3 : Summary of Recent Modifications (2003-2005) 
 
Following the decisions taken at both the May 2004 ECOFIN Council and the June 2005 EPC 
meetings, the most important changes to note regarding the operation of the PF methodology 
are as follows  :  
 
•  PF methodology is now applicable to all 15 of the “old” Member States  : 
Following the resolution of the outstanding country specific issues pertaining to 
Germany, Austria and Spain, all of the 15 countries now accept the use of the PF 
approach as the reference method for the assessment of the stability and convergence 
programmes. The HP filter approach will only be used as a “back-up” method and 
only for a short (unfortunately still to be defined) transition period.  
 
•  A modified PF methodology has been agreed which is applicable to all 10 of the 
”New” Member States - in parallel with the HP filter approach : Due essentially to 
a number of serious statistical problems associated with the availability of only short 
time series for the new Member States, a modified PF framework had to be developed 
for these countries. A common starting date of 1995 was imposed for all 10 countries 
since too many transitional issues were biasing the pre-1995 data. The main 
modifications to the methodology, relative to that which applies to the EU15 
countries, include firstly, a simpler NAIRU methodology based on wage elasticities (it 
was not possible to use the more sophisticated Kalman Filter based approach applied 
to the “old” Member States); secondly, trend TFP is estimated using a moving average 
based, stochastic trend, approach (as opposed to the random walk model used for the 
EU15 countries); and finally, the capital stock is estimated using a capital/output ratio 
which is fixed in the base year of 1995.  
 
•  Improvement of NAWRU estimates : Following requests from a number of 
delegates in the OGWG, additional work was undertaken in 2004 firstly to address the 
issue of whether it was appropriate to constrain the unemployment gap to have a mean 
of zero over the sample period; secondly, to better capture the specificity of the 
European labour market and thirdly, to help desk officers and the Member States to 
more easily interpret changes in the NAWRU / NAIRU estimates. In more concrete 
terms, it was agreed to remove the zero sample mean restriction; to include the wage 
share in the NAWRU estimation model as an additional explanatory variable; and to 
provide additional graphs giving a more intuitive understanding of the basic 
determinants of the NAWRU calculations. The overall NAWRU estimation 
methodology was discussed at the 8 November 2004 meeting of the OGWG, with all 
of the country delegates in broad agreement with the approach described in the present 
paper. 
   
•  Estimation of trend total factor productivity (TFP) : With the objective of reducing 
the mean reverting tendency of the trend TFP estimates, agreement was reached at the 
September 2004 OGWG regarding the use of a stochastic trend approach in the 
method in preference to the deterministic method which had been used previously
6. 
                                                 
6  It should be stressed that the present move from a deterministic to a stochastic I(1) process for the calculation of trend TFP in the EU15 
countries does not change the results for the vast majority of Member States in any meaningful way since mean reversion is a feature of  
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This change will have some additional positive benefits in terms of reducing the end 
of sample bias problem associated with using a HP filter to extract trend TFP, 
although the extent of the bias is limited since the method’s medium term extension is 
already explicitly extended by 3 years to overcome this problem. In addition, in the 
context of our ongoing research to isolate the best method for extracting the cyclicality 
from trend TFP, the OGWG discussed a paper which experimented with using 
capacity utilisation indicators. This approach was however rejected by the Group 
because of the spurious results for some Member States linked with an absence of 
cointegration between the regression variables.  
 
•  Introduction of hours worked : Total hours worked is the preferred measure of 
labour input in the national accounts but its measurement has proved challenging due 
to the growing importance of service activities, self-employed jobs and the emergence 
of a range of new, often irregular, working patterns. Due to these measurement issues, 
its use in the PF methodology was delayed until the Autumn 2005 forecasts since there 
was an absence of datasets of sufficient quality for a large number of the Member 
States. While the ESA95 data transmission programme provides for the provision of 
hours worked series, not all EU countries have, as yet, officially provided the data. 
Eurostat (in close co-operation with the OECD) have however constructed data for 
total hours worked for most of those countries which were not yet in a position to 
provide it.  Following the EPC agreement in June 2005 and the resolution of all the 
outstanding country specific data issues over the summer months, the hours worked 
series for the respective countries were successfully introduced in the Autumn 2005 
forecasting exercise. In addition, given the associated joint OECD / Eurostat decision 
to use the national accounts (as opposed to the labour force survey) as the preferred 
source of labour input data, the method has been modified to take both the 
employment and hours worked input variables from this single source. 
 
•  Amendment of standard tables and graphs and the setting up of the “Output 
Gaps” Circa website : The standard output tables and graphs have been adapted to 
reflect the revisions discussed above. These are now available for all 25 Member 
States, the Euro Area and the US. In addition, with the objective of improving the 
transparency of the approach and facilitating its widest possible use by all interested 
parties, a Circa website has been set up 
(http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/ecfin/outgaps/library). This website is publicly 
available on the internet (i.e. no password is required for access). As can be seen from 
the copy of the “Homepage” given overleaf, it is split into 3 main sections : 
 
o  1. Archives : At the moment this section contains the detailed potential growth 
and output gap results from the Commission services Autumn 2004 and Spring 
2005 forecasts.   
 
o  2. Current Autumn 2005 Forecast Exercise : this section contains a) all the 
detailed information / latest modifications to the approach (eg introduction of 
hours worked / programme changes plus data sources); b) the NAIRU Kalman 
filter programme plus detailed spreadsheets per country giving the NAIRU 
specifications used for each country as well as the data series and a set of 
                                                                                                                                                          
both models. However, a move from an I(1) to an I(2) stochastic model could produce significant changes in terms of trend TFP, with the 
trend for the most recent past playing a much greater role.  
NAIRU related graphs; c) the Rats programmes and data sets used to calculate 
the potential growth rates and output gaps for the 25 countries; d) detailed 
spreadsheets and sets of graphs per country. 
 
o  3. Method : This section of the website is reserved for documents which 
describe the method and its operation. At present it contains ECFIN Economic 
Paper No 176 “Production Function Approach to Calculating Potential Growth 
and Output Gaps” and a first draft of a “Reference Manual” which provides a 
“hands-on” guide for users of the method. Given the extensive changes which 
have occurred to the approach over the last number of years, the present 
Economic Paper will replace No. 176 in due course. 
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Box 1 : Real Time Output Gap Estimates 
(A production-function model for the output gap) 
 
In the Monthly Bulletin of February 2005, the ECB concluded that real-time output gap 
estimates tend to be of low reliability and that business cycle analysis should therefore be 
based on a wider set of indicators. However, the low reliability of output gap estimates is 
mainly due to the inaccuracy of GDP estimates/forecasts in real time; in other words, 
potential output is more reliably estimated than GDP itself.  
 
The assessment of the accuracy of output gap
7 
real time estimation (or forecasts) involves the 
comparison of two estimates: a real time 
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) Potential output                                                  
7 Note that historic (i.e. pre-2002) DG ECFIN estimates of the output gap refer to a concept of trend GDP and not potential GDP (used since 
the Autumn 2002 forecasts). Final (benchmark) estimates are based on potential GDP.  
estimate (or forecast) produced in the past and, as a benchmark, a final estimate (the most 
recently available one) that is supposed to be no longer revised in the future. The following 
equation immediately shows that part of the output gap error might be completely 
independent from the issue of model uncertainty (potential output) but simply accounted for 
by GDP revisions : 
 
Output gap error = ( Historic GDP - Final GDP ) + (Final potential GDP – Historic trend/potential GDP) 
 
An unbiased assessment of the output gap model performance requires disentangling errors 
due to potential output estimation and those due to GDP estimation. The following graph 
allows such a comparison of both components. The assessment based on these statistics 
contrasts with the ECB judgement. The potential output accuracy seems rather satisfactory 
with a RMSE (Root Mean Square Error) lower than 0.5 percentage points up to 6 months 
before the first release of national accounts data. Strikingly, its reliability is much better than 
the reliability of GDP forecasts even though forecasted data are necessarily used for potential 
output forecasts with a production function. 
 
Note to the graph: The RMSE summarises 
differences between final estimates and 
estimates/forecasts produced respectively x 
months (xm) after(+)/before(-) the first 
release of national accounts data. The same 
sample (1999-2003) is used for potential 
output and GDP estimates/forecasts. As with 
previous statistics, estimates published 
6 months after the first release of the national 
accounts (NA) are taken from the Autumn 
forecasts of the subsequent year. Forecasts 
published 6 months before the first release of 
the NA are taken from the Autumn forecasts 
of the current year and forecasts published 
24 months before the first release of the NA 
are taken from the Spring forecasts of the 
year before. 
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Estimates (first NA accounts release and
6 months later)
Forecasts (6 months to 2 years before
NA release)
 
The conclusion with respect to output gap model uncertainty is unambiguously that the model 
is robust enough to cancel out part of the data inaccuracy. Model uncertainty does not seem to 
be the main issue. Conversely, the bad quality (see graph) of GDP estimates for some 
countries and forecasts (in fact, for most countries) is the main source of the errors.  
 
Against this background, other indicators than the output gap might provide valuable 
information for business cycle analysis only if those indicators are not as much revised as 
GDP. 
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SECTION  2 : MODIFICATIONS TO THE NAIRU METHODOLOGY 
 
The so called “Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment” or NAIRU is widely 
accepted as an equilibrium concept of the labour market. The NAIRU is implicitly defined as 
the equilibrium point of a dynamic system of labour supply and labour demand equations. 
This equilibrium concept is linked to the Phillips curve debate which is crucial in monetary 
policy discussions. Since the famous Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) contributions in the 
late 1960s a consensus has emerged that with long run flexible prices and wages, there should 
be no long run trade off between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment. 
Consequently, wage and price dynamics must be formulated in terms of changes in wage and 
price inflation. With this formulation it is assured that the unemployment rate will always 
return to its equilibrium value, regardless of the level of the long run (wage) inflation rate. 
This is the rationale behind the NAIRU concept. 
 
Using a standard bargaining model of the labour market under the assumption of static or 
adaptive expectations (see annex 1 for a more detailed discussion of the model), a relationship 
between the change in nominal wage inflation and the unemployment gap can be derived 
which is controlled for by the change in the growth rate of labour productivity, the wage share 
and the terms of trade
8.  
 
The dynamics of the Phillips curve reflects the process in which wages adjust to economic 
conditions. Wage adjustment can be delayed because of limited information in the formation 
of expectations or because of institutional rigidities.  For modelling expectations we use a 
backward looking framework, in particular we distinguish between static and adaptive 
expectations. Different expectations schemes generate different dynamics of the Phillips curve 
and it turns out that we can capture the heterogeneity of the Phillips curve dynamics in the EU 
with these two schemes.  
 
 
Static (Moving average) vs Adaptive Expectations 
 
Static expectations is the simplest expectation scheme (see Blanchard and Katz (1999)). 
Under this scheme expectations for period t are simply equal to the realisation of the 
respective variable in period t-1. This scheme appears reasonable for quarterly data. Applying 
such a scheme to annual data requires a slight modification, namely a moving average scheme 
over current and lagged inflation. Such a scheme can also approximate an overlapping 
contracts specification. Concerning wage formation, the two crucial variables for which 
expectations must be formed are inflation (π ) and labour productivity (pr)   
 
1 ) 1 ( − − + = t t
e
t a a π π π          ( 1 a )  
 
1 ) 1 ( − Δ − + Δ = Δ t t
e
t pr c pr c pr .         ( 1 b )  
 
The degree of nominal rigidity is proportional to (1-a) while the degree of real rigidity is 
proportional to (1-c). Combining these expectations schemes with the structural model of the 
labour market yields the following Phillips curve : 
                                                 
  19










t v nairu u tot ws pr w + − − Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ ) ( ) (








t pr c pr c pr 1 1 ) 1 ( − − Δ − + Δ = Δ
     
   (2) 
 
where w is the log of nominal wages, pr is the log of labour productivity, ws is the log of the 
wage share, tot is the log of the terms of  trade, and u is the unemployment rate.  
 
The Phillips curve shows the short run response of nominal wages to labour productivity, 
labour demand shocks and the unemployment gap. The response to the unemployment gap is 
intuitively plausible. Whenever unemployment is above the NAIRU, nominal wage growth 
will decelerate and vice versa. However, this link is not perfect but is disturbed by observed 
and unobserved shocks to the wage rule and the labour demand equation. How nominal wage 
growth responds to productivity and labour demand shocks (here approximated by changes in 
the growth rate of the wage share) depends on a variety of factors. This is discussed in more 
detail in annex 1.   
 
The above specification applies to the majority of countries in the EU (see Table 2.1) and in 
particular to the euro area aggregate as well as to the US. However in some countries, in 
particular Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, the unemployment gap appears 
with a quasi first or second difference in the Phillips curve. This cannot be generated with the 
static expectations scheme, one needs to assume adaptive expectations of the following form 
 
       ( 3 a )  
 
.         ( 3 b )  
 
or a combination between adaptive and static expectations. Adaptive inflation and static 
productivity expectations yields 
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The following table shows the Kalman Filter estimates for the old member states, EU15 and 
the US. Due to data limitations this approach cannot be applied to the new member states. The 
approach adopted for the new member states is described in the next section. 
 
     
 Table 2.1:   Phillips Curve Estimates 
WS
2   PROD
2 Δ   TOT
2 Δ   ) 1 (
2 − Δ TOT Δ   U-GAP U-GAP(-1)  U-GAP(-2)  U Δ   R**2  Q-Statistic, 
p-value 
BE  0.48 (3.24)  0.30 (1.05)      -1.49 (2.97)  1.05 (2.08)      0.37  0.59 
DE  0.85 (6.78)    0.21 (1.57)  1.20 (UB)  -0.35 (2.03)        0.80  0.29 
DK  0.47 (3.31)    0.21 (1.56)  0.89 (8.35)    -0.59 (2.46)      0.64  0.62 
ES  0.44 (2.51)    0.76 (3.34)  0.41 (2.48)  -1.18 (3.76)  0.89 (2.72)      0.44  0.68 
FR  0.55 (1.92)  0.29 (1.86)  0.51 (3.32)  1.03 (6.54)  -1.54 (2.71)  2.49 (2.32)  -1.63 (2.41)    0.66  0.87 
GR  0.32  (1.80)      -0.64  (2.20)        0.25  0.75 
IR  0.04 (0.30)    0.53 (4.26)    -0.72 (1.54)        0.45  0.61 
IT  0.09 (0.35)    0.43 (1.04)    -2.46 (1.57)  5.23 (2.60)  -0.97 (1.59)    0.08  0.68 
LX  0.24  (2.22)      -1.30  (3.28)        0.31  0.04 
NL  0.59 (3.48)      0.79 (6.10)    -0.52 (1.67)      0.58  0.76 
OS  0.57 (3.75)    0.10 (0.71)  0.86 (7.54)  -1.28 (2.83)        0.68  0.30 
PO     0.09  (0.19)    -0.95  (2.98)        0.19  0.98 
SF  0.09 (0.38)    0.25 (1.21)    -0.35 (1.13)      -0.76 (2.29)  0.34  057 
SW  0.36 (2.01)      0.76 (6.43)  -0.63 (1.47)  0.55 (1.18)      0.58  0.82 
UK  0.40 (1.64)    1.21 (4.29)    -3.09 (3.51)  1.88 (2.23)      0.42  0.81 
EURO AREA (EU12) and the US 
EU12  0.82 (4.68)  0.03 (0.17)  0.31 (1.74)  0.99 (5.99)  -0.69 (3.10)        0.52  0.85 
US  0.76 (9.10)  0.26 (1.60)  1.04 (5.56)  0.79 (8.18)  -0.53 (4.02)        0.70  0.59 
Notes : Kalman filter estimates over the period 1965-2006. Estimation is performed with annual data, including the short term forecast of DG ECFIN. See C. Planas et al 
(2004) for a description of the program used. 
  
NAIRU Estimation for the new member states 
 
We essentially use the same theoretical specification as described earlier. However, we make 
some simplifying assumptions in order to facilitate the estimation.  
 
For calculating the NAIRU for the new Member States a methodology proposed by the 
OECD is used (i.e. the “Elmeskov” method
9). However, instead of applying the methodology 
to nominal wages we apply it to nominal unit labour costs. This gives a specification for the 
Phillips curve which is close to the model with static expectations 
 
w
t t t t t v nairu u pr w + − − Δ = Δ ) ( ) (
2 2 β      ( 6 a )  
 
w
t t t t t v nairu u pr w ulc + − = Δ − Δ = Δ ) ( ) (
2 2 2 β      (6b) 
 
This formulation indicates that unemployment is below the NAIRU whenever the growth rate 
of unit labour costs increases.  
 
The following table presents the estimates for β . 
 
Table 2.2 :   Estimates of  the Wage Elasticity Parameter 
  Cyprus *  Czech 
Republic 
Estonia  Hungary Latvia Lithuania  Malta  Poland**  Slovakia Slovenia 
W β   21.99 -2.47 2.75 7.75  7.19 5.01 10.5 -.83  5.33 2.28 
ULC β   75.10 0.93  1.51 1.86  3.65 2.66 10.9 0.04 
(2.00) 
3.12 -1.80 
*    For Cyprus, data on the acceleration of wage inflation is only available since 1997 in DG ECFIN’s AMECO database. Since the 
elasticity estimates are consequently unreliable, a HP Filter is used for calculating the NAIRU. 
**   The elasticity estimate for Poland is extremely small (and has the wrong sign for  W β ). In this case a value for the elasticity close to the 
average for the new Member States  was chosen  in order to obtain a reasonable path for the NAIRU. 
 
The parameter estimates show orders of magnitude close to those obtained for the EU15 
member states in the unit labour cost case. Therefore these parameters are used for calculating 
the NAIRU in the new Member States.  
 
The results for four countries merit special attention. These countries are the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In these countries we obtain a marked positive unemployment 
gap at the beginning of the data set which translates into negative output gaps. This 
phenomenon arises due to the fact that the deceleration in unit labour costs was very strong. 
 
 
Does the Phillips equation imply any long run restrictions for the unemployment gap ?  
 
With the unemployment gap entering the calculation of the output gap, the question arises 
whether an unemployment gap generated via a Phillips curve specification will have a zero 
mean property over the sample period. Here it is shown that the standard labour market model 
does not impose a specific restriction on the unemployment gap. This is revealed by 
calculating the unconditional mean of the unemployment gap from the Phillips curve. A mean 
of zero is a possible outcome, however, and would result if the economy under study evolved 
                                                 
9 J. Elmeskov (1993)  
around a constant growth rate of wage inflation, productivity and the terms of trade and if the 
trend of the wage share would have been constant over the sample. Though these conditions 
are closely fulfilled in most European economies, it is nevertheless likely that the sample 
might include a trend break in productivity growth or a permanent change in the inflation rate. 
Suppose, for example, the Phillips curve is estimated over a period of disinflation, i.e. with 
 and with stable trends in productivity , the wage share 
 and the terms of trade  . Retaining the assumption of a zero mean 
unemployment gap would mean that the Phillips curve would have to be estimated with a 
constant (const= ) in order to capture the mean disinflation that occurred over the 
sample.  However, estimating the Phillips curve with a constant term implies that in the 
absence of shocks and when the unemployment rate is equal to the NAIRU, the change in 
wage inflation is negative. This would be inconsistent with the NAIRU hypothesis. Therefore 
it was decided to remove the zero mean constraint on the unemployment gap which was 
initially imposed. In terms of the NAIRU estimates, removing the zero mean constraint results 
in a slight downward adjustment of the NAIRU for most countries in the range between 0.1 
and 0.4% points. In some countries, notably Italy, the NAIRU is adjusted upwards by 0.1% 
points.  
0 ) (
2 < Δ t w E 0 ) (
2 = Δ t pr E
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SECTION 3 : TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TFP) : CHOICE OF SPECIFICATION FOR 
CALCULATING MEDIUM-TERM TFP TRENDS  
 
 
In the framework of the production function approach for calculating potential growth, 
medium-term projections require estimates for key inputs, including trend total factor 
productivity (TFP). Trend TFP is modelled as the HP filtered Solow residual. The trend TFP 
projection in the past was based on TFP forecasts computed with a deterministic trend model. 
Several discussions in the output gap working group led to a revision of the model used for 
calculating the TFP trend (see annexes 3 and 4 for additional details). 
 
The output gap working group in October 2003 first discussed the methodology of the Dutch 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB Memorandum 51, 2002). The CPB method consists of 
estimating a moving average model for the growth rate of TFP. This specification predicts a 
constant growth rate after two years (related to the order of the MA term) and therefore gives 
a clear guidance for the HP trend. However the CPB method not only introduces a new way 
of dealing with the end point bias problem but it is also based on a stochastic trend 
specification. When using this method it was noticed that the stochastic trend model has 
consequences for the most recent TFP trend in some member states. Given the large implicit 
weight given to the last TFP observation (which is in fact a two-year ahead projection), the 
choice of this particular model might not be the most robust for GDP projections. 
 
When deciding on the appropriate specification for TFP, three types of issues are broadly 
involved :  
 
•  Firstly, is the trend of the economic series deterministic (correlated with time periods) 
or stochastic ?  
 
•  Secondly, what is the order of integration of the series, i.e. how many times should it 
be differenced in order for it to become stationary ?  
 
•  Thirdly, what is the best parsimonious ARIMA model specification for the series 
transformed in order to become stationary ?  
 
Some econometric tests (in particular unit root tests) provide some answers to these questions 
and might help to inform the choice of model specification for TFP. The note reproduced in 
annex 4 introduces econometric evidence based on standard available tests and evaluates 
empirically which of the two trend specifications is more consistent with the data. Only the 
main results are summarised in the subsequent paragraph and one should refer to the annex 
for detailed analyses. 
 
In the first step, the TFP series are checked for stationarity with panel unit root tests as well as 
standard augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on the individual series. It appears that the 
TFP series for all of the Member States are not stationary, irrespective of the inclusion of a 
time trend. An important conclusion is that a deterministic trend is in principle ruled out by 
panel unit root tests. Only TFP growth might be stationary. The tests are then applied a 
second time on the first difference of TFP. For a few Member States at least, tests suggest that 
TFP growth is stationary. However, it cannot be ruled out that for other Member States only 
the second difference of TFP is stationary (for individual series, unit root tests are not very  
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robust to the number of lags used and do not necessarily support clear-cut conclusions). The 
main result of this part of the analysis is that TFP series have a stochastic trend and not a 
deterministic trend. In addition, most seem I(1) - integrated of order 1. 
 
In the second step, the Box-Jenkins methodology is applied to determine parsimonious 
ARIMA models for the stationary series. The out-of-sample forecasting performance of the 
stochastic model is then compared to those of the deterministic trend model. 
 
Finally, an analysis is made of the consequences of moving to a stochastic trend model for the 
calculation of potential growth and output gaps country by country. The results suggest that 
the differences between the two specifications in terms of potential growth are small but not 
negligible, at least for some countries. For Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece and Finland we 
obtain higher potential growth rates, while for Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Sweden potential growth is slightly reduced. No significant changes occur 
for Denmark, France, Austria and the UK.  
 
Another interesting comparison can be made concerning the HP filter output gap difference 
between the deterministic and the stochastic trend specification. Since the HP output gap is 
based on a stochastic trend model one would a priori expect that the output gap calculations 
using the stochastic trend model would become more similar. This seems to be the case in 
general. The only exceptions are Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Finland. For all of the other 
countries the differences between the two gaps have narrowed or stayed the same.  
 
As a conclusion, it should be recalled that the choice of an I(1) specification is not neutral in 
terms of projections for the future. This specification implies that TFP growth reverts to its 
sample mean (which for many countries is higher than the TFP growth rates observed over 
recent years), whereas an I(2) specification, such as that suggested by the CPB, implies that 
the best forecast for future TFP growth is to use the last sample observation. Where 
econometric tests do not necessarily provide clear-cut conclusions on a country by country 





KEY  GUIDING  PRINCIPLES USED IN ESTABLISHING AND MODIFYING THE PRDOUCTION 
FUNCTION  METHODOLOGY  :  Since the PF method is the reference to be used by the 
Commission services for calculating structural budget balances it is clear that the pressure for 
changing particular aspects of the approach will continue to be intense over a medium to long 
term time horizon.  It is important in this respect that any changes to the methodology are 
assessed on the basis of some fundamental operating principles, with the following the most 
important ones to be retained : 
 
•  SIMPLICITY : while many academically more complex suggestions could be put forward 
for changing the present PF methodology, the simplicity of the approach, where the key 
inputs and outputs are clearly delineated, is something which should be retained in the 
future given the possible use of these figures in an operationally sensitive area such as 
structural budget balance calculations.  
 
•  TRANSPARENCY / EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL MEMBER STATES : This principle is 
closely linked with the first principle of simplicity, since individual Member States must 
be happy that any methodology which would be used for policy surveillance purposes is 
fully transparent and replicable as well as being as judgement free and automated as 
possible.  In addition it must be accepted that any changes to the methodology should 
only occur following an open and fair consultation process with all of the Member States.  
Furthermore, adjustments for individual country specificities should be kept to an 
absolute minimum in any future revisions, with equal treatment for all countries being a 
principle which should be assiduously respected.  
 
•  PRUDENCE : One of the guiding principles which was adhered to in drawing up the 
original and present versions of the PF method was the need to take a “prudent” view 
regarding changes to the methodology in terms of assessing the past and future evolution 
of potential growth in the EU.  In this regard the cyclicality of the estimates produced is a 
very serious issue, with the ideal PF method being one which produced a potential growth 
series which was less cyclical than the commonly used HP filter method, with output 
gaps growing quickly in the downswing and closing rapidly in the upswing. In this regard 
while it is accepted that at present the differences in terms of cyclicality between the PF 
and HP filter methods may be small, nevertheless reducing the cyclicality of the PF 
estimates to an absolute minimum should be actively striven for in any future changes to 
the method.  This cyclicality issue is particularly important in avoiding the generation of 
an excessively optimistic picture for potential growth, and by implication structural 
budget balance positions, in the upswing stage of the cycle.  Consequently any future 
changes to the estimation methodology must be biased towards taking a prudent view.   
 
FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA : While a lot of work has already been done in this area, it is 
clear that this is an ongoing research topic, with future research likely to be concentrated on 
the following themes : 
 
•  ongoing experimentation with new methodologies, most notably Kalman Filters, where 
consideration will be given to their use in areas other than for the NAIRU estimation;  
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•  looking again at the issue of the cyclicality of the overall methodology and   
experimenting, in this context, with model simulations to estimate the size of any pro-
cyclical estimation bias which may exist; 
 
•  and finally, a range of other issues will need to be looked at including, use of the capital 
services versus the perpetual inventory method in evaluating the capital component of 
potential growth; business sector potential growth versus total economy estimates; and 







AGHION,  P. AND P.  HOWITT (1998), "Endogenous Growth Theory", the MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
APEL, M. AND P. JANSSON (1999A), “A Theory-Consistent Approach for Estimating Potential 
Output and the NAIRU”, Economics letters 64. 
APEL, M. AND P. JANSSON (1999B), “System Estimates of Potential Output and the NAIRU”, 
Empirical Economics 24. 
BARRO, R. AND X. SALA-I-MARTIN (1995), "Economic Growth", McGraw-Hill. 
BASSANINI,  A.,  SCARPETTA,  S. AND I.  VISCO.  (2000), “Knowledge, Technology and 
Economic growth: Recent Evidence from OECD Countries”, OECD Working Paper No. 259. 
BANCA D'ITALIA (1999), "Indicators of Structural Budget Balances", Research Department, 
Public Finance Workshop. 
BAXTER  M. AND R.G.  KING  (1995), "Measuring business cycles: approximate band-pass 
filters for economic time series", NBER Working Paper, No. 5022. 
BEVERIDGE S. AND C.R. NELSON (1981), "A new approach to the decomposition of economic 
time series into permanent and transient components with particular attention to measurement 
of the business cycle", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 7. 
BLANCHARD O.J. (1990), “Suggestions for a new set of fiscal indicators", OECD Working 
Paper, No. 79. 
BLANCHARD  O.J. AND D.  QUAH  (1989), "The dynamic effect of aggregate demand and 
supply disturbances", American Economic Review, No. 79. 
BLANCHARD,  O. AND L.  F.  KATZ  (1999), “Wage Dynamics  : Reconciling Theory and 
Evidence”, American Economic Review 89, pp. 69-74. 
BURNSIDE, C., EICHENBAUM, M. AND S. REBELO (1995), “Capital Utilisation and Returns to 
Scale", in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Edited by B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg, 
MIT Press, pp 67-109. 
CANOVA F. (1999), "Does detrending matter for the determination of the reference cycle and 
the selection of turning points?", The Economic Journal, No. 109. 
CECCHETTI, S. (2000), "Early warning signs of the U.S. productivity pickup: Implications for 
Europe", Mimeo, Ohio State University, August 2000.  
CERRA, V. AND S.C. SAXENA (2000), "Alternative Methods of Estimating Potential Output 
and the Output Gap: An Application to Sweden", IMF Working Paper. 
CLAUS, I. (2000), "Is the output gap a useful indicator of inflation", Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, Discussion Paper Series.   
  29
DAVERI,  F.  (2000), "Is growth an information technology story in Europe too? IGIER 
Working Paper, September. 
DE MASI, P (1997), "IMF Estimates of Potential Output: Theory and Practice", Staff Studies 
for the World Economic Outlook, December. 
DENIS,C.,  MC  MORROW,  K. AND W.  RÖGER  (2002), "Production function approach to 
calculating potential growth and output gaps – estimates for the EU Member States and the 
US", Economic Papers 176, European Commission (Sept). 
 
DIEBOLD F. X. AND R. S. MARIANO (1995), "Comparing predictive accuracy", Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 13, 253-263, 3 (July). 
DOMAR, E. (1961), “On the measurement of technological change” Economic Journal, Vol. 
71, No.284. 
EASTERLY,  W. AND R.  LEVINE  (2000), "It’s not factor accumulation: Stylized facts and 
growth models”, World Bank, University of Minnesota, Mimeo. 
ELMESKOV, J. (1993), “High and persistent unemployment : Assessment of the problems and 
causes”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.132. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1995), “Technical note: The Commission services’ method for the 
cyclical adjustment of government budget balances”, European Economy, No.60, November. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2000), "The EU Economy - 2000 Review"  
EUROSTAT  (1999), "Volume measures for computers and software", Report of the Task 
Force, Luxembourg. 
FORNI M. AND L. REICHLIN (1998), "Cyclical adjustment of government budget balances: 
evaluation of alternative trend estimation methods and of the cyclical sensitivity of budgetary 
components", Internal Study for the DG ECFIN, July. 
GERLACH, S. AND F. SMETS (1999), “Output Gaps and Monetary Policy in the EMU area”.  
European Economic Review 43. 
GIORNO C., RICHARDSON P., ROSEVEARE D. AND P. VAN DEN NOORD (1995), "Estimating 
potential output, output gaps and structural budget balances", OECD Working Paper, No. 152. 
GIORNO  C.,  RICHARDSON  P. AND W.  SUYKER  (1995), "Technical Progress, Factor 
Productivity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Medium Term", OECD Working Paper, 
No. 157. 
GORDON, R. J. (1990), “US Inflation, Labor’s Share and the Natural Rate of Unemployment”, 
in “Economics of Wage Determination”, edited by H. Koenig, Berlin and New York: Springer 
Verlag, 1-34. 
GORDON,  R.  J. (1997), “The Time-Varying NAIRU and its Implications for Economic 
Policy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter).  
  30
GORDON,  R.  J. (1999), "Has the New Economy rendered the productivity slowdown 
obsolete?", mimeo, Northwestern University, April 1999. 
GORDON, R. J. (2000), "Does the 'new economy' measure up to great inventions of the past?", 
NBER working paper, No 7873. 
GRANGER AND NEWBOLD  (1974). “Spurious regressions in econometrics”, Journal of 
Econometrics, vol. 2 (2), 111-120. 
GRILICHES, Z. (1994), “Productivity, R&D and the Data Constraint”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84.  
GRILICHES,  Z.  (1997), "Education, human capital and growth: a personal perspective”, 
Journal of Labour Economics, Vol.15. 
HAMILTON,  J.  D. AND J.  MONTEAGUDO (1998), “The augmented Solow model and the 
productivity slowdown”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 495-509.  
HARVEY, A. C. (1989). “Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter.” 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
HARVEY, A. C. AND A.  JAEGER (1993). “Detrending, Stylized Facts and the Business Cycle.” 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 8, pp. 231-47. 
HARVEY D., S. LEYBOURNE AND P. NEWBOLD (1997), "Testing the equality of prediction 
mean squared errors", International Journal of Forecasting 13, 281-291. 
HODRICK R.J. AND E.C. PRESCOTT (1980), "Post-war U.S. business cycles: an empirical 
investigation", Carnegie-Mellon University discussion paper, No 451. 
HULTEN, C. (2000). “Total Factor Productivity :A Short Biography”, NBER Working Paper, 
No. 7471. 
IM, PESARAN AND SHIN (1997), "Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels", mimeo, 
University of Cambridge. 
IMF  (1993), "Structural Budget Indicators for the major industrial countries", World 
Economic Outlook, October. 
JORGENSEN,  D.W. AND K.  STIROH (1995), "Computers and growth", Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology, Vol. 3, No 3-4, pp. 295-316.  
JORGENSEN, D.W. AND K. STIROH (2000a), "Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. economic growth 
in the Information Age”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 125-235. 
JORGENSEN, D.W. AND K. STIROH (2000b), "U.S. economic growth at the industry level”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No 2. 
KING R.G. AND S.T. REBELO (1993), "Low frequency filtering and real business cycles", 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 
KUO AND MIKKOLA  (2001), "How sure are we about purchasing power parity? Panel 
evidence with the null of stationary real exchange rates", Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 33-3, 767.  
  31
KYDLAND F.E. AND E.C. PRESCOTT (1989), "A Fortran subroutine for efficiently computing 
Hodrick-Prescott-filtered time series", Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, research 
memorandum. 
KRUSELL, P., OHANIAN, L.E, RIOS-BULL, J-V. AND G. VIOLANTE (2000), ‘Capital skill 
complimentarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis’, Econometrica, Vol. 68, No.5. 
KUTTNER, K. N. (1994). “Estimating Potential Output as a Latent Variable.” Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics 12, pp. 361-68.  
LEVIN AND LIN  (1992), "Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic and finite-sample 
properties", mimeo, University of California, San Diego.  
MADDALA AND IM (1998), “Unit roots, cointegration and structural changes”, Cambridge 
University Press. 
MANKIW, N. G., ROMER, D. AND D. N. WEIL (1992), “A contribution to the empirics of 
economic growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, pp. 407-437. 
MARAVALL, A. (1996). “Unobserved Components in Economic Time Series.” Banca de 
Espana, Working Paper No. 9609. 
MC MORROW, K. AND W. ROEGER (2000), "Time-Varying NAIRU / NAWRU Estimates for 
the EU's Member States " ECFIN Economic Paper No. 145.  
MC  MORROW,  K. AND W.  ROEGER  (2001), "Potential Output : Measurement Methods, 
“New” Economy Influences and Scenarios for 2001-2010 – A Comparison of the EU15 and 
the US" ECFIN Economic Paper No. 150.  
NELSON, C. AND C.I. PLOSSER (1982), "Trends and random walks in macroeconomic series", 
Journal of Monetary Economics, No.10. 
NORDHAUS, W. (2001), "Alternative Methods for measuring productivity growth", NBER 
Working Paper No. 8095.  
NORDHAUS, W. (2001), "Productivity Growth and the New Economy", NBER Working Paper 
No. 8096.  
OECD (2000), “The Concept, Policy Use and Measurement of Structural Unemployment. 
Annex 2. Estimating Time varying NAIRU Across 21 OECD Countries”, Paris. 
OECD (2000), "A new economy ? The role of innovation and information technology in 
recent OECD economic growth", OECD, Paris. 
OLINER, S.D. AND D.E. SICHEL (1994), "Computers and output growth revisited: how big is 
the puzzle?", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, pp. 273-317. 
OLINER, S.D. AND D.E. SICHEL (2000), "The resurgence of growth in the late 1990's: is 
information technology the story?", US Federal Reserve Board. 
ONGENA  H. AND W.  RÖGER  (1997), "Les estimations de l'écart de production de la 
Commission européenne", Economie Internationale, No. 69.  
  32
ORLANDI, F. AND W. RÖGER (1999), "The unobserved Components Method for Calculating 
Output Gaps", Technical Note for the EPC Working Group on Output Gaps, DG ECFIN, 
mimeo. 
ORLANDI, F. AND K. PICHELMANN (2000), "Disentangling Trend and Cycle in the EUR11 
Unemployment Series - An unobserved Component Modelling Approach", ECFIN Economic 
Paper No. 140. 
PEDRONI  (1999), "Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with 
multiple regressors", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, special issue 653-670. 
PEDRONI (2004). “Panel cointegration: asymptotic and finite sample properties of pooled time 
series tests with an application to the PPP hypothesis”, Econometric Theory 20, 597-625. 
PERRON P. (1989), "The big crash, the oil shock and the unit root hypothesis", Econometrica. 
PERRON  P.  (1997),  "Further Evidence on breaking trend functions in macroeconomic 
variables", Journal of Econometrics, No. 80. 
PESARAN AND TIMMERMANN (2004), "Real Time Econometrics ", CEPR discussion paper 
4402. 
PHILLIPS  (1986), “Understanding spurious regressions in econometrics”, Journal of 
Econometrics, vol. 33(3), 311-40. 
 
PISSARIDES, C. A. (1998), “The Impact of Unemployment Cuts on Employment and Wages: 
The Role of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure”, European Economic Review 42, 
155-84. 
PRESCOTT E.C. (1986), "Theory ahead of Business-Cycle measurement", Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference on Public Policy, No. 25. 
RÖGER  W.  (1994).  “Total Factor Productivity in West German Manufacturing: Is there 
Investment Induced Technical Progress?”,   Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 78, pp. 251-61. 
RÖGER, W (2001), "The Contribution of Information and Communication Technologies to 
Growth in Europe and the US: A Macroeconomic Analysis", DG ECFIN Economic Papers, 
No 147. 
RÖGER W. AND J. IN 'T VELD (1997), "Quest II - A multi country business cycle and growth 
model", DG ECFIN, Economic Papers, No 123. 
ROMER, P. (1986), "Increasing returns and long-run growth", Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 94, pp. 1002-1037. 
SCHREYER, P. (2000), "The contribution of information and communication technology to 
output growth. A study on the G7 countries", OECD STI Working Papers No. 2000/2. 
SCOTT, A. (2000), "Stylised facts from output gap measures", Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
Discussion Paper Series.   
  33
SOLOW, R. (1956), "A contribution to the theory of economic growth", Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 70, No 1, pp. 65-94. 
STIROH, K. (1999), "Is there a new economy?", Challenge, July/August, pp. 82-101. 
STIROH, K. (2000), "What drives productivity growth?", Mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, July 2000. 
TEMPLE,  J. (2000), “Summary of an Informal Workshop on the Causes of Economic 
Growth”, OECD Working Paper, No. 260.  
TRIPLETT,  J.  E. (1999), “Economic statistics, the new economy and the productivity 
slowdown” forthcoming in Business Economics. 
TURNER, D., RICHARDSON, P. AND S. RAUFFET (1996), "Modelling the Supply side of the 
seven major OECD economies", OECD Working Paper, No. 167. 
UK TREASURY (1996), “How fast can the economy grow ? A special report on the output 
gap", Panel of Independent Forecasters, June. 
VAN ARK, B. (2000), “Measuring Productivity in the “New Economy: Towards a European 
Perspective”, De Economist, No 1. 
VAN DER WIEL, H. (2000), “Is ICT important for growth”, CPB report, No 2. 
WEISS,  A  (1995), "Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, No 4. 
WHELAN,  KARL  (2000), "Computers, Obsolescence, and Productivity", Federal Reserve 
Board Finance and Economics Discussion Paper, No. 2000-6. 
WOLFF  E.N.  (1996), “The Productivity Slowdown: The Culprit at Last?”, American 

































ANNEX 1 :   KALMAN FILTER BASED NAIRU ESTIMATION METHOD 
 
 




ANNEX 3 :  REASSESSING THE END POINT BIAS PROBLEM FOR OUTPUT GAP CALCULATIONS 
(USE OF THE HP FILTER TO CALCULATE TFP) 
 
 
ANNEX 4 :  TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY  - DETERMINISTIC VS STOCHASTIC MODELS 
 
 
ANNEX 5 :  TABLES AND GRAPHS FOR THE 25 EU MEMBER STATES  
 
 
ANNEX 6 : TABLES AND GRAPHS FOR EU AGGREGATES (EURO AREA, EU15, EU10, EU25) 









Note : All figures presented in annexes 5 and 6 are based on data available in early November 2005 in DG 
ECFIN’s AMECO databank and using the Commission services final Autumn 2005 forecasts.  
ANNEX 1 : KALMAN FILTER BASED NAIRU ESTIMATION METHOD 
 
This annex discusses various issues related to the NAIRU. First of all, it provides a 
description of the theoretical framework underlying the NAIRU estimates. It starts from a 
standard model of the labour market with explicitly formulated wage and labour demand 
equations. In particular it is shown how the Phillips curve, which links the change of wage 
inflation to the unemployment gap, is shifted by observed and unobserved shocks to the wage 
rule and the labour demand equation. Within this context the concept of structural 
unemployment or NAIRU can be discussed more clearly. This derivation also allows one to 
provide an economic interpretation for differences between the Euro Area and US labour 
markets.  
 
1. The Labour Market Model  
 
Following standard textbooks, there are broadly four different hypotheses trying to describe 
the labour market: the neoclassical view, the efficiency wage approach, the wage bargaining 
theory and the search model. A generic wage rule covering all four hypothesis can be 
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Workers/trade unions negotiate a nominal wage   at time t conditional on the price 




t p t b
t t t l y pr − =  and on the unemployment rate  .  T h e  t e r m    is a shock to the wage-setting 
rule that can be autocorrelated. As shown by Pissarides (1999), the four macroeconomic 
theories imply certain restrictions on the parameter values of equation (1) : both the 




0 = μ , i.e. wages are not directly linked to 
productivity. The wage bargaining and the search model allow instead for productivity to play 
a role. Within this latter class of models, the magnitude of productivity indexation depends 
crucially on the bargaining strength of workers. In an atomistic labour market without any 
market power for workers such as in the neoclassical model, wages would be equal to the 
reservation wage. By contrast, in a highly unionised labour market, μ  would approach unity.  
 
Theories also differ in the specification of the reservation wage. In the neoclassical model the 
reservation wage would be the value of leisure, a concept derived from a utility function for 
workers which is defined in terms of consumption and leisure. Consequently, in the 
neoclassical model, consumption and leisure time would be the arguments of  . While the 
value of leisure could also play a role under the other hypotheses, these generally stress a non-
market wage as an alternative. The non-market wage could be for instance unemployment 
benefits, the value of home production or the income earned in the shadow economy.  
t b
 
Another important element is the concept of productivity entering the wage equation, namely 
either average labour productivity or “marginal productivity
11”. Under the neoclassical 
model, the search and efficiency wage hypothesis, the relevant concept seems to be “marginal 
                                                 
10 The notion of productivity entering the wage equation will be discussed in more detail later. 
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11 Marginal productivity and the demand wage for labour are used interchangeably. The term marginal productivity is not entirely correct. 
Marginal productivity corrected for the mark-up of prices over marginal cost would be the correct expression.    
productivity” while in bargaining models an average productivity concept applies. As will be 
shown below in situations where average and marginal productivity diverge, the two 
productivity concepts have implications for the structural unemployment rate and also for the 
short run adjustment of wages. This wage rule as expressed in eq (1) is very similar to the rule 
formulated by Blanchard and Katz (1999). Here two generalisations are introduced, first it is 
assumed that expectations not only have to be formulated about prices but also about the 
reservation wage and productivity and we allow for slightly more general expectation 
formation schemes. The second generalisation concerns the concept of productivity which 
enters the wage rule. We will explicitly distinguish between the average and marginal product 
of labour.    
 
In order to close the model, labour demand must be specified. It is assumed that firms set 
labour demand at its profit maximising level by equating the marginal revenue product of 
labour to the real wage. The resulting first order condition of the optimisation problem is 
given by equation (2).  
 
t t t t t x l y p w + − = − ) (             ( 2 )  
  
It can be interpreted in two directions. Starting from the right hand side, eq. (2) determines the 
“demand wage for labour”, which is the wage the firm is willing to pay for a given level of 
marginal productivity. Alternatively, for given real wages it determines the marginal product 
of labour the firm is aiming for. Notice, marginal and average productivity are not always 
proportional. The term x can drive a wedge between marginal and average productivity. One 
can think of the variable x as a shock to a (long run) labour demand equation (as implied by 
the underlying Cobb Douglas PF) by simply rewriting (2) as 
 
t t t t t x p w y l + − − = ) (   .         ( 2 ’ )  
 
The variable x can itself be a function of various factors and it is useful to distinguish between 
a structural (x*) and a cyclical/transitory component (ρ ) 
 
t t t x x ρ + =
* .           ( 3 )  
  
After having determined the demand wage of firms one can ask the question what is the 
productivity concept used by workers in their wage schedule. In particular, do they take into 
account shocks to labour demand, when setting wages ? We are not imposing an a priori 
restriction about the concept of productivity used by workers in setting wages and define the 
concept of productivity entering the wage rule as  
 
1 0 , ) ( ≤ ≤ + − = ψ ψ t t t t x l y pr .        ( 4 )  
 
 
We also express the reservation wage as a fraction of a combination of productivity and x, 
  
t t t t t x l y b b ψ + − + = ) (
0        ( 5 )  
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where   is the logarithm of the replacement rate. Notice that as   is allowed to vary over 






Adjustment of wages to inflation and productivity :  Adjustment of wages to economic 
conditions can be delayed because of limited information in the formation of expectations or 
because of institutional rigidities (e.g. a fixed contract length).  With the annual data used here 
we try to capture two extremes. Either instantaneous adjustment of wages to both inflation 
and productivity, i.e. adjustment within the same period (one year) or completely backward 
looking behaviour where wages only respond with a lag of one year. Such an extreme case 
could occur for example if wage contracts were negotiated at the beginning of each year with 
a duration of one year and where workers/trade unions would simply extrapolate inflation or 
productivity trends from the previous year. Any parameter setting between these two 
extremes is of course possible and is determined by the coefficients a and c in the following 
expectation formulas 
 
1 ) 1 ( − − + = t t
e
t a a π π π          ( 6 a )  
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e
t pr c pr c pr .         ( 7 a )  
 
The degree of nominal rigidity is proportional to (1-a) while the degree of real rigidity is 
proportional to (1-c). However, for some countries the unemployment gap appears in the 
Phillips curve as a quasi difference. This cannot be generated with the moving average 
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We also allow for combinations between (6,7a) and (6,7b) in the regressions. Equations (1) to 
(7) determine the structural unemployment rate which is defined as the level of 
unemployment when there are no expectation errors, i.e.  ,   and where the 
wage share is equal to its long run level, i.e.  . Under these conditions, the equilibrium 
unemployment rate is given by 
t
e
t p p = t
e
t pr pr =
*
t t x x =
 




t t t x b a u − + − + =                 (8)                                       
 
Equation (8) shows that the equilibrium level of unemployment depends positively on the 
reservation wage (which itself is a function of labour taxation, unemployment replacement 
rate etc.), and negatively on the trend value of the labour demand shock, if workers do not 
completely take into account x*. This sounds intuitively plausible. Imagine, for example, an 
increase in the average training costs for workers. This obviously is a cost component for 
firms related to individual workers. In determining labour input, the firm must take these costs 
into account. If wages do not respond to an increase in training costs then effective labour 
costs increase and firms respond with a decline in labour demand. If the increase in training 
costs is permanent then the equilibrium level of unemployment will be higher. If training 
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costs are borne by workers in the form of lower wages ( 1 = ψ  ), equilibrium unemployment 
will not be affected.  
 
A relationship between the change in nominal wage inflation and the unemployment gap can 
be derived, with shocks to labour productivity, labour demand and the terms of trade as 
additional explanatory variables.  
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The Phillips curve shows the short run response of nominal wages to labour productivity, 
labour demand shocks and the unemployment gap. The response to the unemployment gap is 
intuitively plausible. Whenever unemployment is above the NAIRU, nominal wage growth 
will decelerate and vice versa. However, this link is not perfect but is disturbed by observed 
and unobserved shocks to the wage rule and the labour demand equation. How nominal wage 
growth responds to productivity and labour demand shocks (here approximated by changes in 
the growth rate of the wage share) depends on a variety of factors.  
 
Short run nominal wage response to productivity shocks : Nominal wages respond to a 
shock in productivity via two channels, a productivity channel and an inflation channel. The 
strength of the response depends on how strongly inflation and productivity expectations 
respond to the productivity shock within the first year. Everything else equal, wages respond 
positively to productivity (with an elasticity of c) but they respond negatively to the extent 
that productivity affects inflation (with an elasticity equal to –a). Whether the response is 
positive or negative actually depends on the relative magnitude of c and a.   
 
Short run response of nominal wages to changes in labour demand shocks : A similar 
consideration applies to labour demand shocks. The wage rule implies that wages respond 
positively to labour demand shocks (to the extent they are taken into account by workers 
(namely by the size of ψ )). The difference compared to the productivity response comes from 
the parameter ψ . If wages only respond to productivity but not to the demand wage for 
labour ( 0 = ψ ) then there will be no positive transmission of a labour demand shock. Turning 
to the other extreme case, with wages responding fully to the labour demand shock, then the 
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elasticity of wages w. r. t. labour demand shocks will be equal to the productivity response of 
wages. However, in general, the magnitude of the positive response of wages to labour 
demand shocks will be smaller compared to labour productivity shocks.  Also notice from the 
inflation rule that labour demand shocks have a negative effect on inflation. Therefore to the 
extent wages respond to current inflation (negatively) they also respond negatively to labour 
demand shocks via the inflation channel.  
 
Short run response of nominal wages to terms of trade (TOT) shocks : The theoretical 
derivation of the wage equation was done in a closed economy context. Obviously open 
economy aspects are likely to play a role in wage setting, especially if there is a divergence 
between domestic and import prices and if wages are linked to the consumer price deflator. 
To the extent that these conditions are fulfilled one would also expect that nominal wages 
respond positively to the wedge between consumer price and GDP inflation. In order to 
capture this open economy aspect, a TOT variable is added to the Phillips curve.  
 
 
2. Comparing the Euro Area and US Phillips Curves  
 
The Phillips curve estimates (Table 1) appear fairly similar for the Euro Area and the US, 
both in terms of the absolute size of the parameter estimates as well as the statistical fit. The 
response of nominal wages to the unemployment gap is practically identical. Also labour 
productivity has a quantitatively similar effect on wages. This result suggests that there is a 
positive short run response of nominal wages to labour productivity growth. The elasticity 
within a year is about 0.8 in both regions. This suggests that the productivity response by far 
exceeds the inflation response. This seems plausible. First of all, central banks tend to 
accommodate productivity shocks and keep inflation stable. Therefore productivity shocks 
can lead to higher real wage growth via nominal wage growth. Notice also, we are looking at 
wages per employee and changes in hours are consequently translated directly into changes in 
wages. Also to the extent that workers receive piece rate wages, the translation of productivity 
to changes in wages is direct. Finally, to the extent that wages are negotiated at the sectoral or 
even the firm level, information about local productivity might be more easily available than 
information about aggregate inflation.  
 
Interestingly there is a difference in the response of wages to the wage share. US wages 
respond more to the demand wage for labour, while European wages tend to adjust more 
strongly to average productivity growth. This could reflect differences in labour market 
institutions and points to a difference in the response of wages to cyclical versus structural 
shocks. The US aggregate wage response seems typical of a decentralised labour market, 
while the European wage response seems more typical of a centralised labour market. 
Suppose shocks to labour demand result from sectoral shifts, with an increase in production in 
a low productivity sector (e.g. services). At the aggregate level this can be represented as a 
decline in the demand wage for labour. However, employment can be sustained if real wages 
in the low productivity sector declines. If the labour market would ignore the negative 
demand (productivity shock) then the low productivity sector would not expand. Thus the 
Phillips curve estimates suggest that the EU and US labour markets respond fairly similarly to 
typical business cycle movements but they tend to respond differently to structural shocks. 
There is other micro and macro evidence from the empirical literature which suggests that the 
response of wages and prices to the business cycle is similar. In particular some recent micro  
studies suggest that the degree of nominal rigidity (e.g. measured by the duration of price 
changes by firms as well as the duration of wage contracts) is similar across the two regions.  
 
In terms of statistical criteria, the unemployment gap together with the observed shock 
variables, as suggested by the theoretical model, explain about 50% of the observed 
fluctuations in the first difference of wage inflation in the case of the EU and about 70% in 
the case of the US. A more intuitive way to look at the empirical fit is to compare fluctuations 
in the (inverse of the) unemployment gap with fluctuations in wage indicators. The Phillips 
curve predicts that episodes in which the NAIRU is above the actual unemployment rate 
should be associated with an acceleration in wage inflation (see graph 1). The following table 
provides correlations between the unemployment gap as identified by our methodology and 
three alternative wage concepts, firstly nominal wages, secondly unit labour costs and thirdly 
unit labour costs adjusted for changes in the wage share. All three concepts of wage inflation 
show  correlations with the (inverse) of the unemployment gap of a similar magnitude for the 
two regions.  
 
Table 1 : Correlation between unemployment gap and wage indicators 
  Euro Area  US 
2 Δ (Wage)  0.54 0.42 
2 Δ (ULC)  0.50 0.58 
2 Δ (ULC-Wage Share)  0.65 0.67 
    
The following graph provides information about the evolution of  the NAIRU in the euro area 
and the US as well as the fit of the Phillips curve. The two graphs on the top show the NAIRU 
for the Euro Area and the US as estimated with our model. Euro Area structural 
unemployment has peaked in the mid 1990s in the EU and is slightly declining since. In 
contrast, the US NAIRU has been on a steady decline since the early 1980s and is stabilising 
at a level of about 5 ½% since 2000. The two graphs in the middle show how the (inverse) of 
the unemployment gap is correlated with the change in wage inflation. While there is a 
relationship, the Phillips curve specification suggests that there are other factors influencing 
the change in wage inflation. This is shown by the two graphs at the bottom which indicate 
the fit of the Phillips curve.  
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ANNEX 2 : DESCRIPTION OF THE NAIRU ESTIMATION METHOD USED FOR THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES 
 
For calculating the NAIRU for the new Member States, a methodology proposed by the 
OECD is used (i.e. the “Elmeskov” method
12). A simple model of the labour market predicts 
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Assuming static inflation expectations 
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e
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gives the following Phillips curve relationship 
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This is the most simple formulation of the Phillips curve which ignores all other possible 
influences on wage setting such as productivity, for example. Allowing for productivity 
shocks may be important for at least two reasons. Firstly, the new Member States show 
relatively high growth rates of productivity, thus productivity growth may be an important 
factor for wage growth. Secondly, for the EU15 member states we control for productivity 
shocks as well. The following paragraphs therefore present a simple extension of the 
framework presented above. 
 
The wage rule (following the specification that we use for the EU15 member states) is given 
by 
w
t t t t
e
t t u nairu u l y p w + − − − = − ) ( ) ( β                         (3a) 
 
This can be rewritten as 
 
w
t t t t t t
e
t t u nairu u p w l y w + − − − − − = − Δ − − ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 β π     (3b)        
         
Labour demand can be formulated as follows  
 
l
t t t t t u l y p w + − = − ) (            ( 4 )     
 
With static inflation expectations we obtain 
 
) ( 1 1 1 1 − − − − Δ − Δ − Δ = = t t t t
e
t l y w π π . 
 
Using this expectation rule together with the labour demand schedule one can reformulate the 
wage equation as follows 
 
                                                 
12 J. Elmeskov (1993) 
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This formulation indicates that unemployment is below the NAIRU whenever the growth rate 
of unit labour costs increases. 
 
Given these alternative expressions (1b) and (3d), the calculation of the NAIRU proceeds in 
the following steps. 
 
STEP 1 : Assuming the NAIRU to be constant and further assuming that the shocks have a 
mean of zero one can calculate β  by taking a first derivative (in discrete time) of eq. (1b) and 
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+ = −    (5) 
 
 
STEP 3 : Now one can use the right hand sides of eq. (5) to calculate the NAIRU by noticing 
that the right hand side is equal to the NAIRU and the shocks to the wage setting and labour 
demand equations. These shocks are eliminated by applying a filter to the right hand side. 
Notice, this procedure becomes arbitrarily close to applying a filter to the unemployment rate 
directly for large enough β . 
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ANNEX 3 : REASSESSING THE END POINT BIAS PROBLEM FOR OUTPUT GAP CALCULATIONS  
(USE OF THE HP FILTER TO CALCULATE TFP) 
 
Since trend total factor productivity (TFP) is still calculated with the HP filter, there remains 
an end point bias problem with the production function (PF) method. This was pointed out by 
a number of representatives of the EPC’s output gaps working group, with a suggestion being 
made to look more closely at an alternative approach which is used by the CPB in the 
Netherlands for their assessment of potential growth
13. This annex takes up the end point bias 
issue as related to the calculation of the TFP trend and compares the “ECFIN” version of the 
method with the approach followed by the CPB. We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we analyse 
the bias problem by looking at the sensitivity of the TFP trend estimates with respect to 
different data projection periods. Secondly, we present the method used by the CPB and apply 
it to the EU15 Member States and compare the results to our baseline projections. 
 
1. SENSITIVITY OF HP-TREND TO FORECAST HORIZONS 
 
The HP Filter is symmetric. This poses a problem at the end points of the sample since the 
filter must be constructed in such a way that the filter weights become asymmetric at the end 
points. Baxter and King (1995) show that, close to the end points - especially the last 3 to 4 
observations -, the Hodrick-Prescott filter not only eliminates the low frequency cycles it is 
supposed to eliminate, i.e. cycles with a length of more than 16 years in the case of a 
smoothing parameter equal to 100, but also has a tendency to dampen the influence of cycles 
with higher frequencies. This will affect cyclical components with a period larger than 4 
years. Only cycles with shorter periods will be fully passed. This implies that the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter produces a series for the output gap which underestimates the length of 
the cycle close to the end point, if no corrective measures are taken.  
 
Since this phenomenon especially occurs for the last 3 or 4 observations, one possibility to 
correct for this bias is to extend the data set by adding GDP forecasts over a range of 3 to 5 
years. Of course extending the sample does not come without cost. Inaccurate projections can 
themselves inflict a bias. Since the HP filter is applied to calculate a trend for a medium term 
projection which is already 5 years beyond the last observation, adding another 4 to 5 years 
requires a projection for a whole decade. In order to find a compromise between the end point 
bias problem and a trend projection error, the “ECFIN” method projected the relevant 
variables for an additional 3 years beyond the medium term. This means that in order to 
calculate medium term projections, for example until 2007, TFP is projected until 2010. In a 
first exercise we therefore look how the trend estimates are affected if we extend the forecast 
horizon to 2013 in order to comply fully with the recommendations provided by the 
theoretical literature.  
As shown in the Table (comparison between “ECFIN” and  “ECFIN ext.”), the sensitivity is 
moderate, three among the 15 countries show a difference in potential growth above 0.2% 
points in 2007. These countries are Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. One country, namely 
Spain shows a difference of greater than 0.1% point in 2007. There is practically no difference 
for the remaining 10 countries. Following the theoretical suggestion and extending the 
projection by another 3 years seems plausible. However, as will be shown in the next section 
other approaches can give different medium term growth paths for TFP. With very long run 
projection horizons, the medium term forecast may be biased more strongly if indeed the 
                                                 
13 CPB Memorandum 51. 
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alternative method is correct. We will return to this point after presenting the CPB method 
and results.    
 
2. THE CPB METHOD 
 
The CPB uses an alternative approach for avoiding the end point bias problem. The CPB 
method exploits a property of moving average processes, namely that the trend becomes 
constant at a finite time. The CPB assumes that the growth rate of  TFP follows a stochastic 
trend and that the second difference of TFP can be approximated by an MA process i.e. the 
following model is estimated 
 
(1)  2 2 1 1 1 − − − + + + Δ = Δ t t t t t a a tfp tfp ε ε ε  
 
Now notice that the projection for period t+j, conditional on information in period t 
( ) is equal to   ) ( j t t tfp P + Δ
 
(2)  1 2 2 1 ) ( ) ( − + + + + Δ = Δ t t t j t t a a a tfp tfp P ε ε          for  .  2 ≥ j
 
The MA process implies that the projection of TFP growth becomes constant after two 
periods. The constant defined by the right hand side of equation (2) constitutes the end point 
for trend TFP. This end point is connected to the HP trend which is calculated for the 
historical TFP series only. The historic trend is obtained by calculating an HP trend over the 
historic sample and discarding the last two years. The gap is filled by interpolating between 
the HP trend and the MA endpoint. 
In this case the growth differences to the “ECFIN vintage” of the method are substantially 
larger (comparison between “ECFIN” and CPB in Table). Ordering countries according to 
the growth differential obtained by the two alternative methods yields the following result. 
With the CPB method Greek growth in 2007 is estimated to be 1 % higher while Portuguese 
growth is estimated to be 0.6% points lower than growth projected by the “ECFIN” version. 
In the case of Spain the difference is 0.6% points. Germany, Luxembourg and Finland show 
differences of 0.3% points, Italy, Netherlands and the UK 0.2% and for Austria, France, 
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden a growth differential of 0.1% point is projected. The only 
country for which both methods do not give a different result is Ireland. 
In interpreting these differences one has to keep in mind that the two approaches differ in two 
dimensions. Apart from a different treatment of the end point problem, the underlying time 
series representations of TFP differ. The “ECFIN” version uses a deterministic trend model, 
while the CPB uses a stochastic trend specification.  
With the “ECFIN” method, the medium term projection reverts to the (average) trend 
estimated over the period 1975 to 2004, while the CPB trend is more heavily influenced by 
recent growth rates.  
These features generate different trend forecasts, depending on the historic evolution of TFP 
growth. The following pattern can be observed. Those countries which had a relatively weak 
TFP growth in the 1990s, the “ECFIN” method projects a recovery over the medium term 
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(Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, UK), i.e. a return of growth to the 
deterministic trend and therefore predicts a higher trend growth than the CPB method, while 
for countries which showed a rising trend for the 1990s (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden), the “ECFIN” trend reverts back to the historic average. For these countries, 
the CPB trend which gives more weight to the more recent evolution tends to lie above the 
“ECFIN” trend. Spain, which showed a declining trend in the 1980s and 1990s is a special 
case. Here a negative deterministic trend is estimated over the sample and is projected 
forward. The MA method extrapolates forward the recovery of TFP which is projected in the 
forecast.  
This observation suggests that there is both an ‘end point problem’ and a ‘choice of methods 
problem’. The method chosen (deterministic vs. stochastic trend) for representing the TFP 
series may actually be more important as an explanation of the difference in growth rates at 
the end of the projection than the treatment of the end point problem itself. In order to shed 
some light on this issue we have also applied the HP filter trend extraction method to the 
stochastic trend model. If the choice of model is important for the results then we would 
expect a far smaller difference when comparing two different treatments of the end point 
problem. We find (comparison between CPB and CPB HP in the Table) that in general the 
differences are in fact much smaller. For 7 countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, UK) there is no difference. 2 countries (DE, NL) show a difference of 0.1% 
point. In 4 countries (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal) the deviation is 0.2% points and for 
Italy the deviation is 0.3% points
14.  
After having established that differences in medium term growth rates are partly model 
related, one can ask the question whether the adoption of a longer projection period would 
actually accentuate differences between various alternatives. It is in fact interesting to observe 
that the differences between the “ECFIN” method and the CPB approach increases with the 
longer projection period  (comparison between “ECFIN ext.” and CPB). Differences are 
larger for 5 countries (Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg). This could be explained 
by the fact that a longer extension pulls the HP trend even more strongly to the long term 
trend (and away from the actual realisation of the data). This reveals a dilemma pointed out 
above : if the deterministic trend model is correct then a longer extrapolation period seems to 
be preferred. If, however, the deterministic trend model is not correct, then the error inflicted 
by a longer extrapolation could become even stronger.  
 
3. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
This annex has analysed the sensitivity of the trend growth rate with respect to the choice of 
the end point. It has also looked at an alternative method which is based on a stochastic trend 
and which avoids the end point bias problem. The alternative method is, however, likely to be 
more sensitive to erratic movements at the end of the sample. This comparison shows that the 
model choice (stochastic versus deterministic trend) is important for the medium term trend. 
This result also draws attention to the fact that extrapolations are model dependent. A trade-
off may therefore exist between lowering the endpoint bias on the one hand and accentuating 
the trend forecast error.    
 
                                                 
14 There is one exception, namely Luxembourg, where the deviation is 1.5% points. We largely attribute this to a data 
problem. 
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Table: Potential Growth, according to the method used for TFP projection 
Country TFP method
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ECFIN 2.49 1.93 1.77 1.75 1.83 1.81 1.95 1.88
Belgium ECFIN ext. 2.49 1.93 1.77 1.75 1.83 1.81 1.94 1.88
CPB ori. 2.51 1.96 1.81 1.80 1.89 1.87 2.01 1.94
CPB HP 2.51 1.95 1.80 1.77 1.87 1.85 1.99 1.92
ECFIN 2.38 2.20 2.05 1.95 2.04 2.01 1.94 1.85
Denmark ECFIN ext. 2.38 2.20 2.05 1.95 2.03 2.00 1.93 1.84
CPB 2.43 2.27 2.15 2.05 2.13 2.09 2.00 1.92
CPB HP 2.39 2.21 2.07 1.97 2.06 2.04 1.98 1.89
ECFIN 1.47 1.33 1.44 1.41 1.59 1.43 1.54 1.83
Germany ECFIN ext. 1.47 1.34 1.44 1.42 1.60 1.45 1.56 1.87
CPB 1.35 1.15 1.18 1.15 1.32 1.15 1.27 1.51
CPB HP 1.40 1.22 1.29 1.21 1.33 1.12 1.18 1.44
ECFIN 3.53 3.16 3.37 3.33 3.25 2.99 3.00 3.00
Greece ECFIN ext. 3.54 3.15 3.34 3.25 3.12 2.79 2.71 2.61
CPB 3.68 3.40 3.72 3.78 3.85 3.75 3.92 4.04
CPB HP 3.73 3.47 3.82 3.93 4.02 3.93 4.09 4.22
ECFIN 3.19 3.11 2.76 2.68 2.65 2.12 1.93 1.79
Spain ECFIN ext. 3.20 3.11 2.75 2.65 2.61 2.05 1.83 1.65
CPB 3.21 3.14 2.81 2.84 2.93 2.53 2.47 2.36
CPB HP 3.26 3.22 2.91 2.88 2.91 2.44 2.32 2.22
ECFIN 2.59 2.50 2.31 2.14 2.29 2.33 2.35 2.26
France ECFIN ext. 2.59 2.50 2.31 2.15 2.31 2.35 2.38 2.30
CPB 2.54 2.42 2.20 2.04 2.19 2.22 2.24 2.12
CPB HP 2.56 2.44 2.23 2.04 2.17 2.18 2.17 2.06
ECFIN 8.30 7.96 7.55 6.89 6.63 5.98 5.68 5.47
Ireland ECFIN ext. 8.30 7.96 7.55 6.90 6.65 6.00 5.71 5.51
CPB 8.42 8.13 7.77 7.09 6.79 6.06 5.67 5.47
CPB HP 8.28 7.93 7.50 6.83 6.55 5.88 5.57 5.34
ECFIN 2.06 2.13 1.87 1.64 1.83 1.63 1.69 1.71
Italy ECFIN ext. 2.06 2.14 1.88 1.67 1.89 1.72 1.81 1.87
CPB 2.02 2.06 1.76 1.56 1.76 1.53 1.57 1.54
CPB HP 1.98 2.01 1.68 1.40 1.53 1.27 1.27 1.24
ECFIN 4.98 4.94 4.20 4.14 4.47 5.32 5.91 6.42
Luxembourg ECFIN ext. 4.97 4.95 4.25 4.23 4.62 5.57 6.28 6.92
CPB 4.69 4.47 3.52 3.73 4.22 5.15 5.86 6.12
CPB HP 4.72 4.54 3.64 3.39 3.51 4.05 4.37 4.64
ECFIN 2.89 2.70 2.34 2.01 1.98 2.18 2.34 2.38
Netherlands ECFIN ext. 2.89 2.70 2.34 2.02 1.98 2.19 2.35 2.39
CPB 2.84 2.64 2.25 1.92 1.87 2.04 2.18 2.19
CPB HP 2.83 2.62 2.23 1.87 1.80 1.96 2.09 2.10
ECFIN 2.28 2.08 1.59 1.60 1.60 1.18 1.28 1.47
Austria ECFIN ext. 2.28 2.08 1.59 1.60 1.60 1.18 1.29 1.48
CPB 2.33 2.15 1.68 1.70 1.71 1.31 1.41 1.61
CPB HP 2.31 2.12 1.64 1.66 1.68 1.28 1.40 1.60
ECFIN 2.98 2.80 2.55 2.40 2.53 2.32 2.68 2.75
Portugal ECFIN ext. 2.98 2.80 2.56 2.42 2.56 2.36 2.73 2.83
CPB 2.85 2.60 2.27 2.09 2.15 1.85 2.12 2.12
CPB HP 2.83 2.57 2.24 1.99 2.02 1.69 1.94 1.94
ECFIN 3.52 3.54 3.14 2.75 2.76 2.71 2.40 2.27
Finland ECFIN ext. 3.52 3.54 3.14 2.75 2.76 2.72 2.42 2.29
CPB 3.61 3.66 3.29 2.95 2.98 2.95 2.64 2.54
CPB HP 3.56 3.59 3.21 2.85 2.88 2.86 2.58 2.46
ECFIN 2.86 2.83 2.59 2.50 2.60 2.58 2.48 2.32
Sweden ECFIN ext. 2.86 2.83 2.59 2.50 2.61 2.59 2.50 2.35
CPB 2.88 2.86 2.62 2.52 2.60 2.54 2.40 2.24
CPB HP 2.85 2.81 2.56 2.45 2.55 2.51 2.40 2.22
ECFIN 2.80 2.77 2.53 2.56 2.60 2.66 2.70 2.62
United Kingdom ECFIN ext. 2.80 2.77 2.53 2.56 2.60 2.66 2.70 2.62
CPB 2.75 2.69 2.43 2.45 2.48 2.52 2.54 2.44
CPB HP 2.75 2.70 2.44 2.44 2.45 2.48 2.49 2.39  
  
 
  47 
ANNEX 4 : TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY - DETERMINISTIC VS STOCHASTIC MODELS 
 
 
For the empirical discrimination between the stochastic and the deterministic trend 
specification we follow a traditional time series approach : in a first step, the series are 
checked for stationarity with panel unit root tests as well as standard augmented-Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests on individual series. In the second step, the Box-Jenkins methodology is 
applied to determine parsimonious ARIMA models for the stationary series. Finally, the out-
of-sample forecasting performance of the stochastic models is compared to those of the 
deterministic trend model. 
 
1 : DO EU15 TFP SERIES HAVE A UNIT ROOT ? 
 
The specification of a stochastic model for the TFP series requires that the series are 
stationary or suitably differenced in order to become stationary. We examine here whether 
TFP can be transformed in order to become stationary.  
 
1.1 : TFP in levels : A preliminary visual inspection shows that the series (in log) display a 
marked positive trend until the mid-1990s. The growth trend seems to somewhat decline 
afterwards for most series (see graph). It is thus possible that series are integrated processes of 
order 1.  
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Standard unit root tests provide in principle an answer to such an issue. But they have a low 
power, i.e. they tend to accept (not to reject) the null hypothesis of a unit root more frequently 
than is warranted. This is one of the reasons mentioned by Maddala and Im (1998) to discard 
traditional unit root tests.  
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A more powerful test of the unit root hypothesis where data is available in the form of a panel 
is, however, provided by the more recent literature on panel unit root tests. The simple 
reasoning behind panel unit roots is the following : n separate ADF unit root tests are 




j t i i i t i i i t i
i




, 2 1 , 0 ,  (for i = 1 to n). 
Provided that the relevant coefficients obtained are corrected for mean and standard deviation 
biases (based on Monte Carlo simulations), the sample mean of the n independent estimates 
obtained should have asymptotically a standardised normal distribution according to the 
central limit theorem. Thus, Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (1997) construct a panel unit root test 
according to which the null of a unit root is rejected if the sample average of the t-statistics is 
significantly different from zero. Such a case will occur if at least one of the coefficients is 
significantly different from zero.  
 
In short, the test formulation is: 
 
H0: all time series in the panel display a unit root 
vs  H1: at least one of the time series is an integrated process (of order 0 for series 
in levels).  
 
The IPS test was performed on the panel of 14 TFP series (EU15 excluding Luxembourg). 
The de-biased t-stat is 0.95 to be compared to an exact sample critical value of -2.04 at the 
99% confidence level. The null of unit roots in each series cannot be rejected : none of the 
series are integrated processes of order 0.  
 
The test results are robust to : 
 
•  the exclusion of specific countries from the panel, 
 
•  the removal of some of the contemporaneous correlation across equations in the residuals 
(substracting a common time effect from time observations per country), 
 
•  the specification of heterogeneous time trends in the TFP series (-0.79 to be compared to 
an exact sample critical value of -2.67). Thus, the results are irrespective of specific time 
trends in the series, 
 
•  the use of TFP based on hours worked. 
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1.2 : TFP in first differences : The next step is to check whether the series are stationary in 
first differences. A visual inspection of the series (see graph) supports prima facie this 
hypothesis. 
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The same IPS test is applied to the first difference of the TFP series. The de-biased t-stat is 
now -9.69 to be compared to an exact sample critical value of -2.04 at the 99% confidence 
level. The null of a unit root is rejected : at least one series is an integrated process of order 1. 
 
The test results are robust to: 
 
•  the exclusion of specific countries from the panel, for instance Spain, Ireland, UK (it 
should be noted that the statistic is so far from the critical value that it is anyway unlikely 
that only a few countries are stationary), 
 
•  the removal of some of the contemporaneous correlation in the residuals across equations, 
substracting a common time effect from each observation (-12.40), 
 
•  the presence of heterogeneous time trends in the TFP series (-13.14 to be compared to an 
exact sample critical value of -2.67), 
 
•  the choice of high order (4) lags in each ADF tests (-3.41 and -2.79 with heterogeneous 
time trends), 
 
•  the use of TFP based on hours worked. 
 
Separate ADF tests confirm that the null is rejected for every country. The conclusion is that 
all TFP series are stationary integrated processes I(1). 
 
2 : THE DETERMINATION OF PARSIMONIOUS ARIMA MODELS FOR TFP 
 
In this section, we apply the Box and Jenkins methodology to specify parsimonious 
autoregressive integrated moving average models ARIMA (p,1,q) for the countries TFP 
series. As a slight break is visible at the beginning of the sample (1966-1975), the 
identification of a stochastic representation for TFP is performed on a smaller sample : 1976-
2003.  
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2.1 : Decision rules for the choice of the ARIMA specification : This exercise is based on 
the examination of the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of the series with a view 
to specifying the order of AR(p) and MA(q) polynomials. Four decision rules were applied in 
order to decide whether to select an AR(p) or MA(q) representation potentially identified: 
 
•  the coefficients in the regression of TFP in first difference have to be stable and significant 
at the 90% confidence level over the full sample (1976-2003) and two sub-samples (1984-
2003, 1989-2003) in order to check for robustness of the specification, 
 
•  the modulus of the unit roots associated to a given AR(p) or MA(q) have to be smaller than 
0.9 (hence different from 1) in order to avoid potentially spurious results, 
 
•  models with higher values of Akaike or Schwartz information criterion are rejected, 
 
•  models with p>4 and q>4 are rejected (considering the relatively short size of the sample). 
 
2.2 : Model specification details across countries : The optimal models for the various 
countries differ slightly, as can be seen in the following table
15. 
 
AT ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) DE ARIMA ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) EA  ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 1 )
BE ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) ES ARIMA ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) IT ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 1 )
DK ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) NL ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 1 )
EL ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) PT ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 1 )
FI ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 ) UK ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 )
FR ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 )
IE ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 )
LU ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 )
SE ARIMA ( 0 , 1 , 0 )
Optimal parsimonious stochastic models for TFP
 
 
For most countries of the European Union, the most robust specification is an ARIMA(0,1,0). 
Correlograms generally display autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations that are not 
significant up to the order 10 and it was checked that the ARIMA(1,1,0) or ARIMA(0,1,1) 
specification did not meet significance thresholds. 
 
The only exceptions are Spain and Germany, where the AR(1) is stable and significant. UK, 
Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands, where an MA(1) for TFP in first differences is also stable 
(albeit slightly less stable for the latter country
16). An MA(1) process also seems valid for the 
euro area. 
3 : OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST PERFORMANCE 
 
Forecasts obtained with these models for each country of the EU15 at various horizons can be 
compared to current measured values of TFP up to 2003. The forecast error is compared in a 
second step to the forecast error of the deterministic trend model previously used for the 
medium-term TFP projections in order to check whether there is a gain in forecast accuracy 
with the new model. Even if the final impact on the HP-filtered series would be relatively 
minor (because of the filtering), it is safe to assume that a potential gain in forecast accuracy 
                                                 
15 With TFP series based on hours worked (corrected for differences in working time per employee across countries), the model specification 
is different only for the UK and IT. In the latter case, the optimal model was a more parsimonious ARIMA(0,1,0) for both countries. 
16 For the Netherlands, the MA(1) term is only significant at a level of 90% over 1989-2003 but the coefficient remains relatively stable over 
the shorter sample. 
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3.1 : The out-of-sample experiment design : A major difficulty in the handling of out-of-
sample tests on fitted models is to make sure that the sample used to fit the model does not 
overlap with the experiment out-of-sample observations. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that 
the out-of-sample statistics are not affected by a model selection (or fitting) bias.  
 
The previous (deterministic) model used was specified with data from 1976 to 2001, while the 
stochastic models suggested in this section were specified with data from 1976 to 2003. The 
best reference observations for the out-of-sample experiment seem to be 2001, 2002 and 2003 
: the overlap with stochastic models is not a major concern as their very parsimonious 
specifications are unlikely to cause a data “snooping”
18 bias. Three years (observations) are as 
such not sufficient to compute decent forecast accuracy statistics. However, it is possible to 
take advantage of the panel structure of the data and compute compared forecast accuracy 
statistics across countries (and not across time) for each year. These statistics are computed 
separately for various forecast horizons (1 to 5 years). For each sample ending in year Y, five 
forecasts are thus computed for Y+1 to Y+5 and for each country and the forecasts kept for 
the experiment only relate to 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
 
Another methodological problem lies in the fact that the decision rule for the stochastic 
models specification is the same but the individual models are formally not always the same. 
An answer to this is to test the forecast accuracy of the deterministic trend model against 
those of the same stochastic ARIMA(0,1,0) model for each country. 
 
3.2 : Statistics for compared forecast accuracy : The statistics of model comparison are 
squared forecast errors differences across countries for 2001, 2002 and 2003 and the Diebold-
Mariano [1995] (DM) statistics of compared predictive accuracy
19. The DM statistic is, under 
its most simple form : 
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A slightly adapted version of the Diebold-Mariano statistics (DM) can be used for an 
unbiased empirical variance
20 in the case of finite samples : 
                                                 
17 The other option would be to compare filtered estimation to reference trend values for TFP that would be assumed to be the "true" trend 
value. Mid-sample values of HP-filtered series could be good candidates insofar as there is very little revision of mid-sample observations 
with additional observations. However, the experiment would no longer be out-of-sample but in-sample as the reference estimates 
correspond to the observations, which the model was fitted on.  
18 See Pesaran et al. (2004). 
19 This test can be used to directly compare models that are not nested. It seems reasonable to assume that this is not the case here as the 
deterministic trend model includes a time trend and an AR polynomial whereas the stochastic models have no time trend, I(1) and 
sometimes MA(1) representations, except Spain with an AR(1). 
20 The empirical variance is not based on observations across time but mainly across sections (in the panel). Therefore, it was not relevant to 
compute an autocorrelation-consistent estimate using a Bartlett lag window. 
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, where h is the forecast horizon. The tested null 
hypothesis is: models a and b do not exhibit any difference in forecast accuracy, against : 
model a is superior to model b (if  0 < d ) or model b is superior to model a (if  0 > d
                        
).  
 
3.3 : Compared results : deterministic model vs. stochastic model : For each year and each 
country, differences between the squared forecast errors of the deterministic trend model and 
those of the stochastic model were computed (see first table on next page). Shaded
21 areas 
correspond to observations where the errors of the stochastic model were smaller than those 
of the deterministic model. For Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal (at remote forecast 
horizons), the deterministic trend model appears superior in forecast accuracy. For Belgium, 
Austria and the UK, both models are roughly equivalent. And for the other countries 
(Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland -in 2003-, Italy, Luxembourg, Finland and 
Sweden), the stochastic model seems to perform better.  
 
When all countries are stacked together, the difference in forecast accuracy is always in 
favour of the stochastic model. Results are almost identical where the deterministic trend 
model is tested against an ARIMA(0,1,0) for all countries (see second table on next page). 
According to the DM statistics, the stochastic model is superior to the deterministic model at a 
confidence level of 90% for shorter horizons (1 or 2 years). The statistics are more in favour 
of the stochastic model for 2002 and 2003 than for 2001, which might be explained by the 
fact that 2001 remains in-sample for the deterministic trend model. 
 
If Greece and Luxembourg are removed from the 
panel (see table on the right side), the difference in 
forecast errors remains positive (stochastic model 
more accurate), except in three cases where the 
difference is negative and close to zero (2001 for 
1-year forecast horizon), 2002 for 2-year forecast 
horizon and 2003 for 5-year forecast horizon).  
 
According to the Diebold-Mariano test, the 
hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy can still be 
rejected at the 1 or 2  years forecast horizon for 
2003. In the other cases, one should stress that it 
does not provide evidence that both models are 
equivalent, as the non rejection of the null 
hypothesis can be partially accounted for by an 
insufficient power of the test, especially in the case 
of remote forecast horizons
22.  
                           
21 Shaded P-values correspond to the rejection of the null hypothesis at a confidence level of 90%. 
22 A large penalty is imposed for more remote forecast horizons with small samples in Harvey (1997). 
Year h mean std T-stat P-value
2001 1 0.00% 0.02% 0.12  -     45%
2 0.02% 0.08% 0.86       20%
3 0.02% 0.12% 0.58       29%
4 0.04% 0.20% 0.55       29%
5 0.08% 0.20% 0.98       17%
2002 1 0.02% 0.04% 1.51       8%
2 0.00% 0.06% 0.08  -     47%
3 0.03% 0.17% 0.49       32%
4 0.01% 0.20% 0.20       42%
5 0.01% 0.23% 0.10       46%
2003 1 0.02% 0.04% 1.87       4%
2 0.06% 0.11% 1.74       5%
3 0.02% 0.16% 0.39       35%
4 0.04% 0.23% 0.45       33%
5 0.00% 0.21% 0.06  -     48%
Panel excluding EL and LU 
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Year h BE DK DE EL ES FR IR IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK Mean Std T-stat P-value
2001 1 -0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.13% -0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.09% -0.03% -0.02% 0.01% -0.03% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 1.17       13%
2 -0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.79% -0.05% 0.00% -0.03% 0.08% 0.18% 0.00% 0.01% -0.04% 0.28% 0.02% 0.00% 0.08% 0.21% 1.38       10%
3 -0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 1.63% -0.07% 0.02% -0.11% 0.04% 0.31% 0.05% 0.02% -0.07% 0.39% -0.01% -0.01% 0.15% 0.43% 1.14       14%
4 -0.04% 0.13% 0.02% 1.93% -0.03% 0.02% -0.04% -0.08% 0.41% 0.07% 0.00% -0.16% 0.66% -0.01% -0.01% 0.19% 0.52% 1.11       14%
5 0.00% 0.54% -0.02% 1.60% 0.05% 0.04% -0.02% -0.06% 0.28% 0.06% 0.00% -0.15% 0.44% 0.14% -0.01% 0.19% 0.43% 1.25       12%
2002 1 0.04% 0.00% 0.01% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.12% 0.23% -0.01% -0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.03% 0.06% 1.88       4%
2 -0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.54% -0.05% 0.01% 0.01% 0.16% 0.33% -0.11% -0.05% 0.02% -0.04% 0.04% -0.02% 0.06% 0.17% 1.18       13%
3 -0.02% 0.00% 0.07% 1.69% -0.13% 0.01% -0.10% 0.18% 0.54% -0.08% 0.00% -0.10% 0.51% 0.02% 0.00% 0.17% 0.47% 1.21       12%
4 -0.02% 0.02% 0.07% 2.32% -0.13% 0.04% -0.20% 0.05% 0.81% -0.06% 0.00% -0.16% 0.61% -0.01% -0.03% 0.22% 0.64% 1.05       16%
5 -0.07% 0.13% 0.03% 2.47% -0.05% 0.05% -0.13% -0.16% 1.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.31% 0.67% -0.01% -0.02% 0.24% 0.70% 0.97       17%
2003 1 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.12% 0.08% -0.01% -0.01% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% 2.38       2%
2 0.03% 0.00% 0.04% 0.24% -0.01% 0.01% 0.18% 0.33% 0.46% -0.06% -0.03% 0.12% 0.13% 0.01% 0.00% 0.10% 0.15% 2.29       2%
3 -0.05% 0.01% 0.10% 1.20% -0.13% 0.01% 0.40% 0.24% 0.58% -0.25% -0.11% 0.03% 0.01% 0.06% -0.04% 0.14% 0.36% 1.25       12%
4 -0.04% 0.00% 0.13% 2.44% -0.27% 0.02% 0.28% 0.23% 0.92% -0.22% -0.04% -0.19% 0.57% 0.02% -0.01% 0.26% 0.68% 1.15       13%
5 -0.03% 0.01% 0.10% 2.67% -0.22% 0.06% -0.03% 0.03% 1.28% -0.19% -0.03% -0.29% 0.59% -0.02% -0.04% 0.26% 0.77% 0.95       18%
DM stat. Difference in TFP forecast errors: deterministic model vs. optimal stochastic model for each EU15 country
 
Year h BE DK DE EL ES FR IR IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK Mean Std T-stat P-value
2001 1 -0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.13% -0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.09% -0.02% -0.02% -0.01% -0.03% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 1.12       14%
2 -0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.79% -0.05% 0.00% -0.03% 0.07% 0.18% 0.01% 0.01% -0.03% 0.28% 0.02% 0.00% 0.08% 0.21% 1.38       10%
3 -0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 1.63% -0.07% 0.02% -0.11% 0.03% 0.31% 0.06% 0.02% -0.07% 0.39% -0.01% -0.01% 0.15% 0.43% 1.14       14%
4 -0.04% 0.13% 0.01% 1.93% -0.03% 0.02% -0.04% -0.05% 0.41% 0.06% 0.00% -0.10% 0.66% -0.01% -0.01% 0.20% 0.52% 1.15       13%
5 0.00% 0.54% -0.04% 1.60% 0.05% 0.04% -0.02% -0.08% 0.28% 0.05% 0.00% -0.12% 0.44% 0.14% -0.01% 0.19% 0.43% 1.24       12%
2002 1 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.11% 0.23% -0.03% -0.01% -0.01% 0.03% 0.01% -0.01% 0.03% 0.06% 1.59       7%
2 -0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.54% -0.05% 0.01% 0.01% 0.16% 0.33% -0.09% -0.05% -0.02% -0.04% 0.04% -0.01% 0.06% 0.17% 1.18       13%
3 -0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 1.69% -0.13% 0.01% -0.10% 0.17% 0.54% -0.06% 0.00% -0.07% 0.51% 0.02% -0.01% 0.17% 0.47% 1.23       12%
4 -0.02% 0.02% 0.06% 2.32% -0.13% 0.04% -0.20% 0.04% 0.81% -0.02% 0.00% -0.13% 0.61% -0.01% -0.02% 0.22% 0.64% 1.07       15%
5 -0.07% 0.13% 0.02% 2.47% -0.05% 0.05% -0.13% -0.11% 1.01% 0.01% 0.00% -0.18% 0.67% -0.01% -0.02% 0.25% 0.69% 1.03       16%
2003 1 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.09% 0.08% -0.02% -0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 2.09       3%
2 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.24% -0.01% 0.01% 0.18% 0.30% 0.46% -0.10% -0.03% 0.05% 0.13% 0.01% -0.01% 0.09% 0.15% 2.04       3%
3 -0.05% 0.01% 0.10% 1.20% -0.13% 0.01% 0.40% 0.26% 0.58% -0.22% -0.11% -0.02% 0.01% 0.06% -0.02% 0.14% 0.36% 1.27       11%
4 -0.04% 0.00% 0.11% 2.44% -0.27% 0.02% 0.28% 0.22% 0.92% -0.18% -0.04% -0.13% 0.57% 0.02% -0.01% 0.26% 0.67% 1.18       13%
5 -0.03% 0.01% 0.09% 2.67% -0.22% 0.06% -0.03% 0.02% 1.28% -0.12% -0.03% -0.22% 0.59% -0.02% -0.03% 0.27% 0.76% 0.99       17%
Difference in TFP forecast errors: deterministic model vs. ARIMA(0,1,0) model for all EU15 countries DM stat.
 
BE DK DE EL ES FR IR IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK EU15
0.03% 0.15% 0.09% 1.45% 0.19% 0.06% 0.19% 0.24% 0.78% 0.03% 0.02% 0.17% 0.28% 0.08% 0.01% 0.66%
0.05% 0.01% 0.07% 0.54% 0.22% 0.05% 0.16% 0.22% 0.52% 0.09% 0.03% 0.24% 0.04% 0.05% 0.02% 0.29%
Deterministic
Stochastic
Empirical standard deviation of forecast errors (EU15 over 2001-2003)
  
In order to correct for a potential lack of power of the test with small samples, a simple 
solution is to stack the observations for all countries and for the out-of-sample years. Each 
country for each out-of-sample year is considered as providing one realisation for both 
models. Results are indeed more clear-cut when all observations are stacked : the stochastic 
model is always superior in terms of forecast accuracy according to the DM statistics at the 
95% confidence level (see table below)
23. It is also noteworthy that the variance of the 
forecast errors is much lower with the stochastic model (see details per country in third table 
on previous page). 
 
With the full panel, the deterministic trend model is penalised by having very large errors in 
the case of two countries, Greece and Luxembourg. If both countries are removed from the 
panel, the average difference in forecast errors is considerably reduced. As a result, the t-stat 













1 0.024% 0.051% 3.15 0%
2 0.079% 0.176% 2.89 0%
3 0.153% 0.413% 2.35 1%
4 0.222% 0.605% 2.27 1%
5 0.230% 0.637% 2.18 2%
All countries and out-of-sample years stacked
 


















1 0.013% 0.036% 2.22 2%
2 0.026% 0.088% 1.79 4%
3 0.024% 0.149% 0.95 17%
4 0.030% 0.203% 0.85 20%
5 0.027% 0.209% 0.72 24%
All countries (except EL LU) and out-of-sample years stacked
 
 
                                                 
23 The null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy is always rejected. 
  55 
3.4 : What model for what country ? : The out-of-sample experiment showed that for most 
countries except Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal, there is a gain or at least no loss in 
forecast accuracy from switching to a stochastic model. However, for the latter countries, the 
superior out-of-sample performance of the deterministic trend model is closely linked to the 
performance of their economies over the latest years' sample. The choice of a deterministic 
trend specification implicitly relies on the strong assumption that the growth and labour trend 
will stay on the same path in the forthcoming years. A stochastic model does not require any 
such assumption. This is the reason why the latter model was for instance more accurate in the 
case of Ireland in 2003 than the deterministic model, as growth changed momentum. 
 
All in all, neutrality with respect to any assumption for the future and compliance with the 
prescriptions of econometric theory (unit root in the series in levels, parsimony of the 
specification) confirmed by out-of-sample test results (pointing to the overall superiority of 
the stochastic model) provide sufficient reasons to opt for a stochastic model for all countries.  
 
3.5 : Consequences of a stochastic trend specification for potential output and output 
gaps : Moving to a stochastic trend specification for TFP could have implications for trend 
growth. This sub-section explores the consequences of changing the specification for 
individual member states to the ARIMA model identified previously.  
 
One of the initial arguments in favour of moving to a stochastic trend specification has been, 
as mentioned previously, a paper by the CPB (CPB Memorandum 51) which avoids the end 
point bias problem by using an MA process for the growth rate of TFP. Since a moving 
average process reaches a constant long term growth rate in finite time (in fact after 2 years 
given the MA representation), the HP trend can be anchored at this long run trend and 
therefore an end point bias can be avoided. However, empirically we can select MA processes 
only for Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain. Therefore this trick cannot be applied generally. 
We therefore resort to the traditional way of dealing with the end point bias problem by 
projecting the TFP series 3 years beyond the medium term forecast horizon. 
 
The results suggest that the differences between the two specifications in terms of potential 
growth are small but not negligible, at least for some countries. For Belgium, Spain, Italy, 
Greece and Finland, we obtain higher potential growth rates, while for Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden potential growth is slightly reduced. 
No significant changes occur for Denmark, France, Austria and the UK. 
 
Another interesting comparison can be made concerning the HP output gap difference 
between the deterministic and the stochastic trend specification. Since the HP output gap is 
based on a stochastic trend model one would a priori expect that the output gap calculations 
using the stochastic trend model would become more similar. This seems to be the case in 
general. The only exceptions are Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Finland. For all other countries the 
differences between the two gaps have narrowed or stayed the same.   
 
4 : CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis of the TFP series of the EU15 countries showed that all series in levels have a 
unit root and are not stationary. In such a case, coefficient estimates in OLS regressions are 
biased and econometric theory recommends that the series should be differenced prior to any 
regression exercise.  
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As the first difference of the TFP series seemed stationary, the Box and Jenkins methodology 
was applied in order to fit the best ARIMA model to each series. Applying a very strict 
decision rule in terms of the stability and significance of the AR and MA terms, the stochastic 
model chosen for most countries is the most parsimonious one for I(1) series, i.e. 
ARIMA(0,1,0). Based on an out-of-sample experiment over 2001-2003, the forecast accuracy 
of the stochastic model seems superior to that of the deterministic trend model for a majority 
of countries in terms of mean squared forecast errors. However, the hypothesis of equal 
forecast accuracy for all countries put together cannot be formally rejected at a 90% 
confidence level according to the Diebold-Mariano test.  
 
It is suggested that the stochastic model should provide better inputs to the computation of the 
output gap. The generally better forecast accuracy and lower variance in forecast errors is 
likely to enhance, albeit modestly, the calculation of the end-of-sample points with the HP 
filter.  
 
Finally, it should also be noted that the specification of the stochastic model is strictly in line 
with the operating principles established for the production function methodology, namely 
























•  Tables for the EU15 members: pages 57-71, in the following order:  
Belgium (be), Denmark (dk), Germany (de), Greece (el), Spain (es), France (fr), 
Ireland (ie), Italy (it), Luxembourg (lu), Netherlands (nl), Austria (at), Portugal (pt), 
Finland (fi), Sweden (se), United Kingdom (uk) 
 
•  Graphs for the EU15 members: pages 72-79, in the same order 
  
•  Tables for the EU10 members: pages 80-89, in the following order:  
Czech Rep. (cz), Estonia (ee), Cyprus (cy), Latvia (lv), Lithuania (lt), Hungary (hu), 
Malta (mt), Poland (pl), Slovenia (si), Slovakia (sk) 
 
•  Graphs for the EU10 members: pages 90-94, in the same order   
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 0 , 4- 1 , 3- 0 , 31 , 91 , 7- 0 , 8-0,2 -0,5 0,6 1,9 0,5 62,3 7,1 17,4
1982 -0,8 -2,2 0,6 1,8 1,6 -0,7 -0,2 -0,5 0,5 1,8 0,5 62,1 7,5 16,4
1983 -2,3 -3,7 0,3 1,8 1,8 -0,2 0,3 -0,4 0,3 1,7 0,8 61,9 7,6 15,3
1984 -1,7 -2,9 2,5 1,9 1,6 -0,4 0,0 -0,4 0,3 1,7 0,6 61,7 7,9 15,4
1985 -2,0 -2,9 1,7 2,0 1,7 -0,3 0,0 -0,4 0,4 1,6 0,3 61,6 7,9 15,8
1986 -2,2 -2,6 1,8 2,1 1,5 -0,5 -0,1 -0,3 0,4 1,6 0,1 61,5 8,1 16,0
1987 -2,1 -2,0 2,3 2,2 1,7 -0,4 -0,1 -0,3 0,5 1,5 0,0 61,5 8,2 16,5
1988 0,3 0,4 4,7 2,2 2,2 -0,2 0,2 -0,3 0,8 1,5 0,2 61,5 8,2 18,8
1989 1,5 1,4 3,5 2,3 2,5 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 1,1 1,5 0,1 61,6 8,2 20,5
1990 2,4 2,0 3,1 2,3 2,5 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 1,2 1,4 0,0 61,8 8,2 21,7
1991 2,0 1,6 1,8 2,2 2,3 0,0 0,3 -0,3 1,0 1,3 0,0 62,0 8,1 20,3
1992 1,4 0,8 1,5 2,2 2,3 0,1 0,4 -0,3 0,9 1,3 0,1 62,3 8,1 20,1
1993 -1,7 -2,2 -1,0 2,1 2,1 0,1 0,4 -0,3 0,8 1,2 0,2 62,6 8,2 19,2
1994 -0,6 -1,1 3,2 2,1 2,1 0,2 0,4 -0,3 0,7 1,2 0,1 62,9 8,2 18,9
1995 -0,4 -0,9 2,4 2,1 2,1 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,7 1,1 0,0 63,3 8,1 19,1
1996 -1,4 -1,7 1,2 2,2 2,0 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,6 1,1 0,0 63,7 8,0 18,9
1997 -0,3 -0,5 3,3 2,2 2,1 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,7 1,1 0,0 64,1 8,0 19,8
1998 -0,5 -0,6 1,9 2,2 2,0 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,8 1,0 0,0 64,4 8,0 20,1
1999 0,4 0,3 3,1 2,2 2,1 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,8 1,0 0,1 64,8 7,9 20,5
2000 2,1 1,8 3,9 2,1 2,4 0,5 0,6 -0,2 0,8 1,0 0,1 65,1 7,6 20,9
2001 1,0 0,7 1,0 2,1 2,1 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,7 1,0 0,3 65,4 7,6 20,6
2002 0,5 0,3 1,5 2,0 2,0 0,4 0,6 -0,2 0,5 1,1 0,5 65,7 7,6 19,7
2003 -0,6 -0,7 0,9 2,0 1,9 0,3 0,6 -0,2 0,4 1,1 0,4 66,0 7,6 19,2
2004 0 , 0- 0 , 12 , 62 , 02 , 00 , 4 0,6 -0,3 0,5 1,2 0,5 66,2 7,5 19,6
2005 -0,5 -0,8 1,4 2,0 2,1 0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,6 1,2 0,5 66,4 7,4 20,2
2006 -0,5 -0,8 2,1 2,0 2,1 0,2 0,5 -0,3 0,6 1,2 0,4 66,7 7,4 20,5
2007 -0,5 -1,0 2,0 2,0 2,3 0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,6 1,3 0,5 66,9 7,3 20,5
2008 2,0 2,3 0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,7 1,3 0,5 67,2 7,3 20,6
2009 2,1 2,1 0,1 0,4 -0,3 0,7 1,4 0,3 67,4 7,2 20,5
2010 2,1 2,1 0,0 0,3 -0,3 0,7 1,4 0,1 67,7 7,2 20,5
Periods
1981-1985 -1,3 -2,6 0,9 1,9 1,7 -0,5 0,0 -0,4 0,4 1,7 0,5 61,9 7,6 16,0
1986-1990 0,0 -0,2 3,1 2,2 2,1 -0,3 0,1 -0,3 0,8 1,5 0,1 61,6 8,1 18,7
1991-1995 0,1 -0,4 1,6 2,2 2,2 0,1 0,4 -0,3 0,8 1,2 0,1 62,6 8,1 19,5
1996-2000 0,0 -0,2 2,7 2,2 2,1 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,7 1,1 0,1 64,4 7,9 20,0
2001-2005 0,1 -0,1 1,5 2,0 2,0 0,3 0,6 -0,2 0,5 1,1 0,4 66,0 7,5 19,8
2006-2010 2,0 2,2 0,2 0,5 -0,3 0,7 1,3 0,4 67,2 7,3 20,5
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 







































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -3,6 -4,3 -2,1 1,5 1,1 -0,4 0,3 -0,7 0,1 1,4 0,7 82,1 5,4 13,9
1982 -2,4 -3,0 2,7 1,5 1,4 -0,2 0,4 -0,7 0,2 1,4 0,6 82,2 5,5 14,7
1983 -2,3 -2,7 1,7 1,6 1,4 -0,4 0,3 -0,6 0,3 1,5 0,5 82,3 5,7 14,7
1984 -0,5 -0,7 3,5 1,7 1,5 -0,4 0,2 -0,6 0,4 1,5 0,4 82,4 5,8 16,1
1985 1,2 1,0 3,6 1,7 1,7 -0,3 0,2 -0,5 0,6 1,4 0,3 82,4 6,0 18,1
1986 3,5 3,0 4,0 1,7 2,1 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,8 1,4 0,4 82,4 6,0 20,6
1987 1,8 1,0 0,0 1,7 2,0 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,7 1,4 0,5 82,4 6,1 20,1
1988 1,3 0,5 1,2 1,7 1,8 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,6 1,4 0,3 82,3 6,2 19,1
1989 -0,2 -1,1 0,2 1,7 1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,2 0,6 1,4 0,3 82,1 6,3 18,6
1990 -1,0 -1,9 1,0 1,8 1,8 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,5 1,5 0,4 82,0 6,4 17,9
1991 -1,6 -2,4 1,3 1,9 1,8 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,3 1,5 0,4 81,7 6,4 17,0
1992 -1,6 -2,3 2,0 2,0 1,8 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,2 1,6 0,3 81,5 6,4 16,7
1993 -3,7 -4,1 -0,1 2,1 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 1,7 0,3 81,3 6,5 15,8
1994 -0,6 -0,8 5,5 2,3 2,1 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,2 1,7 0,3 81,1 6,3 16,8
1995 0 , 1- 0 , 13 , 12 , 42 , 30 , 3 0,2 0,1 0,4 1,6 0,4 80,9 6,1 18,4
1996 0,5 0,3 2,8 2,4 2,4 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,4 1,6 0,4 80,8 6,0 19,0
1997 1,3 1,1 3,2 2,4 2,4 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,5 1,4 0,2 80,8 5,7 20,4
1998 1,1 0,9 2,2 2,3 2,4 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,6 1,3 0,1 80,8 5,5 21,6
1999 1,4 1,3 2,6 2,3 2,2 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,5 1,2 0,1 80,9 5,3 21,1
2000 2,7 2,6 3,5 2,2 2,2 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,6 1,2 0,1 80,9 5,1 22,2
2001 1,4 1,2 0,7 2,1 2,1 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,5 1,1 0,1 81,0 4,9 21,5
2002 -0,2 -0,3 0,5 2,0 1,9 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,5 1,2 0,1 81,0 4,7 21,2
2003 -1,4 -1,4 0,6 1,9 1,8 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,5 1,2 0,1 81,0 4,6 21,1
2004 -1,3 -1,3 2,1 1,9 1,9 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,5 1,3 0,0 81,0 4,4 21,4
2005 -0,6 -0,6 2,7 1,9 2,1 0,1 0,3 -0,1 0,6 1,3 0,2 81,0 4,2 21,8
2006 -0,2 -0,4 2,3 2,0 2,1 0,1 0,2 -0,2 0,7 1,4 0,2 81,0 4,0 22,2
2007 -0,1 -0,4 2,1 2,0 2,1 0,0 0,3 -0,2 0,7 1,4 0,2 81,0 3,8 22,5
2008 2,0 2,0 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,7 1,5 0,1 81,0 3,7 22,4
2009 2,0 1,9 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 0,7 1,5 -0,1 81,0 3,6 22,3
2010 2,0 1,8 -0,4 -0,1 -0,3 0,7 1,5 -0,1 81,0 3,6 22,3
Periods
1981-1985 -1,5 -1,9 1,9 1,6 1,4 -0,3 0,3 -0,6 0,3 1,4 0,5 82,3 5,7 15,5
1986-1990 1,1 0,3 1,3 1,7 1,9 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,6 1,4 0,4 82,2 6,2 19,3
1991-1995 -1,5 -2,0 2,4 2,1 2,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,2 1,6 0,4 81,3 6,3 16,9
1996-2000 1,4 1,2 2,9 2,3 2,3 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,5 1,4 0,2 80,9 5,5 20,9
2001-2005 -0,4 -0,5 1,3 2,0 2,0 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,5 1,2 0,1 81,0 4,6 21,4
2006-2010 2,0 2,0 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,7 1,4 0,1 81,0 3,7 22,3
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 0 , 5- 0 , 20 , 11 , 92 , 30 , 1 0,8 -0,6 0,8 1,3 1,5 69,0 4,5 22,7
1982 -2,1 -3,0 -0,8 1,9 2,1 0,1 0,7 -0,6 0,7 1,3 1,3 69,2 5,0 21,1
1983 -2,5 -3,5 1,6 2,0 2,0 0,0 0,6 -0,6 0,7 1,4 1,0 69,5 5,5 21,3
1984 -1,8 -2,7 2,8 2,1 2,0 0,0 0,6 -0,6 0,6 1,4 0,6 69,9 5,7 20,8
1985 -1,9 -2,3 2,2 2,3 1,8 -0,4 0,2 -0,6 0,6 1,5 0,2 70,3 6,1 20,4
1986 -1,9 -2,0 2,4 2,4 2,1 -0,2 0,4 -0,6 0,6 1,7 0,1 70,8 6,2 20,6
1987 -3,0 -2,5 1,5 2,6 2,1 -0,3 0,3 -0,6 0,6 1,8 0,1 71,2 6,4 20,6
1988 -2,1 -1,3 3,7 2,8 2,4 -0,1 0,4 -0,6 0,6 1,9 0,3 71,7 6,7 21,0
1989 -1,0 -0,3 3,9 2,9 2,9 0,2 0,8 -0,6 0,7 1,9 0,7 72,1 6,8 21,8
1990 1,7 1,8 5,7 2,9 3,6 0,8 1,3 -0,5 0,8 2,0 1,6 72,5 6,8 22,7
1991 4,0 3,6 5,1 2,8 3,2 0,4 0,9 -0,5 0,8 1,9 0,9 72,8 6,8 23,1
1992 3,6 3,0 2,2 2,6 2,9 0,0 0,5 -0,5 1,0 1,9 0,6 73,1 7,0 23,5
1993 0 , 3- 0 , 4- 0 , 82 , 52 , 5- 0 , 10,4 -0,5 0,8 1,8 0,5 73,3 7,2 21,9
1994 0,6 0,0 2,7 2,3 2,3 -0,2 0,2 -0,5 0,8 1,7 0,1 73,6 7,3 22,4
1995 0,4 -0,3 1,9 2,1 2,3 -0,1 0,4 -0,4 0,8 1,6 0,2 73,8 7,2 21,8
1996 -0,6 -1,2 1,0 2,0 1,9 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,7 1,4 0,2 74,1 7,4 21,3
1997 -0,6 -1,1 1,8 1,8 1,7 -0,3 0,1 -0,4 0,7 1,3 0,1 74,3 7,7 21,2
1998 -0,3 -0,8 2,0 1,7 1,7 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,7 1,2 0,0 74,7 7,8 21,6
1999 0,1 -0,5 2,0 1,6 1,7 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,7 1,2 -0,1 75,0 7,9 22,3
2000 1,8 1,1 3,2 1,5 1,5 -0,3 0,2 -0,4 0,7 1,1 -0,2 75,4 7,9 22,6
2001 1,6 1,1 1,2 1,4 1,3 -0,3 0,1 -0,4 0,6 1,0 -0,1 75,8 8,1 21,5
2002 0,4 0,1 0,1 1,3 1,1 -0,2 0,1 -0,4 0,4 0,9 -0,1 76,1 8,3 20,0
2003 -1,0 -1,1 -0,2 1,2 1,0 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,3 0,9 -0,2 76,5 8,4 19,6
2004 -0,6 -0,6 1,6 1,2 1,1 0,0 0,3 -0,3 0,3 0,9 0,1 76,9 8,5 19,4
2005 -1,0 -0,9 0,8 1,2 1,1 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,3 0,9 0,0 77,2 8,6 19,1
2006 -1,0 -0,8 1,2 1,2 1,1 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,3 0,9 0,0 77,5 8,7 19,2
2007 -0,8 -0,4 1,6 1,3 1,2 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,3 0,9 0,0 77,8 8,8 19,3
2008 1,4 1,2 -0,1 0,1 -0,3 0,3 1,0 -0,1 78,2 8,8 19,5
2009 1,4 1,2 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,3 1,0 -0,2 78,4 8,9 19,5
2010 1,4 1,2 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,3 1,1 -0,2 78,7 8,9 19,5
Periods
1981-1985 -1,5 -2,3 1,2 2,0 2,1 0,0 0,6 -0,6 0,7 1,4 0,9 69,6 5,3 21,3
1986-1990 -1,2 -0,8 3,5 2,7 2,6 0,1 0,7 -0,6 0,7 1,8 0,6 71,6 6,6 21,3
1991-1995 1,8 1,2 2,2 2,5 2,6 0,0 0,5 -0,5 0,8 1,8 0,5 73,3 7,1 22,6
1996-2000 0,1 -0,5 2,0 1,7 1,7 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,7 1,3 0,0 74,7 7,7 21,8
2001-2005 -0,1 -0,3 0,7 1,3 1,1 -0,2 0,2 -0,3 0,4 0,9 -0,1 76,5 8,4 19,9
2006-2010 1,3 1,2 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,3 1,0 -0,1 78,1 8,8 19,4
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 







































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 0,7 0,0 -1,6 1,4 1,7 0,7 1,2 -0,5 1,3 -0,3 1,5 57,3 4,2 22,5
1982 -1,5 -2,2 -1,1 1,1 1,1 0,3 0,8 -0,5 1,2 -0,5 1,1 57,6 4,5 21,4
1983 -3,4 -4,2 -1,1 0,9 1,0 0,4 0,8 -0,5 1,1 -0,5 1,1 57,8 4,8 20,5
1984 -2,2 -3,1 2,0 0,8 0,8 0,4 0,9 -0,5 0,9 -0,5 1,0 58,0 4,8 18,8
1985 -0,5 -1,2 2,5 0,8 0,6 0,0 0,4 -0,4 1,0 -0,4 0,5 58,2 5,0 20,4
1986 -0,8 -1,3 0,5 0,8 0,7 0,0 0,3 -0,4 1,0 -0,3 0,5 58,3 5,1 21,2
1987 -3,8 -4,2 -2,3 0,9 0,7 0,1 0,4 -0,3 0,8 -0,2 0,8 58,3 5,4 17,7
1988 -0,7 -1,0 4,3 1,0 0,9 0,1 0,4 -0,2 0,9 -0,1 0,9 58,3 5,7 19,7
1989 1,9 1,5 3,8 1,1 1,3 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,9 0,1 1,1 58,3 5,9 20,2
1990 0 , 6- 0 , 10 , 01 , 21 , 60 , 5 0,6 -0,1 0,9 0,2 1,1 58,2 6,0 20,2
1991 2,4 1,3 3,1 1,4 1,6 0,4 0,5 -0,1 1,0 0,3 1,2 58,2 6,5 21,3
1992 1,5 0,3 0,7 1,5 1,7 0,5 0,5 -0,1 0,8 0,4 1,3 58,2 6,8 19,7
1993 -1,8 -3,0 -1,6 1,7 1,8 0,4 0,5 -0,1 0,8 0,6 1,1 58,2 7,2 18,5
1994 -1,7 -3,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 0,5 0,5 -0,1 0,7 0,8 1,0 58,3 7,5 17,9
1995 -1,9 -3,1 2,1 2,2 2,2 0,4 0,5 -0,1 0,7 1,1 0,9 58,4 7,9 18,0
1996 -2,1 -3,2 2,4 2,6 2,5 0,4 0,5 -0,1 0,7 1,3 0,9 58,6 8,2 19,1
1997 -1,3 -2,5 3,6 2,9 2,9 0,5 0,6 0,0 0,8 1,6 0,8 58,7 8,4 19,8
1998 -1,1 -2,2 3,4 3,2 3,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,9 1,7 0,7 58,9 8,9 21,3
1999 -1,1 -1,9 3,4 3,4 3,2 0,2 0,2 0,0 1,0 1,9 0,6 59,1 9,4 22,9
2000 -0,3 -1,2 4,5 3,6 3,7 0,6 0,6 0,1 1,1 2,0 0,5 59,4 9,4 23,8
2001 0 , 5- 0 , 24 , 63 , 83 , 50 , 3 0,3 0,1 1,2 2,0 0,3 59,6 9,6 24,6
2002 0,4 0,1 3,8 3,9 3,5 0,3 0,2 0,1 1,2 2,0 0,2 59,8 9,8 25,1
2003 1,1 0,6 4,6 3,9 4,1 0,8 0,7 0,1 1,4 1,9 0,6 60,1 9,7 27,4
2004 1,8 2,0 4,7 3,9 3,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,8 0,0 60,3 10,2 28,0
2005 1,4 2,0 3,5 3,9 3,5 0,6 0,5 0,0 1,3 1,6 0,4 60,6 10,2 27,4
2006 1,0 2,0 3,4 3,8 3,4 0,6 0,5 0,0 1,3 1,5 0,4 60,9 10,2 27,6
2007 0,7 2,2 3,4 3,7 3,2 0,5 0,5 0,0 1,3 1,3 0,4 61,1 10,3 27,9
2008 3,7 3,0 0,4 0,4 0,0 1,4 1,2 0,3 61,3 10,3 28,5
2009 3,6 2,9 0,4 0,4 0,0 1,4 1,1 0,3 61,5 10,3 29,2
2010 3,5 2,7 0,2 0,2 -0,1 1,4 1,1 0,0 61,7 10,3 30,0
Periods
1981-1985 -1,4 -2,1 0,2 1,0 1,0 0,4 0,8 -0,5 1,1 -0,4 1,0 57,8 4,7 20,7
1986-1990 -0,6 -1,0 1,3 1,0 1,0 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,9 -0,1 0,9 58,3 5,6 19,8
1991-1995 -0,3 -1,5 1,3 1,8 1,9 0,4 0,5 -0,1 0,8 0,6 1,1 58,3 7,2 19,1
1996-2000 -1,2 -2,2 3,5 3,1 3,1 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,9 1,7 0,7 59,0 8,9 21,4
2001-2005 1,0 0,9 4,2 3,9 3,6 0,4 0,3 0,1 1,3 1,9 0,3 60,1 9,9 26,5
2006-2010 3,7 3,0 0,4 0,4 0,0 1,4 1,3 0,3 61,3 10,3 28,6
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -2,4 -3,4 -0,1 1,7 1,7 -1,3 -0,6 -0,7 1,0 2,0 1,2 57,9 9,5 18,1
1982 -2,9 -3,8 1,2 1,8 1,7 -1,2 -0,5 -0,7 0,9 2,0 1,1 57,6 10,9 18,0
1983 -3,1 -3,8 1,8 2,0 1,8 -1,0 -0,3 -0,7 0,8 2,0 1,1 57,6 12,2 17,4
1984 -3,5 -3,7 1,8 2,2 1,7 -0,9 -0,2 -0,7 0,6 1,9 1,0 57,6 13,4 16,3
1985 -3,6 -3,4 2,3 2,4 2,0 -0,5 0,1 -0,6 0,7 1,8 0,9 57,8 14,3 17,1
1986 -3,0 -2,7 3,3 2,7 2,5 -0,1 0,4 -0,5 0,9 1,7 0,8 58,1 14,9 18,4
1987 -0,5 -0,1 5,5 2,8 2,8 0,2 0,7 -0,5 1,1 1,5 0,8 58,5 15,3 20,1
1988 1,6 1,8 5,1 2,9 3,2 0,4 0,8 -0,4 1,3 1,3 0,8 59,0 15,6 22,1
1989 3,4 3,1 4,8 3,0 3,5 0,7 1,0 -0,3 1,6 1,2 0,8 59,6 15,7 23,9
1990 4,3 3,5 3,8 2,9 3,4 0,7 1,0 -0,2 1,6 1,0 0,7 60,1 15,9 24,6
1991 4,0 2,8 2,5 2,8 3,3 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,6 0,9 0,8 60,7 16,0 24,3
1992 2,2 0,8 0,9 2,8 2,9 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,3 0,8 0,8 61,3 16,3 22,6
1993 -1,6 -2,5 -1,0 2,7 2,4 0,7 0,9 -0,1 1,0 0,7 0,7 61,9 16,6 20,1
1994 -2,0 -2,6 2,4 2,8 2,5 0,9 1,0 -0,2 1,0 0,6 0,6 62,5 16,6 20,0
1995 -2,1 -2,5 2,8 2,9 2,7 1,0 1,2 -0,2 1,1 0,6 0,5 63,1 16,4 21,0
1996 -2,6 -2,7 2,4 3,0 2,7 1,0 1,3 -0,2 1,1 0,5 0,4 63,8 16,1 21,0
1997 -2,0 -1,8 3,8 3,2 2,8 1,2 1,4 -0,2 1,1 0,5 0,4 64,6 15,6 21,4
1998 -0,9 -0,4 4,5 3,3 3,1 1,3 1,6 -0,3 1,3 0,4 0,4 65,4 14,9 23,1
1999 0,4 0,9 4,7 3,4 3,3 1,5 1,8 -0,4 1,5 0,4 0,5 66,3 14,1 24,7
2000 1,9 2,5 5,1 3,5 3,5 1,6 2,0 -0,4 1,5 0,3 0,9 67,1 13,3 25,5
2001 1,9 2,4 3,5 3,5 3,6 1,8 2,2 -0,4 1,5 0,3 1,2 68,0 12,6 25,7
2002 1,1 1,5 2,7 3,5 3,6 1,9 2,3 -0,4 1,5 0,2 1,6 68,8 11,9 25,6
2003 0,6 0,8 3,0 3,5 3,7 2,0 2,5 -0,5 1,5 0,1 1,8 69,6 11,2 26,1
2004 0,2 0,2 3,1 3,5 3,6 2,0 2,4 -0,4 1,6 0,0 1,8 70,4 10,5 26,4
2005 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,5 3,6 1,9 2,4 -0,4 1,6 0,0 1,7 71,1 9,7 27,1
2006 -0,3 -0,2 3,2 3,6 3,4 1,7 2,2 -0,4 1,7 0,0 1,6 71,8 9,0 27,6
2007 -1,0 -0,5 3,0 3,7 3,3 1,7 2,0 -0,4 1,7 0,0 1,6 72,4 8,3 27,9
2008 3,8 2,2 0,5 0,9 -0,4 1,6 0,1 0,3 72,9 8,0 28,0
2009 3,8 1,9 0,2 0,6 -0,4 1,5 0,2 0,2 73,3 7,9 28,0
2010 3,9 1,7 0,0 0,4 -0,4 1,4 0,2 0,1 73,7 7,8 28,0
Periods
1981-1985 -3,1 -3,6 1,4 2,0 1,8 -1,0 -0,3 -0,7 0,8 2,0 1,1 57,7 12,1 17,4
1986-1990 1,2 1,1 4,5 2,9 3,1 0,4 0,8 -0,4 1,3 1,3 0,8 59,1 15,5 21,8
1991-1995 0,1 -0,8 1,5 2,8 2,7 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,2 0,7 0,7 61,9 16,4 21,6
1996-2000 -0,6 -0,3 4,1 3,3 3,1 1,3 1,6 -0,3 1,3 0,4 0,5 65,4 14,8 23,1
2001-2005 0,8 1,0 3,1 3,5 3,6 1,9 2,4 -0,4 1,6 0,1 1,6 69,6 11,2 26,2
2006-2010 3,8 2,5 0,8 1,2 -0,4 1,6 0,1 0,8 72,8 8,2 27,9
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -0,6 -1,1 1,6 2,4 2,8 -0,3 0,4 -0,7 0,9 2,1 1,4 67,9 6,3 18,7
1982 -0,1 -0,8 2,9 2,4 2,7 -0,2 0,4 -0,6 0,8 2,1 1,4 67,7 6,7 18,0
1983 -0,4 -1,4 2,0 2,3 2,6 -0,1 0,5 -0,6 0,7 2,0 1,3 67,5 6,9 17,2
1984 -1,0 -1,9 1,7 2,3 2,2 -0,5 0,1 -0,5 0,6 2,0 1,1 67,3 7,5 16,8
1985 -1,4 -2,2 1,9 2,3 2,2 -0,3 0,1 -0,5 0,6 1,9 0,8 67,1 7,7 16,8
1986 -1,4 -1,9 2,3 2,3 2,0 -0,5 -0,1 -0,4 0,7 1,8 0,5 66,9 8,1 17,5
1987 -1,5 -2,0 2,1 2,3 2,2 -0,3 0,0 -0,4 0,8 1,7 0,6 66,9 8,4 18,1
1988 0,4 -0,1 4,3 2,3 2,4 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 0,9 1,6 0,6 66,8 8,7 19,3
1989 2,0 1,3 3,8 2,3 2,4 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 1,0 1,5 0,5 66,8 8,9 20,2
1990 2,5 1,6 2,7 2,2 2,4 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 1,0 1,4 0,4 66,9 9,1 20,7
1991 1,6 0,9 1,2 2,1 1,9 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 0,9 1,4 0,2 67,0 9,4 20,0
1992 1,5 1,0 1,9 2,0 1,8 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,8 1,3 0,2 67,1 9,8 19,5
1993 -1,5 -1,7 -1,0 2,0 1,8 -0,3 0,1 -0,3 0,8 1,3 0,2 67,3 10,2 18,0
1994 -1,4 -1,5 2,1 2,0 1,8 -0,2 0,2 -0,3 0,7 1,3 0,2 67,5 10,4 17,9
1995 -1,1 -1,3 2,4 2,1 2,2 0,1 0,5 -0,4 0,8 1,3 0,2 67,8 10,3 17,9
1996 -2,1 -2,0 1,1 2,1 1,8 -0,2 0,3 -0,4 0,7 1,3 0,3 68,1 10,5 17,7
1997 -1,9 -1,7 2,4 2,2 2,0 0,1 0,5 -0,5 0,6 1,3 0,3 68,4 10,5 17,4
1998 -0,7 -0,3 3,6 2,3 2,1 0,0 0,5 -0,5 0,7 1,3 0,3 68,7 10,4 18,3
1999 0,4 0,8 3,3 2,3 2,3 0,0 0,6 -0,5 0,9 1,4 0,3 69,0 10,3 19,3
2000 2,1 2,3 4,1 2,3 2,5 0,2 0,8 -0,6 0,9 1,3 0,4 69,4 10,0 20,2
2001 2,0 1,9 2,1 2,2 2,4 0,2 0,8 -0,6 0,9 1,3 0,4 69,7 9,7 20,2
2002 1,1 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,1 0,0 0,6 -0,5 0,8 1,3 0,5 69,9 9,7 19,5
2003 -0,2 -0,2 0,8 2,1 2,1 0,1 0,6 -0,5 0,8 1,2 0,5 70,2 9,6 19,6
2004 0 , 1- 0 , 22 , 32 , 02 , 30 , 2 0,6 -0,5 0,9 1,2 0,5 70,4 9,4 19,6
2005 -0,3 -0,5 1,5 2,0 1,9 -0,2 0,3 -0,4 0,9 1,2 -0,1 70,6 9,3 19,8
2006 -0,5 -0,9 1,8 2,0 2,2 0,1 0,5 -0,4 0,9 1,2 0,3 70,7 9,1 19,9
2007 -0,2 -1,0 2,3 2,0 2,4 0,3 0,7 -0,4 0,9 1,2 0,5 70,9 8,8 20,1
2008 1,9 2,3 0,2 0,5 -0,4 0,9 1,2 0,4 71,1 8,7 20,1
2009 1,9 2,2 0,0 0,4 -0,4 0,9 1,3 0,3 71,4 8,7 19,9
2010 1,9 2,2 0,0 0,4 -0,4 0,8 1,3 0,2 71,6 8,7 19,8
Periods
1981-1985 -0,7 -1,5 2,0 2,3 2,5 -0,3 0,3 -0,6 0,8 2,0 1,2 67,5 7,0 17,5
1986-1990 0,4 -0,2 3,1 2,3 2,3 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,9 1,6 0,5 66,9 8,6 19,2
1991-1995 -0,2 -0,5 1,3 2,0 1,9 -0,2 0,2 -0,3 0,8 1,3 0,2 67,4 10,0 18,7
1996-2000 -0,4 -0,2 2,9 2,2 2,2 0,0 0,5 -0,5 0,8 1,3 0,3 68,7 10,3 18,6
2001-2005 0,5 0,4 1,6 2,1 2,1 0,1 0,6 -0,5 0,8 1,2 0,4 70,1 9,5 19,7
2006-2010 1,9 2,3 0,1 0,5 -0,4 0,9 1,2 0,3 71,2 8,8 20,0
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 2,8 1,0 3,3 3,3 3,6 -0,4 0,0 -0,4 1,9 2,0 1,4 64,7 10,8 27,1
1982 1,9 0,0 2,3 3,1 3,3 -0,4 -0,1 -0,3 1,7 2,0 1,2 64,4 11,7 25,4
1983 -1,3 -3,1 -0,2 3,0 2,9 -0,4 -0,2 -0,2 1,3 2,0 1,2 64,2 12,7 22,4
1984 -0,1 -1,8 4,3 3,0 3,0 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 1,2 2,1 1,2 63,9 13,7 21,2
1985 -0,1 -1,6 3,1 3,1 2,8 -0,4 -0,3 0,0 1,0 2,2 0,9 63,7 14,5 19,0
1986 -3,0 -4,0 0,3 3,3 2,8 -0,4 -0,4 0,0 0,9 2,4 0,4 63,4 15,0 18,5
1987 -2,0 -2,3 4,7 3,6 2,8 -0,5 -0,5 0,0 0,8 2,6 0,1 63,2 15,4 17,6
1988 -1,7 -1,2 4,3 3,9 3,1 -0,4 -0,3 -0,1 0,7 2,8 0,0 63,0 15,6 16,8
1989 0,1 1,0 6,2 4,3 3,9 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,9 3,1 0,1 62,9 15,5 18,7
1990 2 , 93 , 77 , 64 , 74 , 90 , 50,7 -0,3 1,1 3,3 0,8 62,9 15,2 19,9
1991 - 0 , 20 , 51 , 95 , 15 , 10 , 71,1 -0,3 0,8 3,5 1,4 62,9 15,0 17,7
1992 -2,3 -1,6 3,3 5,6 5,6 1,1 1,5 -0,4 0,8 3,7 1,5 63,1 14,6 16,7
1993 -5,4 -4,5 2,7 6,1 5,8 1,2 1,7 -0,5 0,6 3,9 1,4 63,4 14,0 15,0
1994 -6,1 -5,0 5,8 6,6 6,4 1,5 2,0 -0,6 0,7 4,1 1,4 63,8 13,0 15,8
1995 -3,8 -2,6 9,8 7,1 7,1 1,8 2,4 -0,6 0,9 4,2 1,6 64,3 11,8 16,9
1996 -3,1 -2,0 8,3 7,5 7,6 1,9 2,7 -0,7 1,2 4,3 1,9 64,9 10,7 18,5
1997 0,4 1,2 11,7 7,8 8,2 2,2 3,0 -0,8 1,5 4,3 2,0 65,6 9,4 20,2
1998 1 , 11 , 38 , 57 , 98 , 42 , 23,0 -0,8 1,8 4,2 1,8 66,4 8,0 21,4
1999 3,8 3,6 10,7 7,8 8,3 2,1 2,9 -0,8 2,0 4,0 1,8 67,2 6,8 22,7
2000 5 , 54 , 99 , 27 , 57 , 92 , 12,8 -0,8 1,9 3,7 2,0 68,0 5,7 22,6
2001 4 , 53 , 76 , 27 , 17 , 42 , 02,8 -0,7 1,8 3,4 2,2 68,8 4,8 21,0
2002 4 , 03 , 16 , 16 , 76 , 71 , 82,4 -0,7 1,7 3,1 2,2 69,5 4,3 20,4
2003 2 , 21 , 44 , 46 , 26 , 11 , 52,1 -0,6 1,7 2,8 1,9 70,1 4,0 20,3
2004 0 , 90 , 14 , 55 , 85 , 81 , 31,8 -0,6 1,9 2,6 1,8 70,8 3,8 20,7
2005 -0,1 -1,6 4,4 5,4 6,1 1,6 2,2 -0,5 1,9 2,4 2,4 71,4 3,7 21,1
2006 -0,4 -2,2 4,8 5,1 5,5 1,3 1,7 -0,5 1,9 2,3 1,9 71,9 3,8 20,6
2007 -0,4 -2,6 5,0 4,9 5,3 1,1 1,6 -0,5 1,8 2,3 1,8 72,5 3,9 20,2
2008 4,7 4,7 0,7 1,1 -0,4 1,7 2,3 1,0 73,1 3,9 19,6
2009 4,5 4,5 0,6 1,0 -0,4 1,5 2,3 0,8 73,7 4,0 18,8
2010 4,4 4,4 0,6 1,0 -0,4 1,4 2,4 0,8 74,2 4,0 18,1
Periods
1981-1985 0,6 -1,1 2,6 3,1 3,1 -0,4 -0,2 -0,2 1,4 2,0 1,2 64,2 12,7 23,0
1986-1990 -0,8 -0,6 4,6 4,0 3,5 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 0,9 2,8 0,3 63,1 15,3 18,3
1991-1995 -3,5 -2,6 4,7 6,1 6,0 1,3 1,8 -0,5 0,8 3,9 1,5 63,5 13,7 16,4
1996-2000 1,5 1,8 9,7 7,7 8,1 2,1 2,9 -0,8 1,7 4,1 1,9 66,4 8,1 21,1
2001-2005 2,3 1,3 5,1 6,3 6,4 1,6 2,3 -0,6 1,8 2,9 2,1 70,1 4,1 20,7
2006-2010 4,7 4,9 0,8 1,3 -0,5 1,7 2,3 1,2 73,1 3,9 19,5
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 0,8 1,2 0,8 2,6 2,6 0,0 0,3 -0,3 1,1 1,5 1,0 62,3 8,0 21,4
1982 -1,0 -0,7 0,6 2,5 2,6 0,2 0,5 -0,3 1,0 1,4 1,1 62,3 8,3 20,1
1983 -2,2 -2,3 1,2 2,4 2,8 0,6 0,8 -0,3 0,9 1,4 1,1 62,4 8,2 19,3
1984 -1,8 -2,1 2,8 2,4 2,5 0,3 0,6 -0,2 0,9 1,3 1,0 62,4 8,4 19,5
1985 -1,3 -1,4 3,0 2,4 2,3 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,8 1,3 0,6 62,5 8,6 19,1
1986 -1,1 -1,0 2,5 2,4 2,1 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,8 1,3 0,3 62,7 8,8 19,2
1987 -0,4 -0,1 3,0 2,3 2,1 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,8 1,2 0,4 62,8 9,2 19,6
1988 1,2 1,5 3,9 2,2 2,3 0,1 0,3 -0,1 0,9 1,2 0,3 62,9 9,4 20,4
1989 2,0 2,1 2,9 2,1 2,3 0,1 0,3 -0,1 0,9 1,1 0,3 63,1 9,5 20,8
1990 1,9 1,7 2,0 2,0 2,4 0,3 0,4 -0,1 1,0 1,1 0,3 63,2 9,4 21,1
1991 1,5 0,8 1,4 1,9 2,3 0,3 0,5 -0,1 0,9 1,1 0,5 63,4 9,5 20,9
1992 0 , 5- 0 , 40 , 81 , 82 , 00 , 1 0,3 -0,2 0,8 1,1 0,3 63,5 9,6 20,2
1993 -2,1 -2,3 -0,9 1,7 1,0 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0,5 1,0 -0,1 63,6 10,3 17,8
1994 -1,6 -1,4 2,2 1,7 1,2 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2 0,5 1,0 -0,2 63,8 10,5 17,6
1995 -0,3 0,3 2,9 1,6 1,2 -0,4 -0,2 -0,2 0,6 1,0 -0,1 64,0 11,0 18,4
1996 -0,9 0,0 1,1 1,6 1,4 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 0,6 0,9 -0,1 64,3 11,2 18,8
1997 -0,5 0,6 2,0 1,6 1,5 0,1 0,3 -0,2 0,6 0,8 -0,1 64,7 11,3 18,9
1998 -0,2 0,6 1,8 1,6 1,7 0,4 0,6 -0,2 0,6 0,7 -0,1 65,1 10,9 19,3
1999 -0,1 0,7 1,7 1,5 1,6 0,4 0,6 -0,3 0,7 0,6 -0,1 65,6 10,6 20,0
2000 1,4 1,8 3,0 1,5 1,8 0,6 0,9 -0,3 0,8 0,4 -0,1 66,1 10,1 21,0
2001 1,8 1,8 1,8 1,4 1,8 0,7 1,0 -0,3 0,8 0,3 -0,1 66,6 9,4 21,0
2002 0,9 0,6 0,4 1,3 1,6 0,6 0,9 -0,3 0,7 0,3 -0,1 67,2 8,9 20,9
2003 -0,1 -0,4 0,3 1,2 1,3 0,4 0,7 -0,3 0,6 0,2 -0,1 67,8 8,6 20,3
2004 0 , 0- 0 , 51 , 21 , 21 , 40 , 5 0,8 -0,3 0,6 0,2 -0,1 68,3 8,2 20,4
2005 -1,0 -1,5 0,2 1,1 1,2 0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,6 0,3 -0,2 68,9 7,9 20,0
2006 -0,6 -1,2 1,5 1,1 1,2 0,3 0,5 -0,3 0,6 0,3 -0,2 69,5 7,7 20,3
2007 -0,3 -1,2 1,4 1,1 1,3 0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,6 0,4 -0,1 70,0 7,5 20,5
2008 1,1 1,4 0,3 0,5 -0,3 0,6 0,5 -0,1 70,6 7,4 20,4
2009 1,1 1,4 0,2 0,4 -0,3 0,6 0,6 -0,1 71,1 7,3 20,2
2010 1,1 1,4 0,2 0,4 -0,3 0,5 0,7 -0,1 71,6 7,3 20,1
Periods
1981-1985 -1,1 -1,0 1,7 2,5 2,6 0,3 0,5 -0,3 0,9 1,4 1,0 62,4 8,3 19,9
1986-1990 0,7 0,9 2,9 2,2 2,2 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,9 1,2 0,3 62,9 9,3 20,2
1991-1995 -0,4 -0,6 1,3 1,7 1,6 -0,2 0,0 -0,2 0,7 1,0 0,1 63,7 10,2 19,0
1996-2000 -0,1 0,7 1,9 1,6 1,6 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,7 0,7 -0,1 65,1 10,8 19,6
2001-2005 0,3 0,0 0,8 1,2 1,4 0,5 0,8 -0,3 0,7 0,3 -0,1 67,8 8,6 20,5
2006-2010 1,1 1,3 0,2 0,5 -0,3 0,6 0,5 -0,1 70,6 7,4 20,3
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -3,0 0,0 -0,6 2,6 0,8 2,1 0,9 65,2 #N/A #N/A
1982 -4,8 -5,7 1,1 3,0 0,8 2,4 0,7 65,4 2,1 21,5
1983 -5,3 -5,9 3,0 3,5 3,2 0,1 0,6 -0,5 0,3 2,8 0,7 65,6 2,3 18,3
1984 -3,4 -3,7 6,2 4,1 3,8 0,5 1,0 -0,4 0,1 3,1 0,7 65,9 2,1 17,7
1985 -5,0 -4,3 2,9 4,6 3,6 0,5 0,9 -0,4 -0,2 3,3 0,5 66,5 2,1 15,5
1986 -0,6 0,3 10,0 5,1 5,0 0,8 1,1 -0,3 0,7 3,4 0,7 67,2 2,1 20,2
1987 -2,1 -1,4 4,0 5,5 5,7 1,0 1,3 -0,3 1,1 3,4 0,8 68,1 2,1 22,5
1988 0,4 0,9 8,5 5,7 6,0 1,2 1,4 -0,2 1,4 3,3 0,6 69,2 2,1 23,7
1989 4,1 4,4 9,8 5,9 6,1 1,4 1,6 -0,2 1,4 3,2 0,7 70,4 2,1 23,9
1990 3,6 3,6 5,3 5,8 6,1 1,7 1,9 -0,2 1,4 2,9 1,0 71,9 2,1 23,2
1991 6,5 5,8 8,6 5,7 6,5 1,8 2,0 -0,2 1,9 2,6 0,9 73,4 2,0 25,3
1992 2,7 2,5 1,8 5,6 5,0 1,7 2,0 -0,3 0,9 2,3 0,9 75,0 2,1 20,4
1993 1,6 1,2 4,2 5,4 5,5 1,8 2,1 -0,3 1,6 2,0 0,8 76,8 2,1 23,3
1994 0,1 0,1 3,8 5,3 5,0 1,8 2,0 -0,3 1,4 1,8 0,8 78,6 2,2 22,2
1995 -3,4 -3,2 1,4 5,2 4,8 2,0 2,3 -0,3 1,2 1,6 0,9 80,6 2,1 20,9
1996 -5,2 -4,4 3,3 5,2 4,6 1,9 2,2 -0,3 1,2 1,4 1,0 82,7 2,3 20,7
1997 -2,4 -1,5 8,3 5,2 5,1 2,0 2,3 -0,3 1,7 1,3 1,0 84,9 2,3 22,2
1998 -0,8 0,0 6,9 5,2 5,3 2,0 2,4 -0,3 2,0 1,2 1,0 87,3 2,5 23,6
1999 1,8 1,8 7,8 5,1 5,9 2,2 2,6 -0,4 2,5 1,1 1,2 89,9 2,6 25,5
2000 5,7 5,2 9,0 4,9 5,5 2,4 2,8 -0,4 2,0 1,0 1,6 92,5 2,8 23,3
2001 2,5 1,2 1,5 4,7 5,5 2,4 2,8 -0,4 2,2 0,9 1,5 95,3 3,0 24,3
2002 0 , 4- 1 , 02 , 54 , 54 , 71 , 9 2,3 -0,4 1,8 0,9 1,0 98,1 3,3 23,0
2003 -1,0 -2,2 2,9 4,4 4,2 1,7 2,2 -0,5 1,5 0,9 0,8 101,0 3,7 20,7
2004 -0,7 -1,8 4,5 4,2 4,1 1,6 2,0 -0,5 1,4 1,0 0,8 103,9 4,2 20,5
2005 -0,7 -1,6 4,2 4,1 4,0 1,6 2,0 -0,4 1,3 1,1 0,7 106,8 4,6 20,0
2006 -0,4 -1,3 4,4 4,1 4,1 1,5 1,9 -0,4 1,3 1,2 0,6 109,8 5,1 20,0
2007 0 , 1- 1 , 24 , 54 , 04 , 31 , 5 1,9 -0,4 1,5 1,3 0,6 112,9 5,5 20,6
2008 3,9 5,0 1,8 2,3 -0,4 1,6 1,4 1,0 115,9 5,7 21,3
2009 3,9 5,2 1,9 2,3 -0,4 1,7 1,5 1,0 118,9 5,8 21,6
2010 3,9 5,4 1,9 2,3 -0,4 1,8 1,6 1,1 122,0 5,8 21,8
Periods
1981-1985 -4,3 2,5 3,6 0,4 2,7 0,7 65,7 #N/A
1986-1990 1,1 1,6 7,5 5,6 5,8 1,2 1,5 -0,3 1,2 3,2 0,7 69,3 2,1 22,7
1991-1995 1,5 1,3 4,0 5,4 5,4 1,8 2,1 -0,3 1,4 2,0 0,9 76,9 2,1 22,4
1996-2000 -0,2 0,2 7,1 5,1 5,3 2,1 2,5 -0,4 1,9 1,2 1,1 87,5 2,5 23,1
2001-2005 0,1 -1,1 3,1 4,4 4,5 1,8 2,3 -0,4 1,6 1,0 1,0 101,0 3,8 21,7
2006-2010 4,0 4,8 1,7 2,1 -0,4 1,6 1,4 0,9 115,9 5,6 21,1
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






(annual % change) Contributions to Potential Growth*
 
The participation rate in excess of 100% for Luxembourg is explained by the fact that the method uses the national accounts definition of resident (domestic) employment which includes foreign workers.
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -0,5 -1,4 -0,5 1,6 1,4 -0,6 0,1 -0,7 0,7 1,3 1,3 64,7 6,8 19,2
1982 -3,3 -3,7 -1,3 1,6 1,1 -0,7 0,0 -0,7 0,6 1,3 1,1 64,4 7,4 18,3
1983 -3,3 -3,8 1,8 1,7 1,9 0,0 0,7 -0,7 0,6 1,2 1,1 64,2 7,2 18,5
1984 -2,2 -2,5 3,1 1,9 1,7 -0,1 0,6 -0,7 0,7 1,2 1,2 64,3 7,4 19,2
1985 -1,6 -2,1 2,7 2,1 2,2 0,3 1,0 -0,7 0,7 1,1 1,1 64,5 7,3 20,0
1986 -0,8 -1,3 3,1 2,3 2,3 0,4 1,1 -0,7 0,8 1,1 1,0 65,0 7,3 20,8
1987 -1,4 -1,8 1,9 2,5 2,4 0,5 1,3 -0,7 0,7 1,1 0,9 65,6 7,2 20,5
1988 -1,0 -1,5 3,0 2,6 2,6 0,6 1,4 -0,7 0,8 1,2 0,8 66,3 7,0 21,1
1989 1,0 0,5 4,8 2,7 2,7 0,6 1,4 -0,7 0,8 1,2 0,6 67,1 6,7 21,6
1990 2,2 1,8 4,1 2,8 2,8 0,8 1,5 -0,7 0,8 1,3 0,6 68,0 6,4 21,5
1991 1,9 1,3 2,4 2,8 2,8 0,8 1,5 -0,7 0,7 1,3 0,6 68,9 6,1 21,0
1992 0,5 0,0 1,5 2,8 2,9 0,9 1,5 -0,6 0,7 1,3 0,6 69,8 5,7 20,6
1993 -1,6 -1,9 0,7 2,8 2,6 0,8 1,3 -0,5 0,5 1,3 0,5 70,7 5,6 19,4
1994 -1,6 -1,7 2,9 2,9 2,6 0,8 1,3 -0,5 0,5 1,3 0,4 71,6 5,3 19,3
1995 -1,4 -1,4 3,0 2,9 2,7 0,9 1,2 -0,4 0,6 1,2 0,3 72,5 5,0 19,6
1996 -1,3 -1,1 3,0 2,9 2,7 0,9 1,2 -0,3 0,7 1,1 0,3 73,3 4,7 20,3
1997 -0,3 -0,1 3,8 2,8 2,9 1,0 1,2 -0,2 0,8 1,1 0,4 74,1 4,3 21,0
1998 1,3 1,3 4,3 2,7 2,8 1,0 1,2 -0,2 0,8 1,0 0,4 74,9 4,0 21,3
1999 2,7 2,5 4,0 2,6 2,8 1,0 1,1 -0,1 0,9 0,9 0,5 75,6 3,7 22,3
2000 3,8 3,3 3,5 2,4 2,6 1,0 1,1 -0,1 0,8 0,8 0,6 76,2 3,4 22,0
2001 3,1 2,2 1,4 2,2 2,6 1,0 1,1 -0,1 0,8 0,7 0,7 76,7 3,1 21,5
2002 1,1 0,2 0,1 2,0 2,0 0,7 0,8 -0,1 0,6 0,7 0,6 77,2 3,0 20,1
2003 -0,8 -1,5 -0,1 1,9 1,7 0,5 0,6 -0,1 0,5 0,7 0,4 77,6 3,1 19,1
2004 -0,9 -1,3 1,7 1,8 1,5 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,5 0,7 0,2 78,0 3,2 19,4
2005 -2,2 -2,2 0,5 1,8 1,5 0,2 0,4 -0,1 0,5 0,7 0,2 78,4 3,4 19,4
2006 -2,1 -1,9 2,0 1,9 1,6 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,6 0,8 0,1 78,9 3,5 19,9
2007 -1,7 -1,4 2,4 1,9 1,9 0,4 0,5 -0,2 0,7 0,8 0,1 79,4 3,5 20,8
2008 2,0 2,2 0,6 0,8 -0,2 0,7 0,9 0,4 80,1 3,5 21,1
2009 2,1 2,1 0,5 0,8 -0,3 0,7 0,9 0,3 80,8 3,5 21,0
2010 2,2 2,1 0,5 0,8 -0,3 0,7 0,9 0,2 81,6 3,5 20,6
Periods
1981-1985 -2,2 -2,7 1,1 1,8 1,7 -0,2 0,5 -0,7 0,7 1,2 1,2 64,4 7,2 19,0
1986-1990 0,0 -0,5 3,4 2,6 2,6 0,6 1,3 -0,7 0,8 1,2 0,8 66,4 6,9 21,1
1991-1995 -0,4 -0,7 2,1 2,8 2,7 0,8 1,4 -0,5 0,6 1,3 0,5 70,7 5,5 20,0
1996-2000 1,3 1,2 3,7 2,7 2,8 1,0 1,2 -0,2 0,8 1,0 0,4 74,8 4,0 21,4
2001-2005 0,0 -0,5 0,7 1,9 1,8 0,5 0,6 -0,1 0,6 0,7 0,4 77,6 3,2 19,9
2006-2010 2,0 2,0 0,4 0,7 -0,2 0,7 0,9 0,2 80,2 3,5 20,7
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






(annual % change) Contributions to Potential Growth*
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -0,7 -1,4 -0,1 2,2 2,6 -0,1 0,4 -0,5 1,2 1,4 1,4 77,6 1,8 22,7
1982 -0,9 -1,6 1,9 2,1 2,2 -0,1 0,3 -0,4 0,9 1,4 1,3 77,2 2,1 20,3
1983 0,1 -0,6 3,1 2,1 2,0 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,9 1,3 1,1 76,8 2,3 20,0
1984 -2,0 -2,6 0,0 2,1 2,0 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,8 1,4 1,0 76,4 2,6 19,5
1985 -1,6 -2,0 2,6 2,2 1,9 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 0,9 1,4 0,5 76,2 2,8 20,2
1986 -1,6 -1,7 2,2 2,3 1,9 -0,4 -0,1 -0,3 0,8 1,4 0,3 76,0 2,9 20,2
1987 -2,4 -2,1 1,5 2,4 2,0 -0,4 -0,1 -0,3 0,9 1,5 0,1 76,0 3,1 20,6
1988 -1,5 -0,9 3,5 2,5 2,2 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 1,0 1,6 0,1 76,0 3,2 21,6
1989 -0,6 0,1 3,5 2,6 2,5 -0,1 0,3 -0,4 1,0 1,6 0,4 76,1 3,2 22,0
1990 1,3 1,8 4,6 2,6 2,9 0,2 0,5 -0,4 1,0 1,7 0,7 76,2 3,3 22,5
1991 2,2 2,2 3,6 2,6 3,1 0,3 0,7 -0,4 1,1 1,7 0,9 76,4 3,4 23,6
1992 2,0 1,5 2,4 2,6 3,1 0,3 0,8 -0,5 1,1 1,7 1,0 76,6 3,5 22,9
1993 -0,3 -0,8 0,3 2,6 2,7 0,0 0,5 -0,5 1,0 1,7 0,7 76,8 3,6 22,0
1994 -0,1 -0,6 2,7 2,5 2,5 -0,3 0,3 -0,5 1,1 1,7 0,2 77,0 3,6 22,6
1995 -0,7 -0,9 1,9 2,5 2,2 -0,4 0,1 -0,5 1,0 1,6 0,0 77,2 3,7 21,9
1996 -0,5 -0,5 2,6 2,5 2,2 -0,3 0,2 -0,5 1,0 1,5 0,1 77,5 3,8 22,0
1997 -1,1 -1,0 1,8 2,4 2,3 -0,1 0,3 -0,4 0,9 1,5 0,2 77,7 3,9 21,8
1998 0,0 0,3 3,6 2,4 2,3 0,0 0,3 -0,4 1,0 1,4 0,3 78,0 4,0 22,1
1999 1,0 1,2 3,3 2,3 2,4 0,1 0,5 -0,3 0,9 1,3 0,4 78,2 3,9 22,0
2000 2,2 2,1 3,4 2,2 2,4 0,2 0,5 -0,3 1,0 1,2 0,5 78,4 4,0 22,9
2001 0,9 0,7 0,8 2,1 2,2 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,9 1,1 0,5 78,6 4,0 22,1
2002 -0,2 -0,2 1,0 2,0 1,9 0,2 0,4 -0,1 0,7 1,0 0,5 78,7 4,2 20,6
2003 -0,7 -0,8 1,4 2,0 2,0 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,8 1,0 0,5 78,9 4,3 21,4
2004 -0,2 -0,2 2,4 1,9 1,8 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,8 1,0 0,4 79,0 4,5 21,1
2005 -0,4 -0,7 1,7 1,9 2,2 0,5 0,6 -0,1 0,7 1,0 0,9 79,1 4,7 20,8
2006 -0,3 -1,0 1,9 1,9 2,2 0,5 0,5 -0,1 0,7 1,0 0,8 79,2 4,9 20,8
2007 0 , 0- 0 , 92 , 21 , 82 , 10 , 3 0,4 -0,1 0,7 1,0 0,5 79,4 5,0 21,0
2008 1,8 2,0 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,8 1,1 0,3 79,6 5,1 21,1
2009 1,8 2,1 0,2 0,3 -0,2 0,8 1,1 0,3 79,8 5,1 21,2
2010 1,8 2,1 0,1 0,3 -0,2 0,8 1,2 0,2 80,1 5,2 21,3
Periods
1981-1985 -1,0 -1,6 1,5 2,1 2,1 -0,2 0,2 -0,4 0,9 1,4 1,1 76,8 2,3 20,5
1986-1990 -1,0 -0,6 3,1 2,5 2,3 -0,2 0,1 -0,3 0,9 1,6 0,3 76,1 3,2 21,4
1991-1995 0,6 0,3 2,2 2,6 2,7 0,0 0,5 -0,5 1,0 1,7 0,6 76,8 3,6 22,6
1996-2000 0,3 0,4 2,9 2,4 2,3 0,0 0,4 -0,4 1,0 1,4 0,3 78,0 3,9 22,2
2001-2005 -0,1 -0,2 1,5 2,0 2,0 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,8 1,0 0,6 78,8 4,3 21,2
2006-2010 1,8 2,1 0,2 0,4 -0,1 0,8 1,1 0,4 79,6 5,1 21,1
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 2,2 0,1 1,6 2,8 3,5 -0,5 -0,1 -0,4 2,1 1,8 1,4 78,6 6,5 23,4
1982 1,6 -0,9 2,1 2,7 3,2 -0,5 -0,2 -0,3 2,0 1,7 1,1 77,5 6,5 23,2
1983 -1,3 -3,7 -0,2 2,7 2,8 -0,6 -0,3 -0,3 1,6 1,7 1,0 76,5 6,6 21,0
1984 -5,8 -7,7 -1,9 2,8 2,3 -0,4 -0,2 -0,2 1,0 1,8 0,9 75,6 6,5 16,9
1985 -6,0 -7,2 2,8 3,0 2,3 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 0,8 1,9 0,7 74,8 6,4 16,0
1986 -5,3 -5,7 4,1 3,3 2,5 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0,9 2,0 0,4 74,1 6,3 17,3
1987 -2,6 -2,8 6,4 3,5 3,1 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 1,2 2,0 0,3 73,5 6,1 19,8
1988 1,0 1,0 7,5 3,6 3,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,5 2,0 0,3 73,1 5,8 21,9
1989 3,8 3,9 6,4 3,6 3,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,9 0,2 72,9 5,7 22,0
1990 4,2 4,1 4,0 3,6 3,8 0,4 0,4 0,0 1,5 1,8 0,7 72,7 5,5 22,8
1991 5,1 4,7 4,4 3,4 3,8 0,5 0,6 0,0 1,4 1,7 0,8 72,5 5,3 22,7
1992 2,9 2,4 1,1 3,2 3,4 0,3 0,3 -0,1 1,4 1,6 0,5 72,5 5,1 23,0
1993 -2,2 -2,5 -2,0 3,1 2,9 0,2 0,3 -0,1 1,1 1,5 0,5 72,4 5,1 21,1
1994 -4,2 -4,2 1,0 3,0 2,8 0,2 0,4 -0,2 1,1 1,5 0,5 72,5 5,1 21,1
1995 -3,0 -2,7 4,3 3,0 2,7 0,3 0,5 -0,2 1,0 1,4 0,5 72,6 5,0 21,9
1996 -2,4 -1,8 3,6 3,0 2,6 0,2 0,5 -0,2 1,1 1,3 0,5 72,8 5,0 22,5
1997 -1,2 -0,6 4,2 2,9 2,9 0,2 0,5 -0,3 1,4 1,2 0,5 73,1 5,1 25,0
1998 0,6 1,0 4,7 2,8 3,1 0,4 0,6 -0,3 1,7 1,0 0,5 73,4 5,0 27,1
1999 1,9 1,9 3,9 2,6 2,9 0,3 0,6 -0,3 1,7 0,9 0,5 73,7 5,1 27,9
2000 3,4 3,0 3,8 2,3 2,7 0,3 0,6 -0,3 1,7 0,7 0,5 74,1 5,1 28,2
2001 3,5 2,7 2,0 2,0 2,3 0,4 0,6 -0,2 1,4 0,5 0,5 74,5 5,2 26,7
2002 2,3 1,3 0,5 1,6 1,9 0,4 0,6 -0,2 1,1 0,4 0,6 74,9 5,4 24,9
2003 -0,2 -1,2 -1,2 1,3 1,3 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,7 0,3 0,6 75,2 5,7 22,1
2004 -0,1 -1,3 1,2 1,1 1,3 0,3 0,5 -0,1 0,6 0,3 0,5 75,5 5,9 22,1
2005 -0,6 -2,0 0,4 0,8 1,1 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,5 0,3 0,5 75,8 6,1 21,4
2006 -0,4 -2,4 0,8 0,7 1,2 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,5 0,4 0,6 76,0 6,3 21,2
2007 0 , 2- 2 , 61 , 20 , 51 , 40 , 3 0,4 -0,1 0,5 0,5 0,6 76,2 6,5 21,3
2008 0,4 1,3 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,6 0,7 0,1 76,4 6,7 22,0
2009 0,4 1,5 0,0 0,1 -0,1 0,7 0,8 0,0 76,6 6,7 22,9
2010 0,3 1,6 -0,1 0,0 -0,1 0,8 0,9 -0,1 76,8 6,7 23,5
Periods
1981-1985 -1,9 -3,9 0,9 2,8 2,8 -0,5 -0,2 -0,3 1,5 1,8 1,0 76,6 6,5 20,1
1986-1990 0,2 0,1 5,7 3,5 3,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,3 2,0 0,4 73,3 5,9 20,8
1991-1995 -0,2 -0,4 1,7 3,2 3,1 0,3 0,4 -0,1 1,2 1,6 0,5 72,5 5,1 21,9
1996-2000 0,5 0,7 4,0 2,7 2,8 0,3 0,6 -0,3 1,5 1,0 0,5 73,4 5,1 26,1
2001-2005 1,0 -0,1 0,6 1,4 1,6 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,9 0,4 0,6 75,2 5,7 23,4
2006-2010 0,5 1,4 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,6 0,7 0,2 76,4 6,6 22,2
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 








































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -0,6 -0,3 2,1 3,3 3,2 0,1 0,5 -0,4 1,0 2,1 0,7 76,6 4,6 24,7
1982 -0,5 -0,5 3,2 3,2 3,4 0,3 0,6 -0,4 1,1 2,1 0,8 76,8 4,6 25,1
1983 -0,7 -1,1 2,8 3,0 3,5 0,3 0,7 -0,4 1,1 2,0 0,7 76,8 4,3 25,0
1984 -0,4 -1,2 3,2 2,9 3,3 0,3 0,7 -0,4 0,9 2,0 0,6 76,8 4,0 23,7
1985 0 , 4- 0 , 83 , 42 , 73 , 00 , 0 0,4 -0,3 0,9 2,0 0,4 76,7 3,7 23,6
1986 0,2 -0,8 2,3 2,4 2,4 -0,5 -0,2 -0,3 0,9 2,0 0,1 76,5 3,8 23,3
1987 2,4 1,3 4,3 2,1 2,2 -0,7 -0,4 -0,3 0,9 1,9 0,1 76,2 4,1 23,8
1988 5,3 4,0 4,7 1,8 2,0 -1,0 -0,7 -0,3 1,1 1,9 0,0 75,9 4,7 26,1
1989 8,8 6,8 4,8 1,5 2,0 -1,1 -0,9 -0,2 1,3 1,8 0,0 75,4 5,5 28,8
1990 7,1 4,7 -0,3 1,2 1,7 -1,1 -1,0 -0,2 1,1 1,7 0,3 74,9 6,4 27,0
1991 -0,8 -2,7 -6,4 1,0 0,7 -1,4 -1,3 -0,1 0,5 1,7 0,4 74,3 8,0 21,8
1992 -5,6 -6,7 -3,8 1,1 0,3 -1,5 -1,5 0,0 0,0 1,8 0,4 73,8 9,9 18,2
1993 -7,9 -8,0 -1,2 1,3 0,2 -1,4 -1,4 0,0 -0,3 1,9 0,3 73,3 11,6 15,4
1994 -5,9 -5,4 3,9 1,7 1,1 -0,6 -0,7 0,1 -0,4 2,0 0,2 72,9 12,3 14,7
1995 -4,6 -3,8 3,4 2,1 1,7 -0,3 -0,4 0,1 -0,1 2,1 0,2 72,6 12,6 16,0
1996 -3,3 -2,2 3,8 2,4 2,1 -0,1 -0,2 0,1 0,0 2,2 0,2 72,5 12,9 16,8
1997 -0,1 0,9 6,2 2,8 3,0 0,5 0,4 0,1 0,2 2,3 0,3 72,5 12,6 18,5
1998 1,8 2,4 5,0 3,0 3,4 0,8 0,7 0,0 0,3 2,3 0,4 72,6 12,1 19,4
1999 2,0 2,1 3,4 3,1 3,7 1,0 1,0 0,0 0,4 2,3 0,4 72,8 11,3 19,2
2000 3,8 3,5 5,0 3,2 3,6 0,9 0,9 -0,1 0,4 2,2 0,3 73,1 10,6 19,3
2001 1,6 0,9 1,0 3,2 3,7 1,0 1,1 -0,1 0,5 2,2 0,2 73,4 9,6 19,4
2002 0 , 7- 0 , 22 , 23 , 13 , 30 , 8 0,9 -0,1 0,4 2,1 0,2 73,7 8,9 18,2
2003 0 , 1- 0 , 82 , 43 , 13 , 00 , 7 0,8 -0,1 0,3 2,1 0,1 74,0 8,3 17,4
2004 0 , 6- 0 , 23 , 63 , 13 , 00 , 6 0,7 -0,1 0,4 2,1 0,1 74,2 7,7 17,7
2005 -0,5 -1,2 1,9 3,0 2,9 0,5 0,6 -0,1 0,4 2,0 0,1 74,5 7,2 17,4
2006 -0,1 -0,7 3,5 3,0 2,9 0,4 0,6 -0,1 0,4 2,0 0,1 74,7 6,8 17,5
2007 0 , 1- 0 , 53 , 13 , 02 , 90 , 4 0,5 -0,1 0,5 2,0 0,1 74,9 6,4 17,5
2008 2,9 2,9 0,5 0,6 -0,1 0,4 2,0 0,5 75,1 6,2 16,9
2009 2,9 2,5 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,3 2,0 0,1 75,2 6,1 15,8
2010 2,9 2,2 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,2 2,0 0,1 75,4 6,0 14,7
Periods
1981-1985 -0,4 -0,7 2,9 3,0 3,3 0,2 0,6 -0,4 1,0 2,0 0,6 76,7 4,2 24,4
1986-1990 4,8 3,2 3,2 1,8 2,0 -0,9 -0,6 -0,2 1,1 1,9 0,1 75,8 4,9 25,8
1991-1995 -4,9 -5,3 -0,8 1,4 0,8 -1,0 -1,1 0,0 -0,1 1,9 0,3 73,4 10,9 17,2
1996-2000 0,8 1,3 4,7 2,9 3,1 0,6 0,6 0,0 0,3 2,3 0,3 72,7 11,9 18,6
2001-2005 0,5 -0,3 2,2 3,1 3,2 0,7 0,8 -0,1 0,4 2,1 0,2 74,0 8,3 18,0
2006-2010 2,9 2,7 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,3 2,0 0,2 75,1 6,3 16,5
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -2,0 -2,8 -0,2 1,8 1,8 0,4 0,6 -0,2 0,7 0,7 0,4 81,8 1,0 16,0
1982 -2,5 -3,3 1,2 1,8 1,8 0,4 0,5 -0,1 0,7 0,7 0,3 82,1 1,1 15,8
1983 -2,6 -3,2 1,9 1,9 1,8 0,4 0,3 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,2 82,5 1,2 15,9
1984 -0,4 -1,0 4,3 2,0 2,0 0,5 0,4 0,1 0,7 0,7 0,2 82,8 1,2 16,8
1985 -0,1 -0,8 2,2 2,0 1,9 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,8 0,8 0,0 83,0 1,2 17,6
1986 0,6 0,2 2,8 2,0 1,8 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,8 0,7 0,0 83,1 1,4 17,5
1987 2,1 1,6 3,4 1,9 2,0 0,4 0,1 0,3 0,9 0,7 0,3 83,2 1,6 18,5
1988 2,9 2,2 2,6 1,8 2,0 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,9 0,7 0,4 83,2 1,9 19,3
1989 4,1 2,8 2,7 1,7 2,2 0,3 0,0 0,3 1,1 0,7 0,6 83,0 2,3 21,2
1990 3,5 1,7 1,0 1,5 2,1 0,3 0,0 0,3 1,0 0,8 0,7 82,8 2,8 20,8
1991 1 , 0- 0 , 9- 1 , 11 , 51 , 6- 0 , 1-0,5 0,3 0,8 0,9 0,5 82,5 3,5 18,7
1992 -1,7 -3,2 -1,2 1,5 1,2 -0,4 -0,8 0,4 0,6 1,0 0,3 82,0 4,4 16,4
1993 -5,1 -5,9 -2,0 1,6 0,8 -0,6 -1,0 0,4 0,3 1,2 0,4 81,5 5,6 13,9
1994 -2,9 -3,7 4,2 1,8 1,8 0,0 -0,3 0,3 0,4 1,4 0,5 81,1 6,0 14,6
1995 -0,9 -2,0 4,1 2,0 2,2 0,2 -0,1 0,3 0,5 1,5 0,5 80,6 6,0 15,7
1996 -1,8 -2,6 1,3 2,2 1,9 -0,3 -0,5 0,2 0,5 1,7 0,2 80,2 6,5 16,1
1997 -1,7 -2,2 2,4 2,4 2,1 -0,2 -0,3 0,1 0,4 1,8 0,2 79,8 6,7 15,7
1998 -0,6 -1,2 3,6 2,5 2,6 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,5 1,9 0,3 79,6 6,3 16,5
1999 1,2 0,5 4,6 2,6 2,8 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,6 1,9 0,3 79,3 6,0 17,3
2000 2,8 2,0 4,3 2,7 2,8 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,6 2,0 0,5 79,2 5,7 17,8
2001 1,2 0,2 1,0 2,7 2,8 0,3 0,5 -0,2 0,5 2,0 0,6 79,1 5,4 17,2
2002 0 , 4- 0 , 42 , 02 , 72 , 60 , 3 0,5 -0,2 0,4 1,9 0,6 79,0 5,2 16,3
2003 -0,8 -1,4 1,5 2,7 2,5 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,4 1,9 0,7 78,9 5,2 15,6
2004 0 , 1- 0 , 33 , 62 , 72 , 50 , 2 0,3 -0,2 0,4 1,8 0,6 78,8 5,2 16,1
2005 -0,1 -0,4 2,5 2,7 2,6 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,6 1,7 0,6 78,7 5,1 17,0
2006 0 , 3- 0 , 13 , 02 , 62 , 80 , 5 0,6 -0,1 0,7 1,7 0,6 78,6 4,8 17,5
2007 0,5 0,0 2,8 2,6 2,7 0,4 0,4 -0,1 0,7 1,6 0,6 78,5 4,6 17,9
2008 2,6 2,4 0,2 0,3 -0,1 0,7 1,5 0,4 78,4 4,5 17,7
2009 2,5 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 1,4 0,2 78,3 4,4 17,1
2010 2,5 1,8 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,6 1,4 0,0 78,1 4,4 16,6
Periods
1981-1985 -1,5 -2,2 1,9 1,9 1,9 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,7 0,7 0,2 82,4 1,1 16,4
1986-1990 2,7 1,7 2,5 1,8 2,0 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,9 0,7 0,4 83,1 2,0 19,5
1991-1995 -1,9 -3,2 0,8 1,6 1,5 -0,2 -0,5 0,3 0,5 1,2 0,4 81,5 5,1 15,9
1996-2000 0,0 -0,7 3,3 2,5 2,4 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,5 1,9 0,3 79,6 6,2 16,7
2001-2005 0,2 -0,4 2,1 2,7 2,6 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,5 1,9 0,6 78,9 5,2 16,4
2006-2010 2,6 2,4 0,2 0,2 -0,1 0,6 1,5 0,4 78,4 4,5 17,4
100
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 







































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -3,9 -4,1 -1,4 1,7 1,4 -0,2 -0,2 0,0 0,3 1,3 0,6 73,3 7,6 13,7
1982 -3,8 -4,1 1,9 1,9 1,9 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,3 1,3 0,5 73,4 8,0 14,2
1983 -2,5 -2,8 3,5 2,1 2,2 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,4 1,4 0,8 73,7 8,5 14,6
1984 -2,2 -2,8 2,6 2,3 2,6 0,6 0,6 0,1 0,5 1,4 0,8 74,0 8,8 15,5
1985 -1,2 -1,6 3,6 2,4 2,3 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,5 1,5 0,2 74,3 9,1 15,8
1986 0,2 -0,1 3,9 2,5 2,4 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,5 1,5 0,3 74,6 9,2 15,7
1987 2 , 11 , 84 , 52 , 62 , 60 , 40,5 -0,1 0,6 1,6 0,2 74,9 9,2 16,8
1988 4 , 64 , 05 , 02 , 52 , 80 , 30,5 -0,2 0,9 1,6 0,1 75,2 8,9 18,7
1989 4 , 33 , 32 , 22 , 42 , 80 , 20,4 -0,3 1,0 1,7 0,1 75,5 8,6 19,3
1990 2 , 71 , 30 , 72 , 32 , 60 , 00,4 -0,4 0,9 1,8 0,1 75,6 8,4 18,3
1991 -1,0 -2,0 -1,4 2,3 2,0 -0,5 0,1 -0,5 0,6 1,9 0,0 75,7 8,4 16,5
1992 -2,9 -3,6 0,3 2,3 2,0 -0,5 0,1 -0,6 0,5 2,0 -0,1 75,8 8,2 16,0
1993 -2,9 -3,1 2,4 2,4 1,9 -0,6 0,1 -0,7 0,3 2,2 0,0 75,7 8,1 15,8
1994 -1,1 -1,2 4,4 2,5 2,3 -0,3 0,4 -0,7 0,4 2,2 0,2 75,7 7,6 16,1
1995 -0,8 -0,7 2,9 2,6 2,4 -0,3 0,4 -0,6 0,5 2,2 0,3 75,7 7,4 16,2
1996 -0,8 -0,5 2,7 2,7 2,6 -0,2 0,4 -0,6 0,7 2,1 0,3 75,6 7,1 16,7
1997 -0,4 -0,1 3,2 2,8 2,7 -0,1 0,4 -0,5 0,8 2,0 0,3 75,6 6,7 17,4
1998 0 , 00 , 23 , 22 , 82 , 90 , 00,5 -0,5 1,0 1,9 0,4 75,6 6,3 19,0
1999 0 , 20 , 43 , 02 , 82 , 90 , 10,5 -0,5 0,9 1,8 0,5 75,6 6,1 18,9
2000 1 , 41 , 44 , 02 , 83 , 00 , 30,7 -0,4 0,9 1,8 0,7 75,6 5,7 19,0
2001 0 , 90 , 82 , 22 , 72 , 80 , 30,7 -0,4 0,9 1,7 0,7 75,6 5,4 18,9
2002 0 , 20 , 22 , 02 , 72 , 70 , 20,5 -0,4 0,9 1,6 0,6 75,6 5,1 19,0
2003 0 , 20 , 12 , 52 , 62 , 60 , 20,5 -0,4 0,8 1,6 0,7 75,6 5,0 18,5
2004 0 , 80 , 63 , 22 , 52 , 70 , 20,6 -0,3 0,9 1,5 0,6 75,5 4,7 18,9
2005 0,0 -0,5 1,6 2,5 2,8 0,3 0,7 -0,3 0,9 1,5 0,9 75,5 4,6 18,9
2006 -0,1 -0,9 2,3 2,4 2,7 0,3 0,6 -0,3 0,9 1,5 0,9 75,5 4,6 19,1
2007 0,3 -0,8 2,8 2,3 2,7 0,2 0,5 -0,3 1,0 1,5 0,7 75,5 4,4 19,4
2008 2,3 2,5 0,0 0,3 -0,3 1,0 1,5 0,5 75,5 4,4 19,5
2009 2,2 2,4 -0,1 0,2 -0,3 1,0 1,6 0,3 75,5 4,3 19,6
2010 2,2 2,4 -0,2 0,2 -0,3 1,0 1,6 0,3 75,4 4,3 19,6
Periods
1981-1985 -2,7 -3,1 2,0 2,1 2,1 0,3 0,2 0,0 0,4 1,4 0,6 73,7 8,4 14,8
1986-1990 2,8 2,1 3,3 2,5 2,7 0,2 0,4 -0,2 0,8 1,6 0,1 75,2 8,9 17,8
1991-1995 -1,7 -2,1 1,7 2,4 2,1 -0,4 0,2 -0,6 0,5 2,1 0,1 75,7 7,9 16,1
1996-2000 0,1 0,3 3,2 2,8 2,8 0,0 0,5 -0,5 0,8 1,9 0,4 75,6 6,4 18,2
2001-2005 0,4 0,2 2,3 2,6 2,7 0,2 0,6 -0,4 0,9 1,6 0,7 75,5 5,0 18,8
2006-2010 2,3 2,6 0,0 0,4 -0,3 1,0 1,5 0,5 75,5 4,4 19,5
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 
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Luxembourg: The participation rate in excess of 100% is explained by the use of resident (domestic) employment which includes foreign 
workers. 
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 1,8 5,9 0,5 76,4
1996 4,1 4,2 1,9 2,2 1,0 0,3 76,0
1997 1,4 -1,2 -0,7 1,9 1,8 1,0 0,3 75,5 2,3 31,4
1998 -1,7 -3,8 -1,1 2,0 1,6 -1,1 -1,0 -0,1 1,6 1,1 0,3 75,1 3,6 30,5
1999 -2,6 -4,0 1,2 2,1 1,4 -1,2 -1,0 -0,1 1,4 1,2 0,4 74,7 4,9 29,1
2000 -1,1 -1,9 3,9 2,3 1,6 -1,2 -1,0 -0,2 1,4 1,4 0,4 74,3 6,2 30,0
2001 -1,1 -1,2 2,6 2,6 1,9 -1,1 -0,9 -0,2 1,4 1,6 0,0 74,0 7,1 31,0
2002 -2,4 -2,3 1,5 2,8 2,6 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 1,4 1,8 0,2 73,6 7,4 31,2
2003 -2,2 -2,3 3,2 3,1 3,2 -0,1 0,0 -0,2 1,4 1,9 0,4 73,3 7,4 31,7
2004 -1,2 -1,4 4,4 3,3 3,5 -0,1 0,0 -0,1 1,5 2,1 0,5 73,1 7,5 32,9
2005 0,1 -0,2 4,8 3,5 3,5 -0,3 -0,1 -0,1 1,5 2,2 0,2 72,9 7,6 33,1
2006 0,8 0,6 4,4 3,6 3,6 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 1,5 2,3 0,2 72,7 7,7 33,3
2007 1,3 1,2 4,3 3,7 3,7 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 1,5 2,3 0,2 72,5 7,8 33,8
2008 1,4 0,8 3,3 3,8 3,7 -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 1,6 2,4 -0,1 72,3 7,8 34,6
2009 1,2 0,4 3,2 3,8 3,6 -0,4 -0,4 -0,1 1,6 2,4 -0,3 72,1 7,8 35,2
2010 0,9 0,0 3,1 3,8 3,5 -0,6 -0,5 -0,1 1,6 2,4 -0,6 72,0 7,8 35,6
Periods
1995-2000 0,3 2,2 0,4 75,3 30,2
2001-2005 -1,4 -1,5 3,3 3,1 2,9 -0,4 -0,3 -0,2 1,5 1,9 0,3 73,4 7,4 32,0
2005-2010 0,9 0,5 3,8 3,7 3,6 -0,4 -0,3 -0,1 1,6 2,3 -0,1 72,4 7,8 34,3
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 0 , 9- 6 , 74 , 5 -1,8 74,1 0,0 24,2
1996 -0,8 -7,2 4,4 6,1 4,9 -1,5 -1,7 0,1 3,1 3,3 -1,4 73,7 0,6 25,3
1997 3,9 -0,6 11,1 6,1 3,7 -3,1 -3,3 0,1 3,6 3,3 -1,0 73,3 4,0 29,2
1998 2,2 -0,6 4,4 6,1 4,5 -2,5 -2,7 0,1 3,7 3,3 -0,6 72,8 6,9 31,9
1999 -3,4 -4,1 0,3 6,2 4,0 -1,8 -1,9 0,1 2,5 3,3 -0,2 72,4 8,9 25,9
2000 -2,0 -1,6 7,9 6,3 5,0 -1,0 -1,2 0,1 2,7 3,3 0,0 72,0 10,1 28,1
2001 -2,0 -0,8 6,5 6,4 5,7 -0,6 -0,8 0,1 2,9 3,3 0,0 71,7 10,8 30,1
2002 -1,4 -0,2 7,2 6,6 6,6 -0,1 -0,3 0,2 3,3 3,3 0,0 71,3 10,8 33,1
2003 -1,5 -0,6 6,7 6,7 7,1 0,3 0,2 0,2 3,2 3,3 0,0 71,0 10,1 33,5
2004 -0,6 -0,2 7,8 6,8 7,4 0,7 0,6 0,2 3,1 3,3 0,1 70,7 9,0 33,1
2005 0,8 0,5 8,4 6,9 7,6 1,0 0,8 0,2 3,1 3,4 0,1 70,4 7,6 33,3
2006 1,1 0,1 7,2 6,9 7,7 1,1 0,9 0,2 2,9 3,4 0,1 70,1 6,0 32,9
2007 1 , 6- 0 , 17 , 46 , 87 , 61 , 1 0,9 0,2 2,8 3,4 0,1 69,8 4,3 32,5
2008 1 , 6- 0 , 17 , 16 , 87 , 00 , 2 0,0 0,2 3,3 3,4 -0,4 69,5 3,4 36,0
2009 1,4 0,0 6,9 6,7 6,8 -0,1 -0,3 0,2 3,3 3,4 -0,4 69,1 3,0 37,3
2010 1,0 0,0 6,4 6,6 6,4 -0,3 -0,5 0,2 3,1 3,4 -0,6 68,8 2,8 37,2
Periods
1995-2000 0,1 -3,5 5,4 -0,8 73,1 5,1 27,4
2001-2005 -0,9 -0,3 7,3 6,7 6,9 0,3 0,1 0,2 3,1 3,3 0,0 71,0 9,7 32,6
2005-2010 1,3 0,1 7,2 6,8 7,2 0,5 0,3 0,2 3,1 3,4 -0,2 69,6 4,5 34,9
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 1,2 1,6 9,9 2,3 72,0 4,3 19,1
1996 -0,7 -0,6 1,8 3,7 4,0 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,7 1,4 2,1 71,8 4,5 19,6
1997 -2,0 -1,9 2,3 3,7 3,7 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,4 1,4 2,0 71,7 4,7 18,2
1998 -0,8 -0,9 5,0 3,7 3,8 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,6 1,4 1,9 71,5 4,8 18,9
1999 0,2 0,2 4,8 3,7 3,7 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,4 1,4 1,8 71,3 4,9 18,0
2000 1,5 1,5 5,0 3,7 3,7 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,4 1,4 1,8 71,2 4,8 18,0
2001 1,9 2,0 4,1 3,7 3,6 0,8 1,1 -0,2 1,4 1,4 1,7 71,0 4,7 18,0
2002 0,5 0,3 2,1 3,6 3,9 1,0 1,2 -0,2 1,5 1,4 1,9 70,9 4,7 18,7
2003 -1,1 -0,9 1,9 3,6 3,2 0,4 0,7 -0,2 1,4 1,3 1,2 70,8 4,7 18,2
2004 -0,9 -1,1 3,8 3,5 4,0 1,0 1,2 -0,2 1,6 1,3 2,1 70,7 4,7 19,6
2005 -0,6 -0,7 3,9 3,5 3,5 0,5 0,7 -0,2 1,6 1,3 1,2 70,7 4,7 19,8
2006 0 , 0- 0 , 24 , 03 , 53 , 50 , 5 0,7 -0,2 1,6 1,3 1,2 70,6 4,8 20,0
2007 0,6 0,4 4,2 3,5 3,5 0,5 0,7 -0,1 1,6 1,3 1,2 70,5 4,7 20,3
2008 0,6 0,2 3,9 3,4 4,0 0,9 1,1 -0,1 1,7 1,4 1,8 70,4 4,7 20,9
2009 0,5 0,1 3,8 3,4 4,0 0,8 1,0 -0,1 1,7 1,4 1,6 70,3 4,7 21,2
2010 0,3 0,0 3,8 3,4 4,0 0,8 0,9 -0,1 1,8 1,4 1,5 70,3 4,7 21,7
Periods
1995-2000 -0,1 0,0 4,8 2,0 71,6 4,7 18,6
2001-2005 0,0 -0,1 3,2 3,6 3,6 0,8 1,0 -0,2 1,5 1,3 1,6 70,8 4,7 18,9
2005-2010 0,2 0,0 3,9 3,5 3,7 0,7 0,8 -0,1 1,7 1,3 1,4 70,5 4,7 20,6
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 2,4 -2,9 -0,9 -1,2 71,6 14,4 13,4
1996 0,0 -2,3 3,8 6,3 3,2 -1,1 -1,1 0,0 1,2 3,2 -0,8 71,3 14,9 15,8
1997 1,9 1,2 8,3 6,3 4,5 -0,4 -0,4 0,0 1,7 3,2 -0,5 71,0 14,7 18,3
1998 0,3 -0,6 4,7 6,4 6,7 -0,1 0,0 0,0 3,4 3,2 -0,2 70,8 14,3 27,7
1999 -2,7 -2,7 3,3 6,5 5,4 -0,5 -0,5 0,0 2,7 3,2 -1,1 70,6 13,8 24,5
2000 -2,4 -1,4 6,9 6,6 5,5 -0,6 -0,5 0,0 2,8 3,2 -1,2 70,5 13,3 25,5
2001 -1,3 0,0 8,0 6,8 6,5 0,2 0,2 0,0 2,9 3,3 -0,2 70,4 12,9 26,7
2002 -1,8 -0,5 6,4 6,9 6,9 0,4 0,4 0,0 3,1 3,3 -0,2 70,5 12,3 28,2
2003 -1,6 -0,3 7,2 7,1 7,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 3,2 3,3 -0,6 70,7 11,6 29,3
2004 -0,6 0,1 8,3 7,2 7,9 0,8 0,8 0,0 3,5 3,4 0,0 70,9 10,8 31,8
2005 1,2 0,8 9,1 7,2 8,3 0,9 0,8 0,1 3,8 3,4 -0,1 71,2 10,0 34,2
2006 1,7 0,3 7,7 7,2 8,3 0,9 0,8 0,1 3,7 3,4 -0,1 71,6 9,2 34,8
2007 1 , 7- 0 , 77 , 17 , 18 , 21 , 0 0,8 0,1 3,7 3,4 -0,1 72,0 8,4 35,2
2008 2 , 1- 0 , 58 , 27 , 07 , 90 , 5 0,4 0,1 3,8 3,4 -0,4 72,4 8,0 37,2
2009 1 , 7- 0 , 28 , 16 , 97 , 80 , 3 0,2 0,1 3,9 3,4 -0,6 72,9 7,8 38,9
2010 1,0 0,0 8,0 6,7 7,7 0,2 0,1 0,1 3,8 3,4 -0,7 73,4 7,7 40,0
Periods
1995-2000 -0,1 -1,5 4,3 -0,8 71,0 14,3 20,9
2001-2005 -0,8 0,0 7,8 7,0 7,3 0,5 0,5 0,0 3,3 3,3 -0,2 70,7 11,5 30,1
2005-2010 1,6 0,0 8,0 7,0 8,1 0,6 0,5 0,1 3,8 3,4 -0,3 72,2 8,5 36,7
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 1,3 3,3 -0,8 72,7
1996 0,6 -6,3 4,7 5,4 2,5 2,8 -0,8 72,5 3,7 22,0
1997 2,1 -3,0 7,0 5,4 3,3 -2,7 -2,7 0,0 3,2 2,9 -0,8 72,3 6,7 26,5
1998 3,9 0,0 7,3 5,5 4,1 -2,5 -2,5 0,0 3,7 2,9 -0,7 72,1 9,4 31,1
1999 -3,3 -5,2 -1,7 5,6 3,8 -2,1 -2,1 0,0 2,9 3,0 -0,5 71,8 11,5 28,1
2000 -4,9 -4,9 3,9 5,7 3,6 -1,7 -1,7 0,0 2,2 3,1 -0,4 71,5 13,0 24,7
2001 -3,8 -2,5 7,2 5,9 4,6 -1,1 -1,1 0,0 2,4 3,2 -0,1 71,2 13,9 26,8
2002 -3,2 -1,6 6,8 6,1 5,7 -0,3 -0,2 0,0 2,6 3,3 0,2 70,8 14,0 28,2
2003 0,6 2,1 10,5 6,3 6,5 0,3 0,3 0,0 2,8 3,3 0,1 70,5 13,3 30,2
2004 1,2 2,1 7,0 6,4 7,0 0,6 0,6 0,0 3,0 3,3 0,0 70,1 12,0 31,6
2005 1,8 2,2 7,0 6,4 6,9 0,5 0,5 0,0 3,0 3,2 -0,5 69,8 10,5 32,6
2006 1,7 1,4 6,2 6,3 7,0 0,7 0,7 0,0 3,0 3,1 -0,3 69,4 8,8 32,9
2007 1,3 0,2 5,8 6,2 7,0 0,8 0,8 0,0 3,0 3,1 -0,1 69,1 7,2 33,2
2008 2,1 0,1 6,3 6,1 6,4 0,2 0,2 0,0 3,0 3,0 -0,1 68,8 6,3 34,5
2009 1,5 0,1 6,0 5,9 6,0 -0,2 -0,2 0,0 3,1 3,0 -0,2 68,4 5,9 35,9
2010 0,8 0,0 5,8 5,8 5,8 -0,3 -0,3 0,0 3,1 2,9 -0,2 68,0 5,7 37,0
Periods
1995-2000 0,0 4,1 -0,7 72,2 26,5
2001-2005 -0,7 0,5 7,7 6,2 6,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,8 3,2 -0,1 70,5 12,7 29,9
2005-2010 1,5 0,7 6,2 6,1 6,5 0,3 0,3 0,0 3,0 3,0 -0,2 68,9 7,4 34,4
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 







































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 1,1 2,2 1,5 0,0 57,0 11,2 20,5
1996 -1,6 -0,9 1,3 4,0 4,5 1,2 1,4 -0,2 2,0 1,3 0,0 57,2 9,7 20,9
1997 -1,1 -0,9 4,6 4,1 4,6 1,1 1,3 -0,2 2,1 1,3 0,0 57,5 8,3 21,8
1998 -0,3 -0,7 4,9 4,1 4,6 0,9 1,1 -0,2 2,3 1,3 -0,1 57,8 7,1 23,7
1999 -0,2 -0,8 4,2 4,0 4,3 0,6 0,8 -0,2 2,3 1,3 -0,1 58,2 6,4 24,0
2000 0,9 0,3 5,2 4,0 4,1 0,4 0,6 -0,2 2,3 1,3 0,0 58,5 6,0 24,8
2001 0,8 0,0 3,8 4,0 4,1 0,4 0,7 -0,2 2,3 1,4 0,0 58,8 5,5 25,3
2002 0 , 4- 0 , 63 , 53 , 94 , 10 , 3 0,5 -0,2 2,4 1,4 -0,1 59,1 5,2 26,5
2003 -0,4 -1,3 2,9 3,8 3,8 0,1 0,4 -0,2 2,2 1,4 -0,1 59,5 5,1 26,2
2004 0 , 0- 0 , 94 , 23 , 83 , 70 , 0 0,3 -0,2 2,3 1,4 -0,1 59,8 5,2 27,2
2005 0,0 -0,7 3,7 3,7 3,5 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 2,3 1,3 -0,1 60,2 5,5 28,2
2006 0,3 -0,3 3,9 3,6 3,5 -0,2 0,0 -0,2 2,3 1,3 -0,1 60,5 5,9 29,1
2007 0,6 0,2 3,9 3,6 3,4 -0,2 0,0 -0,2 2,3 1,3 -0,2 60,9 6,3 29,9
2008 0,5 0,1 3,4 3,5 3,4 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 2,2 1,3 -0,3 61,2 6,5 30,3
2009 0,3 0,1 3,4 3,4 3,4 0,0 0,1 -0,2 2,2 1,3 -0,3 61,6 6,6 31,0
2010 0,1 0,0 3,3 3,3 3,3 -0,1 0,0 -0,2 2,2 1,2 -0,4 61,9 6,6 31,7
Periods
1995-2000 -0,2 -0,1 3,6 0,0 57,7 8,1 22,6
2001-2005 0,2 -0,7 3,6 3,8 3,8 0,1 0,4 -0,2 2,3 1,4 -0,1 59,5 5,3 26,7
2005-2010 0,3 -0,1 3,6 3,5 3,4 -0,1 0,0 -0,2 2,2 1,3 -0,2 61,0 6,2 30,0
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 -3,8 -3,0 6,2 60,4 5,1 27,7
1996 -2,7 -2,3 4,0 2,8 3,3 -0,3 -0,1 -0,2 2,8 0,8 0,3 60,3 5,5 24,5
1997 -0,8 -0,7 4,9 2,8 3,1 0,1 0,3 -0,2 2,2 0,8 1,0 60,3 6,0 22,7
1998 0,0 0,0 3,4 2,7 2,7 0,1 0,3 -0,2 1,9 0,7 1,0 60,3 6,5 21,4
1999 1,5 1,5 4,1 2,5 2,5 0,1 0,3 -0,2 1,8 0,5 1,0 60,2 6,8 21,7
2000 5,6 4,3 6,4 2,2 3,6 1,0 1,2 -0,2 2,2 0,3 2,2 60,2 7,2 24,6
2001 3,9 1,8 0,2 1,9 2,7 1,1 1,3 -0,2 1,5 0,0 2,4 60,1 7,4 20,7
2002 3,0 2,1 0,8 1,6 0,4 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0,7 0,0 0,0 60,1 7,6 16,3
2003 -0,2 -1,1 -1,9 1,3 1,3 -0,1 0,0 -0,1 1,4 0,0 0,2 60,0 7,6 20,8
2004 -0,9 -2,0 0,4 1,1 1,3 0,0 0,0 -0,1 1,4 0,0 0,0 60,0 7,5 21,5
2005 -1,1 -3,1 0,8 0,9 2,0 0,4 0,4 0,0 1,6 0,0 0,6 59,9 7,4 23,2
2006 -1,2 -4,3 0,7 0,8 2,0 0,4 0,4 0,0 1,6 0,0 0,6 59,9 7,3 23,8
2007 -0,8 -5,1 1,1 0,7 2,0 0,4 0,5 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,6 59,8 7,1 24,0
2008 -0,7 -3,4 4,2 0,7 2,4 0,9 1,0 0,0 1,4 0,0 1,5 59,8 7,0 23,8
2009 -0,5 -1,7 3,7 0,7 1,9 0,5 0,6 0,0 1,4 0,0 0,9 59,7 7,0 23,9
2010 -0,4 0,0 3,2 0,7 1,4 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,4 0,0 0,2 59,7 7,0 24,4
Periods
1995-2000 0,0 -0,1 4,8 60,3 6,2 23,8
2001-2005 0,9 -0,4 0,1 1,4 1,5 0,2 0,3 -0,1 1,3 0,0 0,6 60,0 7,5 20,5
2005-2010 -0,8 -3,0 2,3 0,8 1,9 0,5 0,5 0,0 1,5 0,0 0,7 59,8 7,1 23,9
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 -3,1 -4,4 7,0 0,6 66,8 8,3 16,7
1996 -1,3 -2,6 6,0 4,1 4,1 -0,3 -0,4 0,1 1,9 2,4 0,6 66,4 8,8 19,2
1997 1,3 -0,5 6,8 4,1 4,5 -0,4 -0,4 0,1 2,4 2,4 0,7 66,0 9,6 22,3
1998 2,0 -0,2 4,8 4,0 4,5 -0,6 -0,7 0,1 2,7 2,4 0,9 65,6 10,8 24,4
1999 2,2 -0,2 4,1 3,9 4,1 -1,0 -1,0 0,1 2,6 2,4 0,9 65,3 12,5 25,0
2000 2,4 0,2 4,0 3,8 3,6 -1,2 -1,3 0,0 2,4 2,4 0,8 64,9 14,3 24,8
2001 -0,2 -1,8 1,0 3,7 3,0 -1,2 -1,2 0,0 1,8 2,4 0,7 64,5 15,9 22,0
2002 -2,3 -2,8 1,4 3,6 2,4 -1,4 -1,4 0,0 1,5 2,3 -0,2 64,0 17,0 20,2
2003 -2,0 -1,6 3,8 3,5 2,6 -1,1 -1,1 0,0 1,3 2,3 -0,1 63,6 17,8 19,6
2004 -0,3 0,4 5,3 3,5 3,2 -0,5 -0,5 0,0 1,4 2,3 0,4 63,1 18,2 19,9
2005 -0,4 0,2 3,4 3,5 3,6 -0,2 -0,2 0,0 1,4 2,3 0,3 62,7 18,1 20,3
2006 0,4 0,4 4,3 3,4 4,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,5 2,3 0,3 62,2 17,6 21,1
2007 1,6 0,6 4,5 3,3 4,3 0,3 0,2 0,0 1,7 2,3 0,3 61,7 16,9 22,4
2008 1,3 0,4 3,9 3,2 4,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 2,2 0,3 61,3 16,6 22,6
2009 0,8 0,2 3,6 3,1 3,8 -0,1 -0,2 0,0 1,7 2,2 0,3 60,8 16,4 22,4
2010 0,3 0,0 3,3 3,0 3,5 -0,3 -0,3 0,0 1,5 2,2 0,1 60,4 16,4 21,7
Periods
1995-2000 0,6 -1,3 5,4 0,8 65,8 10,7 22,0
2001-2005 -1,1 -1,1 3,0 3,5 3,0 -0,9 -0,9 0,0 1,5 2,3 0,2 63,6 17,4 20,4
2005-2010 0,7 0,3 3,8 3,2 3,9 0,0 -0,1 0,0 1,6 2,3 0,3 61,5 17,0 21,8
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 






































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1995 -0,6 4,1 0,2 69,5
1996 -0,9 3,7 4,0 2,2 1,6 0,1 69,3
1997 -0,1 0,1 4,8 4,0 2,5 1,5 0,1 69,2 6,5 24,1
1998 -0,2 0,2 3,9 4,0 3,8 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 2,6 1,5 -0,1 69,1 6,5 25,4
1999 1,2 1,2 5,4 3,9 4,4 -0,1 0,1 -0,2 3,0 1,4 0,3 69,0 6,5 28,8
2000 1,5 1,0 4,1 3,9 4,3 0,2 0,3 -0,2 2,7 1,4 0,5 68,9 6,4 28,1
2001 0 , 3- 0 , 32 , 73 , 83 , 90 , 1 0,3 -0,2 2,4 1,4 0,2 68,9 6,2 27,1
2002 0 , 0- 0 , 53 , 53 , 83 , 70 , 1 0,3 -0,2 2,2 1,3 0,2 68,9 6,0 26,4
2003 -1,0 -1,6 2,7 3,7 3,8 0,3 0,4 -0,2 2,2 1,4 0,4 69,0 5,8 27,2
2004 -0,5 -1,2 4,2 3,7 3,7 0,1 0,3 -0,1 2,2 1,4 0,2 69,0 5,7 27,8
2005 -0,4 -0,9 3,8 3,6 3,5 0,1 0,1 -0,1 2,1 1,4 0,0 69,1 5,6 27,8
2006 0 , 0- 0 , 54 , 03 , 63 , 50 , 1 0,1 -0,1 2,0 1,4 0,1 69,1 5,5 28,1
2007 0,6 0,2 4,2 3,6 3,5 0,1 0,1 0,0 2,0 1,4 0,0 69,2 5,5 28,7
2008 0,6 0,1 3,3 3,5 3,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,9 1,4 -0,1 69,3 5,5 28,7
2009 0,5 0,1 3,3 3,5 3,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,9 1,4 -0,1 69,4 5,5 28,8
2010 0,2 0,0 3,3 3,4 3,4 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,8 1,4 0,1 69,5 5,4 29,0
Periods
1995-2000 0,1 4,3 0,2 69,2 26,6
2001-2005 -0,3 -0,9 3,3 3,7 3,7 0,1 0,3 -0,2 2,2 1,4 0,2 69,0 5,8 27,3
2005-2010 0,3 -0,2 3,7 3,5 3,5 0,1 0,1 0,0 2,0 1,4 0,0 69,3 5,5 28,5
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
Period Averages
Output Gaps (% of 




























































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
-0,7 5,8 1,0 67,6
1,5 0,2 6,1 3,9 3,8 2,0 0,9 67,4 10,1 30,5
2,3 0,7 4,6 3,9 4,1 -1,8 -1,3 -0,5 3,9 2,0 0,9 67,3 12,5 33,7
2,6 0,7 4,2 3,9 4,2 -1,8 -1,3 -0,5 3,9 2,0 0,9 67,1 14,8 35,9
0,2 -0,7 1,5 3,9 2,9 -1,6 -1,2 -0,5 2,4 2,1 0,9 67,0 16,9 28,0
-1,7 -1,2 2,0 4,0 2,6 -1,5 -1,0 -0,4 1,8 2,2 0,6 66,9 18,6 25,4
-2,0 -1,1 3,8 4,1 3,7 -0,8 -0,4 -0,4 2,1 2,3 0,6 66,7 19,4 27,9
-1,7 -1,1 4,6 4,3 4,7 0,2 0,6 -0,4 1,9 2,5 0,8 66,6 19,1 26,5
-1,8 -2,1 4,5 4,6 5,4 1,1 1,4 -0,4 1,7 2,6 0,0 66,5 17,3 24,7
-1,1 -1,5 5,5 4,8 4,9 0,5 0,9 -0,3 1,6 2,7 0,2 66,4 16,2 24,2
-1,0 -1,3 5,1 5,0 4,8 0,2 0,5 -0,3 1,7 2,8 0,2 66,3 15,6 25,0
-0,8 -0,9 5,5 5,2 5,1 0,3 0,5 -0,2 1,8 2,9 0,3 66,3 15,1 25,8
0,2 0,2 6,3 5,3 5,1 0,2 0,5 -0,2 1,8 3,0 0,3 66,2 14,6 25,8
0,8 0,1 5,0 5,4 5,0 0,0 0,3 -0,2 1,9 3,0 0,3 66,1 14,4 26,2
1,2 0,1 5,0 5,5 5,1 -0,1 0,2 -0,2 2,0 3,1 0,3 66,0 14,3 27,1
1,2 0,0 4,9 5,5 4,9 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 2,0 3,1 0,0 65,9 14,2 27,9
0,7 4,1 0,9 67,2 30,7
-1,5 -1,4 4,7 4,6 4,7 0,3 0,6 -0,4 1,8 2,6 0,3 66,5 17,5 25,6
0,3 -0,3 5,3 5,3 5,0 0,1 0,3 -0,2 1,9 3,0 0,2 66,1 14,7 26,3
Determinants of Labour Potential and 
Capital Accumulation
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Output Gaps (% of 
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ANNEX 6 :  TABLES AND GRAPHS FOR EU AGGREGATES  
(EURO AREA, EU15, EU10, EU25)  








































Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 0.5 1.2 66.0 20.8
1982 0.8 2.1 1.2 66.0 19.8
1983 -2.5 1.5 2.1 2.3 -0.1 0.4 -0.6 0.8 1.7 1.1 65.9 7.1 19.3
1984 -2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.7 1.6 0.9 65.9 7.5 18.8
1985 -2.0 2.4 2.3 2.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.7 1.6 0.6 66.0 7.8 18.8
1986 -1.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.7 1.6 0.4 66.1 8.0 19.3
1987 -1.3 2.5 2.5 2.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.7 1.6 0.4 66.3 8.3 19.7
1988 0.4 4.2 2.5 2.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.4 0.8 1.6 0.5 66.5 8.5 20.7
1989 1.6 3.9 2.5 2.7 0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.9 1.6 0.5 66.7 8.6 21.6
1990 2.2 3.6 2.5 2.9 0.3 0.6 -0.4 1.0 1.7 0.7 67.0 8.7 22.2
1991 2 . 72 . 12 . 62 . 42 . 70 . 20.6 -0.3 0.9 1.5 0.6 67.2 8.8 21.9
1992 1 . 91 . 21 . 52 . 42 . 50 . 10.4 -0.3 0.9 1.4 0.5 67.5 9.0 21.4
1993 -1.1 -1.6 -0.8 2.3 2.1 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.7 1.4 0.4 67.7 9.3 19.7
1994 -0.9 -1.2 2.5 2.2 2.1 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.7 1.3 0.2 68.1 9.4 19.7
1995 -0.7 -0.9 2.5 2.2 2.2 0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.7 1.3 0.2 68.4 9.4 19.9
1996 -1.4 -1.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.7 1.2 0.2 68.8 9.5 19.8
1997 -1.0 -0.9 2.6 2.2 2.1 0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.7 1.1 0.2 69.2 9.5 20.0
1998 -0.3 -0.2 3.0 2.2 2.2 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.8 1.1 0.2 69.6 9.4 20.8
1999 0 . 40 . 52 . 92 . 22 . 20 . 40.7 -0.3 0.8 1.0 0.1 70.1 9.2 21.7
2000 2 . 11 . 93 . 82 . 12 . 30 . 50.8 -0.3 0.9 0.9 0.2 70.6 8.9 22.3
2001 1 . 91 . 61 . 92 . 02 . 10 . 50.8 -0.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 71.0 8.7 21.9
2002 0 . 80 . 61 . 01 . 91 . 90 . 40.7 -0.3 0.7 0.8 0.4 71.5 8.6 21.1
2003 -0.4 -0.6 0.8 1.9 1.8 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 71.9 8.5 20.9
2004 -0.2 -0.4 2.1 1.8 1.9 0.5 0.8 -0.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 72.3 8.3 21.0
2005 -0.7 -0.9 1.3 1.8 1.8 0.4 0.6 -0.3 0.7 0.8 0.4 72.7 8.2 21.0
2006 -0.7 -0.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.7 0.8 0.3 73.1 8.1 21.2
2007 -0.5 -0.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 0.5 0.8 -0.3 0.7 0.8 0.4 73.5 7.9 21.5
2008 1.9 0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.7 1.0 0.2 73.9 7.8 21.5
2009 1.8 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.7 1.0 0.1 74.3 7.7 21.5
2010 1.8 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.7 1.1 0.0 74.7 7.7 21.4
Periods
1981-1985 -2.3 1.5 2.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.7 1.6 1.0 66.0 7.5 19.5
1986-1990 0.3 3.3 2.5 0.0 0.4 -0.4 0.8 1.6 0.5 66.5 8.4 20.7
1991-1995 -0.1 1.7 2.3 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.8 1.4 0.4 67.8 9.2 20.5
1996-2000 0.0 2.8 2.2 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.8 1.1 0.2 69.6 9.3 20.9
2001-2005 0.1 1.4 1.9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.7 0.8 0.4 71.9 8.5 21.2
2006-2010 1.9 0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.7 0.9 0.2 73.9 7.9 21.4
(*): obtained using the aggregated NAIRU
(**): obtained by difference between aggregated potential growth and the sum of K and L contribution (as a single economy)
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
1981 -1.2 2.5 2.9 1.2 1.3 -0.1 0.9 0.8 1.2 71.7 6.8 16.5
1982 -5.6 -2.1 2.6 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 1.0 72.2 6.9 14.9
1983 -4.3 4.3 2.8 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 72.6 6.7 15.4
1984 -0.6 7.3 3.3 1.3 1.2 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 73.1 6.4 17.3
1985 0.0 3.8 3.2 1.1 1.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 73.5 6.4 17.7
1986 0.2 3.4 3.3 1.2 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 74.0 6.3 17.4
1987 0.5 3.4 3.1 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.9 1.1 0.8 74.4 6.2 16.8
1988 1.6 4.2 3.0 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 74.8 6.1 16.9
1989 2.3 3.5 2.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.6 75.2 6.0 17.0
1990 1.2 1.7 2.8 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.1 0.8 75.5 6.0 16.4
1991 -1.6 -0.2 2.7 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.0 75.7 5.9 15.2
1992 -1.1 3.3 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.1 75.9 5.9 15.6
1993 -1.4 2.7 3.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 76.1 5.7 16.2
1994 -0.4 4.1 3.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 76.2 5.6 17.0
1995 -1.1 2.5 3.2 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.2 1.3 76.4 5.4 17.5
1996 -0.6 3.7 3.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 76.5 5.3 18.3
1997 0.3 4.5 3.5 1.1 1.1 -0.1 1.1 1.3 1.5 76.6 5.2 19.2
1998 1.0 4.2 3.5 0.9 1.1 -0.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 76.7 5.1 20.3
1999 2.0 4.5 3.5 0.8 1.0 -0.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 76.8 5.1 21.2
2000 2.2 3.7 3.4 0.7 0.9 -0.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 76.9 5.1 21.8
2001 -0.1 0.8 3.1 0.6 0.8 -0.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 76.9 5.1 20.8
2002 -1.3 1.6 2.8 0.5 0.7 -0.2 0.9 1.4 1.2 76.9 5.3 19.4
2003 -1.4 2.7 2.9 0.5 0.8 -0.2 1.0 1.4 1.2 77.0 5.3 19.4
2004 -0.4 4.2 3.1 0.6 0.8 -0.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 77.0 5.2 20.4
2005 0.1 3.5 3.0 0.5 0.6 -0.2 1.2 1.3 0.9 77.0 5.2 21.2
2006 0.2 3.2 3.1 0.5 0.6 -0.1 1.3 1.3 0.9 77.1 5.1 21.7
2007 -0.3 2.7 3.2 0.6 0.7 -0.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 77.2 5.1 21.9
2008 3.1 0.5 0.6 -0.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 77.2 5.1 21.8
2009 3.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.2 1.2 0.8 77.3 5.1 21.7
2010 3.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.2 1.2 0.8 77.4 5.1 21.8
Periods
1981-1985 -2.3 3.2 3.0 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 72.6 6.7 16.3
1986-1990 1.2 3.2 3.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.8 74.8 6.1 16.9
1991-1995 -1.1 2.5 2.9 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.8 1.2 1.2 76.1 5.7 16.3
1996-2000 1.0 4.1 3.5 0.9 1.0 -0.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 76.7 5.2 20.2
2001-2005 -0.6 2.6 3.0 0.5 0.7 -0.2 1.1 1.4 1.1 77.0 5.2 20.2
2006-2010 3.1 0.6 0.6 -0.1 1.2 1.3 0.9 77.2 5.1 21.8
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
* * * * * ** ** *** ** *** ** ** * *
1981 2.1 67.6
1982 2.1 0.7 1.1 67.6
1983 2.1 2.2 0.0 0.5 -0.4 0.7 1.5 1.0 67.6
1984 2.2 2.1 0.0 0.4 -0.4 0.7 1.5 0.9 67.7
1985 2.3 2.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.7 1.5 0.5 67.8
1986 2.4 2.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.7 1.5 0.4 68.0
1987 2.4 2.2 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.8 1.5 0.4 68.2
1988 2.5 2.5 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.8 1.5 0.4 68.4
1989 2.5 2.6 0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.9 1.6 0.5 68.6
1990 2.4 2.9 0.3 0.7 -0.3 0.9 1.6 0.7 68.8
1991 2.1 1.4 2.4 2.6 0.1 0.5 -0.3 0.8 1.6 0.6 69.1 8.5 21.1
1992 1 . 10 . 41 . 32 . 32 . 30 . 00.4 -0.4 0.7 1.6 0.4 69.2 8.7 20.6
1993 -1.5 -2.0 -0.4 2.3 2.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.5 1.6 0.3 69.4 8.9 19.0
1994 -1.0 -1.2 2.8 2.3 2.1 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.6 1.6 0.2 69.7 9.0 19.2
1995 -0.7 -0.9 2.6 2.3 2.2 0.1 0.4 -0.4 0.6 1.5 0.2 69.9 8.9 19.3
1996 -1.3 -1.3 1.7 2.3 2.1 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.6 1.4 0.3 70.2 9.0 19.3
1997 -0.9 -0.8 2.7 2.3 2.2 0.1 0.5 -0.3 0.6 1.4 0.2 70.5 8.9 19.5
1998 -0.2 -0.1 3.0 2.3 2.3 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.3 0.2 70.8 8.7 20.4
1999 0 . 50 . 53 . 02 . 32 . 30 . 30.6 -0.3 0.8 1.3 0.3 71.2 8.5 21.1
2000 2 . 01 . 93 . 82 . 22 . 40 . 40.8 -0.3 0.8 1.2 0.3 71.5 8.2 21.6
2001 1 . 71 . 41 . 92 . 12 . 30 . 40.8 -0.3 0.7 1.1 0.4 71.9 8.0 21.2
2002 0 . 70 . 51 . 12 . 12 . 00 . 40.7 -0.3 0.6 1.0 0.4 72.3 7.9 20.5
2003 -0.3 -0.5 1.1 2.0 1.9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.6 1.0 0.4 72.6 7.8 20.2
2004 0.0 -0.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.6 1.0 0.5 73.0 7.6 20.4
2005 -0.6 -0.8 1.4 1.9 1.9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.7 0.9 0.4 73.3 7.5 20.4
2006 -0.6 -0.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 0.4 0.6 -0.3 0.7 0.9 0.4 73.6 7.3 20.6
2007 -0.4 -0.8 2.2 2.0 2.1 0.4 0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.0 0.5 73.9 7.2 20.9
Periods
1981-1985 2.1 0.0 0.4 -0.4 0.7 1.5 67.7
1986-1990 2.5 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.8 1.5 68.4
1991-1995 0.0 -0.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 0.0 0.4 -0.4 0.7 1.6 0.4 69.5 8.8 19.8
1996-2000 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.3 2.3 0.2 0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.3 0.3 70.8 8.7 20.4
2001-2005 0.3 0.1 1.6 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.6 1.0 0.4 72.6 7.8 20.5
2005-2007 -0.5 -0.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.7 -0.3 0.7 0.9 0.4 73.6 7.3 20.6
*: Source: AMECO
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HP Filter PF method
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
***** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
1995 -0.9 5.5 67.5 22.6
1996 -0.1 4.6 3.7 2.2 0.4 67.2 24.4
1997 0.9 -0.6 4.8 3.7 2.4 0.4 67.0 8.3 26.0
1998 0.8 -0.8 3.8 3.7 3.9 -0.7 -0.7 0.0 2.5 2.1 0.5 66.7 9.3 27.5
1999 0.5 -1.0 3.3 3.7 3.6 -0.9 -0.8 -0.1 2.3 2.2 0.5 66.5 10.6 27.0
2000 1.0 -0.3 4.2 3.7 3.4 -1.0 -0.9 -0.1 2.2 2.2 0.5 66.2 11.9 27.0
2001 -0.3 -1.1 2.4 3.7 3.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.1 1.9 2.2 0.4 66.0 12.8 25.7
2002 -1.6 -1.9 2.4 3.7 3.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 1.7 2.1 0.0 65.7 13.3 25.2
2003 -1.6 -1.6 3.8 3.7 3.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 1.7 2.1 0.0 65.5 13.4 25.2
2004 -0.5 -0.4 5.0 3.8 3.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.7 2.1 0.3 65.2 13.5 25.9
2005 -0.2 -0.2 4.2 3.8 3.8 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.8 2.1 0.2 65.0 13.3 26.2
2006 0 . 40 . 24 . 53 . 84 . 10 . 10.2 0.0 1.8 2.1 0.2 64.7 13.0 26.8
2007 1 . 20 . 54 . 63 . 84 . 30 . 20.2 0.0 1.9 2.2 0.2 64.5 12.5 27.6
Periods
1995-2000 0.4 4.3 0.5 66.8 10.0 25.7
2001-2005 -0.8 -1.0 3.6 3.7 3.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 1.8 2.1 0.2 65.5 13.3 25.6
2005-2007 0.5 0.1 4.4 3.8 4.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.8 2.1 0.2 64.7 12.9 26.9
*: Source: AMECO
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Rate (% of 
Working Age 
Population)
NAIRU       
(% of Labour 
Force)
Investment 
Ratio (% of 
Potential 
Output)
***** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
1995 -0.7 2.7 69.5 20.0
1996 -1.2 1.8 2.3 0.7 0.3 69.7 20.0
1997 -0.8 -0.8 2.7 2.3 0.7 0.3 69.9 8.8 20.4
1998 -0.2 -0.2 3.0 2.3 2.3 0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.8 1.5 0.3 70.1 8.8 21.3
1999 0 . 50 . 43 . 02 . 32 . 40 . 10.4 -0.3 0.8 1.5 0.3 70.4 8.9 21.8
2000 2 . 01 . 83 . 82 . 32 . 40 . 20.5 -0.3 0.8 1.4 0.3 70.6 8.8 22.2
2001 1 . 61 . 31 . 92 . 22 . 30 . 20.5 -0.3 0.7 1.3 0.4 70.9 8.8 21.4
2002 0 . 60 . 41 . 22 . 12 . 10 . 20.5 -0.3 0.7 1.2 0.4 71.2 8.7 20.8
2003 -0.4 -0.6 1.2 2.1 2.0 0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.6 1.1 0.4 71.4 8.7 20.7
2004 -0.1 -0.3 2.4 2.0 2.1 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.1 0.4 71.7 8.5 21.1
2005 -0.6 -0.8 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.0 0.4 71.9 8.4 21.0
2006 -0.6 -0.8 2.1 2.0 2.1 0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.7 1.0 0.4 72.1 8.2 21.5
2007 -0.3 -0.7 2.4 2.0 2.2 0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.8 1.1 0.4 72.3 8.0 21.8
Periods
1995-2000 -0.1 2.8 0.3 70.0 8.8 20.9
2001-2005 0.2 0.0 1.7 2.1 2.1 0.3 0.5 -0.3 0.7 1.2 0.4 71.4 8.6 21.0
2005-2007 -0.5 -0.8 2.0 2.0 2.1 0.3 0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.0 0.4 72.1 8.2 21.4
*: Source: AMECO
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